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1.1 Relevance and Foundations of Financial
Decision Making
People make hundreds of decisions every day. All of these decisions in-
volve instances of uncertainty and risk. Depending on the degree of these
factors, some decisions are associated with greater complexity than others.
Financial decisions certainly belong to the more complex ones, for both, fi-
nancial professionals and even more for private investors. Not only is the
decision complex because of the shear amount of information regarding fi-
nancial products, but also because of the limited experience and financial
literacy of many investors. Confronted with these difficulties, investors need
to make long-lasting financial decisions which strongly impact their future
living standard.
Taking all of this into account, it seems not surprising that there are so
many people who are overwhelmed, disinterested, or have a flawed under-
standing of financial decision making. In particular, it puzzles researchers
why in Germany – one of the most developed and richest economies – only
very few people invest in the stock market. With a rate of barely 15.2% not
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even one out of six people invests directly or indirectly in stocks.1 This low
stock market participation rate is striking because many scientific studies
demonstrate that from a pure rational perspective most people should in-
vest at least a small part of their wealth in stocks (Haliassos and Bertaut,
1995). Thus, many people forgo the so-called market risk premium, i.e. the
difference between the return of a broadly diversified market index and a
risk-free investment. For example, over a long-term investment horizon of
50 years, the average yearly return of the German stock market index DAX
30 was around 7%.2
There are various reasons why stock market participation is so low and a
straightforward answer does not exist. In a recent, large-scale survey people
who are not investing in stocks were asked why they refrain from stock mar-
ket participation. The top three answers were fear of high losses due to eco-
nomic catastrophes (67% of respondents agreed), limited financial resources
(66%), and lack of elementary financial knowledge (65%).3 It is particularly
interesting that the researchers of this survey determine errors in risk and
probability estimation as well as the lack of knowledge about how to reduce
risk as the potential reasons for the above-listed answers. The authors argue
that if risks are systematically overstated, the already high risk aversion of
many people becomes even more severe and consequently keeps them away
from investments in the stock market.
Why should politicians and researchers be concerned about this finding?
The low stock market participation is especially problematic for long-term
financial decisions such as the decision about how to save for retirement. If
1 See report 2019 of the "Deutsche Aktieninstitut" on the stock market participation rate in
Germany. The stock market participation rate subsumes investments in stocks and mutual
funds.
2 See DAX-Rendite Dreieck of the "Deutsche Aktieninstitut", December, 31 2019, the average
yearly return of the DAX from 1969-2019 was 7.3%.
3 See "Zum Rätsel der Aktienmarktteilnahme in Deutschland" (2019), a study by researchers
of the Frankfurt School of Finance & Management and the Goethe-University Frankfurt on
behalf of the Deutsche Börse AG.
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people forgo the market risk premium when they save for retirement, they
will likely have a hard time to secure their living standard after they retire.
On top of this, many pension schemes — not only in Germany – face signifi-
cant demographic challenges. Less and less pension contributors have to pay
for the large generation of pension receivers in the present and near future.
Thus, people cannot rely only on statuary pension insurance, but should in-
stead complement those with private pension schemes. This means, they
have to take precautions themselves. In other words, they need to deal with
financial decisions about how to save for retirement, and thereby cannot cir-
cumvent the confrontation with risk and uncertainty in the stock market.
Adding to this, one might argue that the necessity to deal with financial
decisions in the stock market has increased due to the ongoing low interest
rate environment. In the past, considering a stock market investment might
not have been as necessary as it is today. Saving accounts yielded quite re-
markable nominal risk-free interest rates which were 5% p.a. around the
year 2000.4 However, nowadays, within the low interest rate environment,
classic savings accounts seem to be an unpromising vehicle to save appro-
priately for retirement. At the same time, financial markets offer more and
more products which allow retail investors to participate in the stock mar-
ket at relatively low costs. A good example are so-called index funds which
usually are, and initially only were, intended to replicate a broad equity mar-
ket index. On the one hand, one might argue that the increased variability
of products makes financial decisions more complex because of the overload
of choices. On the other hand, the increased variability can also be under-
stood as a benefit since investors are likely to find a product which fits their
individual preferences more closely.
4 Average yearly interest rate of banks for deposits/savings bonds with maturity of four years
was 5.37% p.a. between 1990 and 2002 taken from the Deutsche Bundesbank Time Series
BBK01.SU0031: Deposit rates of banks/bank savings bonds with regular interest payments,
maturity of 4 years/average interest rate.
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The example of retirement investing intends to show that people have
to deal more with financial decisions which concern direct or indirect stock
market participation. This comes with several aspects about which people
need to think before making an investment decision such as an appropriate
assessment of risk and probabilities in financial markets. However, this is
difficult and may overwhelm potential investors. Instead and as mentioned
above, people may falsely evaluate risk and may over- or understate the like-
lihood of extreme events. Hence, it is and should be an important concern
of politicians and researchers to help people with their financial decisions.
However, to support people in their financial decision making process, it
is in a first step necessary to examine how their actual behavior looks like
relatively to what normative theory advices them to do. The objective of this
thesis is to analyze actual investment and risk-taking behavior of individuals
to identify and better understand potential drivers for the observed behavior,
to compare whether and when they systematically deviate from normatively
optimal decisions, and to potentially derive policy implications on how to
help them.
The question of how individuals make investment decisions under risk
and uncertainty, and in particular, what determines investors’ risk-taking has
been the object of theoretical and empirical research in economics for cen-
turies (Machina, 1987). Economists have developed various models to un-
derstand and predict investment behavior and asset prices in financial mar-
kets. Among the neoclassical models is the fundamental risk-return model
by Markowitz (1952, 1959). It became the foundation for ground-breaking
work in finance such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (Sharpe,
1964; Lintner, 1965) and the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) (Ross, 1976; Roll
and Ross, 1980).
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Given the importance of Markowitz work in the literature and its implica-
tions for the topics investigated throughout this thesis, I will briefly describe
the main intuition of a common risk-return model. The common risk-return
model resembles a fundamental trade-off which investors face in various fi-
nancial decision making problems. An investor’s willingness to pay (WTP)
for a risky asset X can be modeled as a function of the asset’s expected return
R(X) and its risk, usually measured by the variance of the asset’s return dis-
tribution Var(X). In this model, researchers assume investors to minimize the
level of risk for any given level of return. Investors trade-off expected return
against risk. This trade-off can, in its simplest form, be described as follows:
WTP(X) = R(X)− bVar(X), (1.1)
where the parameter b describes an individual’s risk aversion. In this model,
an investor’s willingness to invest in a risky asset depends on three integral
parameters: (i) the expected return R(X) of the investment option, (ii) the risk,
i.e. Var(X), of the investment option, and (iii) the risk attitude (b) of the in-
vestor. While there is still debate how these parameters are defined and mea-
sured (e.g. whether variance is the "true" and only measure of risk, how risk
aversion is measured), researchers agree that risk-taking in the neoclassical
world depends on three parameters: expected return, risk, and risk attitude
(see Sarin and Weber, 1993, Weber et al., 2013).5
RiskTaking = f (ExpectedReturn, Risk, RiskAttitude) (1.2)
5 Further neoclassical parameters of risk-taking are background risk and intertemporal con-
sumption preferences. For the case of a stock market investment, background risks are
health risks, job insecurity, or for example the loss of real estate due to a natural catastro-
phe. Intertemporal consumption preferences describe how a person plans to consume, i.e.
spend money, over time. These preferences can affect the amount of investment and the
investment horizon. For reasons of simplification, we neglect these parameters.
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Based on this model, financial decision-making can be described as a two-
stage process: First, an investor forms beliefs about the expected return and
the risk of an investment option. Second, using the estimates about expected
return and risk (i.e. given his/her beliefs), the investor evaluates based on
his/her risk preferences whether to invest in the risky asset or not. However,
how exactly do investors form beliefs and evaluate risk? In particular, which
assumptions do researchers make about how investors form beliefs about
expected returns and risk? Which assumptions do they make about how
investors evaluate risk?
The Traditional Framework
The "traditional" framework in financial economics builds on simple as-
sumptions about individual psychology: (i) Individuals have rational beliefs.
This means, they update their beliefs promptly and correctly, according
to Bayes’ Theorem, when new information arrives. (ii) Given their beliefs,
individuals make investment decisions according to the Expected Utility
Theory (Bernoulli, 1954; Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947), whereby the
utility function is monotonically increasing, concave, and defined over final
wealth (i.e. consumption outcomes). Many models in financial economics
build on the assumptions of the traditional framework.
Applying the assumptions of the traditional framework to the fundamen-
tal risk-return model implies that the investor forms beliefs about the first
two parameters (expected return and risk) of the risky investment option ac-
cording to Bayes’ Rule. In classic portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952), this
means that the investor estimates the expected return (first moment) and the
volatility (second moment) of the return distribution of the risky asset. Fur-
ther assuming that all investors form beliefs from the same set of information
and by using the same rule, beliefs about one and the same risky asset should
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be independent and identical across all investors who evaluate this asset. In
contrast to that, the third parameter (an individual’s risk aversion) captures
the investor’s personal attitude towards risk and is as such investor-specific.
The Behavioral Framework
By the 1990s, a new framework, the “behavioral finance” framework,
emerged. The behavioral finance framework deviates from the widely-
accepted, rational approach in financial economics by allowing for psycho-
logically more realistic assumptions about how individuals update their
beliefs and how they evaluate risk (see Barberis, 2018). The driving force
of the emergence of behavioral finance was and still is to better understand
empirical facts about the trading behavior and portfolio choice of individ-
uals (e.g. non-participation in financial markets, under-diversification, the
disposition effect, etc.) and asset returns (e.g. the equity premium puzzle,
momentum and long-term reversal of stock returns, excess volatility, etc.)
which “traditional” approaches have problems to explain.
According to Barberis (2018), behavioral finance aims to improve the psy-
chological realism of models in financial economics along three dimensions:
(i) Beliefs can be less than fully rational. (ii) Preferences can be more realistic.
(iii) People suffer from cognitive limits. Inspired by the work in psychology
about “judgment and decision making”, behavioral finance has developed
various models of belief formation (e.g. extrapolative beliefs, overconfidence,
etc.) and preferences (e.g. prospect theory, ambiguity aversion, and other
preference specifications) which prove to be very useful in understanding
investor behavior and asset prices.
Integrating the assumptions of the behavioral finance framework to the
fundamental risk-return model has important implications. If investors up-
date their beliefs about a risky investment in a not-fully rational way, what
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does this imply for their investment decision? In particular, if investors sys-
tematically deviate from Bayes’ Rule, how and in which situations does this
deviation occur? Furthermore, if investors evaluate risk differently from
what the Expected Utility Theory implies, how do their risk preferences actu-
ally look like and which characteristics should models featuring alternative
risk preference specifications incorporate?
Taken together, it is essential to learn more about the underlying drivers
of financial decision making which are (i) how investors form beliefs about
risky assets and (ii) how they evaluate risk (i.e. how their risk preferences
look like). Answers to these fundamental questions will enable researchers
to better understand investment behavior on the individual investor level
as well as trading volume and asset prices in equilibrium on the aggregate
market level.
Most Important Behavioral Concepts Used in the Thesis
Throughout this dissertation thesis, I will build on well-established frame-
works and theories in behavioral finance. Therefore, I will briefly explain
three of these frameworks which are core to the research questions I am ex-
amining in the following chapters.
The first framework is mental accounting. Mental accounting origins from
the psychology literature and describes “the set of cognitive operations used
by individuals and households to organize, evaluate, and keep track of fi-
nancial activities” (Thaler, 1999). A fundamental part of mental accounting
is the categorization and grouping of outcomes to certain mental accounts.
The way in which people assign outcomes to distinct mental accounts af-
fects how they evaluate outcomes and how they make investment decisions.
Categorization is one of the clearest mechanisms of the human thought as
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it improves cognitive efficiency by facilitating the processing of complex in-
formation (Rosch and Lloyd, 1978; Henderson and Peterson, 1992). Given
the complexity of financial decisions, financial decision making presents a
promising field for the application of mental accounting theories. While
mental accounting can reduce the cognitive effort associated with financial
decisions, it can also cause systematic errors. For example, mental accounts
violate the economic principle of fungibility of money (Shefrin and Thaler,
1988; Thaler, 1985, 1999).
Mental accounting does not follow the same clear-cut rules as traditional
accounting does. However, work in psychology has established that in
mental accounting funds or financial outcomes are grouped based on
their sources and uses (Thaler, 1999), a concept which is related to choice
bracketing (Read et al., 1999). Choices or outcomes can be defined broadly
(assigned to one broadly defined mental account) or narrowly (assigned to
many distinct narrowly defined mental accounts). How broadly or narrowly
they are defined often depends on the similarity of their sources and uses
(Heath and Soll, 1996).
The way how outcomes are assigned to mental accounts affects how these
outcomes are evaluated. Outcomes within the same mental account are eval-
uated jointly, while outcomes assigned to different mental accounts are eval-
uated separately. This has implications for investing. Shefrin and Statman
(1987) proposed a model of mental accounting to explain the selling behav-
ior of investors in financial markets. An investor opens a mental account
when making an investment and closes the mental account upon selling the
respective asset. The purchase price is the reference price against which rel-
ative gains and losses are evaluated. In a recent model on realization utility,
Barberis and Xiong (2012) follow this logic. However, they call it an invest-
ment episode instead of a mental account which an investor starts and ends
or opens and closes, respectively.
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The second framework is the Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979). Prospect theory in its original form deviates from the Expected Util-
ity Theory in three main features: (i) It replaces the utility function which is
defined over absolute outcomes (wealth levels) by a value function which is
defined over relative gains and losses, i.e. changes in value from a reference
point. (ii) It maintains the property of “marginal decreasing sensitivity”, but
introduces reference-dependent evaluation. The value function has two dis-
tinct parts: It is concave in the gain domain, implying risk-averse behavior
and convex in the loss domain, implying risk-seeking behavior. (iii) There
is an asymmetry in the slope of the value function that evaluates gains and
losses, with a steeper function for losses. This kink in the value function
incorporates the empirically observed loss aversion (Rabin, 1998). Later, this
framework has been extended by the feature of probability weighting leading
to Cumulative Prospect Theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Probability
weighting incorporates that individuals tend to overweight small probabil-
ities and underweight large probabilities. This feature is implemented in
cumulative prospect theory by transforming objective probabilities into sub-
jective decision weights.
These seemingly more realistic assumptions about how individuals eval-
uate risk have proven to be very helpful in better understanding investor
behavior as well as asset prices. Barberis and Xiong (2009, 2012) and In-
gersoll and Jin (2013) have shown that prospect theory in combination with
realization utility can explain patterns in investor trading behavior such as
the disposition effect (Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Odean, 1998; Weber and
Camerer, 1998).6 Combining prospect theory with mental accounting, Bar-
beris and Huang (2001) as well as Barberis et al. (2001) have pointed out that
6 Realization utility depicts the idea that individuals receive a burst of utility or disutility at
the point in time they realize a gain or loss. This burst of utility depends on the size of the
realized gain or loss. The first formal model of realization utility was developed by Barberis
and Xiong (2012). Ingersoll and Jin (2013) extended the model.
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models incorporating prospect theory preferences can even account for var-
ious time-series and cross-sectional patterns in stock market returns such as
momentum and long-term reversal as well as excess volatility and the value
premium.
The final part of this brief review will be attributed to beliefs and which
biases and heuristics investors engage in when forming them. This litera-
ture, however, is much less neat and organized compared to the literature
on risk preferences in behavioral finance (Barberis, 2018). Multiple biases
and heuristics in belief formation have been identified over the past, includ-
ing the belief in the law of small numbers (Tversky and Kahneman, 1971),
gambler’s fallacy (Alberoni, 1962), conservatism bias (Phillips and Edwards,
1966), base-rate neglect (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973), representativeness
heuristic (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972), and the confirmation bias (Nick-
erson, 1998). With respect to the research questions covered in this thesis,
I will focus the review on two “types of biases” which are prior-biased in-
ference and base-rate neglect. Prior-biased inference subsumes biases which
lead to inference which is biased towards current beliefs (for example the
confirmation bias). Base-rate neglect describes the fact that individuals on
average under-use prior information. Interestingly, these two types of bi-
ases can point in opposite directions. While prior-biased inference implies
that individuals overinfer and update too much if new information confirms
their prior beliefs, base-rate neglect implies that they overinfer and update
too much if new information disconfirms prior information as individuals
tend to neglect prior information (Benjamin, 2019). There are several studies
providing evidence for prior-biased inference and others providing evidence
for base-rate neglect.
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Overview of Chapters
This dissertation thesis contributes to research in finance which investigates
individual investor financial decision making and its underlying drivers.
Drawing from various streams of the finance, psychology, and economics lit-
erature, each chapter of this dissertation thesis focuses on a particular factor
in either investors’ risk preferences or investors’ belief formation that ulti-
mately influences their investment decisions. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 ex-
amine how investors evaluate risk and thus contribute primarily to research on
risk preferences. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 are concerned about how investors
form expectations in financial markets and hence contribute mostly to research
on belief formation.
In the following paragraphs, I will give a very brief overview of the main
research questions covered in each chapter of the dissertation thesis. After-
wards, Section 1.2 provides a more detailed summary which focuses on the
main findings and contributions to the literature.
The first two chapters of this thesis examine how individuals frame and
evaluate investment episodes over time (Chapter 2) and across assets (Chapter
3). Research in the field of mental accounting has advocated that individuals
follow certain, but so far inconclusively explored rules when grouping and
valuing financial outcomes. These rules define so-called investment episodes
which in turn impact the way individuals evaluate risk (see Barberis and
Xiong, 2012). A key question in this framework is, when investors start and
when they end investment episodes. Using a sequential risk-taking design,
Chapter 2 investigates experimentally whether and under which conditions
the framework of realization ends an investment episode and consequently af-
fects risk-taking. The study focuses on whether dynamic risk-taking over
time is differently affected by realized gains and losses versus unrealized
gains and losses.
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In Chapter 3, the findings from Chapter 2 are complemented and the fo-
cus shifts from a single risky asset towards a portfolio of stocks. Instead of
one single asset, Chapter 3 analyzes experimentally how individuals eval-
uate and frame gains and losses (and as such investment episodes) across
many assets in a portfolio. More precisely, it examines whether individu-
als evaluate and frame gains and losses in a portfolio on the overall portfolio
level (i.e. portfolio-level mental accounting) and/or on the individual stock
level (individual stock-level mental accounting) to finally learn more about
their portfolio investment decisions. To do so, a novel counting-based per-
formance measure is defined which is the composition of the number of win-
ner stocks relative to loser stocks in a portfolio. The experimental insights are
applied to financial market data to show that portfolio composition matters
not only for individual investment decisions in an experiment, but also for
the demand of exchange-traded funds on leading equity market indices.
In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, the main focus is on research questions re-
lated to belief formation, selected biases in belief updating, and the impact
of biased beliefs on investment decisions. One general question in financial
economics is why risk-taking varies strongly and systematically with market
cycles: Investors take more risk during boom markets and less risk during
recessions. One reason for this observed behavior could be that investors’
attitude towards risk (i.e. their level of risk aversion) changes, albeit pref-
erences are usually assumed to be a stable construct in economics. Another
possible reason is that investors’ expectations about returns and risk change.
This question goes to the basis of financial decision making and is – even af-
ter years of scientific work – still causing heated debates among researchers
on both, the question in terms of content, and the necessity of finding an an-
swer per se. With regard to the effectiveness of potential policy implications,
it is however essential to know more about the underlying driver(s) of the
observed differences in risk-taking over time. Chapter 4 takes a step in this
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direction. It uses an experimental approach to show that the way individuals
form beliefs across boom and bust markets differs and that the resulting biased
beliefs can explain differences in risk-taking over time and in particular across
macroeconomic cycles.
In a recent review on errors in probabilistic reasoning and judgment bi-
ases, Benjamin (2019) argues that “despite so much work by psychologists
[. . . ] and modern behavioral economics, to date belief biases have received
less attention from behavioral economics than time, risk, and social prefer-
ences” (p. 71). Thus, prior to incorporating biases into applied economic
models making them fit better to the observable data, it is relevant to learn
more about which biases in belief formation are likely to occur under which
conditions. In other words, according to Benjamin (2019), it should be a ma-
jor objective of future research in behavioral economics and finance to study
the interaction between biases to better understand when people will update
too much or too little. Finally, Chapter 5 aims to add to this agenda. It inves-
tigates whether people follow a simple counting rule implied by Bayes’ The-
orem when incorporating sequential, binary information about the quality of
a risky asset. Based on an empirical framework, Chapter 5 tests experimen-
tally how individuals update their prior beliefs after same-directional and
opposite-directional signals to identify whether and in which situations they
over- or underinfer.
1.2 Contribution and Main Results
1.2.1 Closing A Mental Account: The Realization Effect for
Gains and Losses
Chapter 2, coauthored with Christoph Merkle and Martin Weber, presents
an experimental study of the realization effect. The realization effect was
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first documented by Imas (2016) and refers to the difference in risk-taking be-
tween unrealized (i.e. paper) and realized losses. After a realized loss, indi-
viduals become more risk-averse, while they become more risk-seeking after
a paper loss. Imas (2016) explains its occurrence with cumulative prospect
theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) and choice bracketing (Read et al.,
1999; Rabin and Weizsäcker, 2009), a concept which is directly related to men-
tal accounting (Thaler, 1985, 1999). The framework of realization sheds light
on an apparent inconsistency in the literature on dynamic risk-taking which
is that some studies find risk-seeking behavior after prior losses (Coval and
Shumway, 2005; Weber and Zuchel, 2005; Langer and Weber, 2008), while
others provide evidence for risk-averse behavior after prior losses (Massa
and Simonov, 2005; Shiv et al., 2005; Frino et al., 2008).
In this study, we contribute to the long-lasting debate on how prior out-
comes affect subsequent risk-taking by examining two main research ques-
tions: (1) Does the realization effect exist for gains as well? (2) Under which
conditions does a distinction between paper and realized outcomes lead to
differential risk-taking behavior? In particular, does the realization effect de-
pend on the skewness of the underlying investment opportunity?
We first derive theoretical predictions for risk-taking behavior after gains
and investment opportunities with different skewness. The intuition of the
framework is the following. We develop a model with loss-averse investors
who open a mental account at the beginning of an investment episode and
close it upon realization. Realization triggers the closure of a mental account
and as such it affects whether prior outcomes are considered finite (when
the account is closed) or temporary (when the account remains open). Paper
gains act as a cushion against future losses which makes increased risk-taking
attractive (Thaler and Johnson, 1990), while realized gains are internalized,
considered as “own money” and are not available as a cushion anymore.
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Therefore, risk-taking decreases after realized gains. Skewness alters risk-
taking mainly via the magnitude of potential gains and losses relative to the
mental account balance. Keeping the expected value constant, the less pos-
itively skewed the investment opportunity is, the less probable, but also the
larger losses become, and the more probable, but the smaller gains are. This
leads to an attenuated realization effect after both, gains and losses. Risk-
seeking behavior becomes in both domains less attractive, because the down-
side risk threatens to exceed the paper gain cushion and the upside potential
is too small to allow for breaking even after a paper loss.
In a series of experiments, we first replicate the realization effect for losses
and then test our theoretical predictions for gains and investment opportuni-
ties with different skewness. The experimental design is based on a modified
version of Gneezy and Potters (1997). Participants were endowed with EUR
8.00 which they could invest over the course of four rounds in a positively
skewed (symmetric or negatively skewed) lottery. Each round, participants
decide on the amount of money (between EUR 0.00 and EUR 2.00) they want
to invest in the risky lottery, whereby the invested amount serves as a mea-
surement tool for their level of risk-aversion. At the beginning of each ex-
periment, participants are randomly allocated to either a Paper treatment or
a Realization treatment. Participants in the Paper treatment were informed
about their earnings after round 3 on the screen of the computer, and contin-
ued playing a final round. Participants in the Realization treatment were also
informed about their earnings after round 3, but had to hand back money
they lost, or received money they gained up until that round, before playing
a final round, respectively. Consequently, outcomes remained unrealized, so
to say “on the paper”, in the Paper treatment, whereas they were realized,
initiated by a physical transfer of money, in the Realization treatment. As
such, the design allows us to test for differences in subsequent risk-taking fol-
lowing unrealized (Paper treatment) versus realized (Realization treatment)
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gains and losses conditional on the skewness of the investment opportunity.
The results can be summarized as follows. We replicate the realization
effect for losses, albeit less pronounced than in Imas (2016). The realization
effect, defined as the between-treatment difference of the within-treatment
differences in risk-taking between round 3 and 4, is 16 cents and as such
smaller than in the original experiment (38 cents). The smaller realization
effect in our replication study is primarily caused by the less pronounced
risk-seeking behavior we observe after paper losses. Consistent with our
theoretical predictions, we find that the realization effect also exists for gains
and that the effect is even larger for gains than for losses with a difference
of 22 cents. This finding can also be confirmed in the original data by Imas
(2016) which we analyze with respect to gains. Finally, we provide evidence
– consistent with our theoretical predictions – that the realization effect re-
duces or even disappears for symmetric and negatively skewed investment
opportunities. Participants in both treatments invest similarly after paper
and realized outcomes.
Taken together, Chapter 2 proposes an extension of the theoretical frame-
work of the realization effect by Imas (2016), tests it experimentally and con-
firms it. On the one hand, we find evidence that the realization effect is more
general, since it not only applies to losses, but also to gains. Likewise, on
the other hand, our findings suggest boundary conditions for the realiza-
tion effect showing that positive skewness of the investment opportunity
is a necessary condition to observe differential risk-taking after paper and
realized gains and losses.
1.2.2 The Portfolio Composition Effect
Chapter 3, coauthored with Martin Weber, presents an experimental and
empirical study of how investors evaluate portfolio investment decisions.
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Portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952) gives clear normative advice how wealth
between two financial securities should be allocated: Portfolio evaluation
should be reduced to two key parameters which are expected returns and
variance of returns. Wealth should be allocated across financial securities
such that the variance of returns is minimized for any given overall expected
return. However, various studies in behavioral finance have shown that this
is not the case and that actual investment behavior substantially diverges
from basic portfolio theory (Barber and Odean, 2000; Benartzi and Thaler,
2001; Barber and Odean, 2013). Therefore, it is essential to learn more about
how investors evaluate their portfolios to better understand how they make
investment decisions.
To this end, we study one specific allocation decision of the portfolio
choice problem, namely how investors’ allocation decisions between given,
pre-determined portfolios of stocks are affected by different levels of perfor-
mance information. We ask the following two main research questions: (1)
Do investors consider both, the overall portfolio level and the individual stock
level, when evaluating a portfolio’s performance? (2) How does this two-
level informational setup affect their portfolio investment decisions?
So far, there is relatively little knowledge about how investors frame and
evaluate gains and losses in a portfolio (i.e. how they frame and evaluate
investment episodes for not just a single asset over time, but across various
assets over time). The dominant, often implicit assumption of studies in this
field is that investors consider stocks in isolation, so to say, detached from
one another. In other words, gains and losses are framed narrowly on the in-
dividual stock level (Frydman et al., 2017). Consequently, it is not surprising
that the role of the portfolio for the analysis of individual investor trading be-
havior has widely been ignored. However, this is questionable not at least be-
cause many retail investors hold either self-selected or pre-determined (e.g.
index funds) portfolios of assets. Only a few recent papers challenge the
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narrow framing assumption and consider also the portfolio level when ana-
lyzing investors’ trading behavior (see Hartzmark, 2015; An et al., 2019.
Gaining a better understanding of the role of portfolio-level and individ-
ual stock-level information for the evaluation of portfolios, is extremely im-
portant to derive potential interventions for the regulator helping individu-
als to make better investment decisions. For example, when it comes to the
disclosure of past performance information of portfolio-like securities (e.g.
index funds) in the Key Investor Information Document (KIID) it is of great
importance to know whether there is a discrepancy between information in-
vestors actually care about and information they should care about.
To investigate how different levels of performance information affect
portfolio investment decisions, we define a simple, counting-based mea-
sure which is determined from performance information of the portfolio’s
individual stocks. The portfolio composition measure is calculated as the
number of winner stocks (positive return since purchase) relative to the
number of loser stocks (negative return since purchase).
In a series of three experiments, we let participants allocate an endow-
ment between two portfolios which differ in either (i) the portfolio compo-
sition or (ii) the overall realized (expected) portfolio return and variance, or
(ii) in both dimensions. In the baseline experiment, we hold the overall re-
alized returns across portfolios identical and only differ the composition of
winner and loser stocks. More precisely, one portfolio consists of 70% win-
ner/30% loser stocks, while the other portfolio consists of the reversed com-
position of 30% winner/70% loser stocks. Within our baseline design, we
find a strong portfolio composition effect which is that participants allocate
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26% (22%) more of their endowment to the portfolio consisting of 70% win-
ner/30% loser stocks than to the alternative portfolio with the reversed port-
folio composition. We also find that participants report more optimistic re-
turn expectations and lower risk evaluations for those portfolios which con-
sist of more winner than loser stocks.
In a next step, we try to eliminate the effect by controlling participants’
beliefs about expected returns and variance. Portfolios are now not only
identical with respect to the overall realized return, but also with respect to
the expected return and variance. To implement this feature in our design,
we explain to participants the underlying data generating process of returns
such that they can learn about expected returns and variance before making
an investment decision. Yet, the effect persists even among those participants
who state the same beliefs about expected returns for both portfolios.
In our third and last experiment, we put the effect to a severe test. We
extent the learning phase, provide computational support for the calculation
of expected returns and variance, and clearly display the resulting expected
return and variance of each portfolio. Portfolios are designed such that there
is a unique mean-variance efficient allocation. Even under these conditions,
we still find a pronounced portfolio composition effect.
Motivated by how participants in an experimental task evaluate portfo-
lios and make investment decisions, we apply our insights to real market
data. We investigate whether historical fund flows of exchange-traded funds
on leading equity market indices from the period 2016-2019 are influenced by
the index composition of winner and loser stocks. We find that the proposed
portfolio composition measure affects future fund flows of exchange-traded
funds on leading equity market indices controlling for the index return. Sev-
eral robustness analyses show that the effect is of rather short-term, daily
nature, it does not depend on extreme portfolio compositions, and persist
when controlling for an index return dispersion.
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In summary, Chapter 3 shows that it seems to matter to investors how an
overall portfolio return has been achieved in the past and is expected to
be achieved in the future with respect to the portfolio’s composition of win-
ner and loser stocks. Strikingly, we find that the here documented portfolio
composition effect is not predicted by theories that assume mean-variance
efficient portfolio selection (Markowitz, 1952). The results from Chapter 3
have implications on how investors evaluate and frame gains and losses
in a portfolio and as such contributes to theoretical work on risk preference
specifications which combines Prospect Theory with different levels of men-
tal accounting as proposed by Barberis and Huang (2001).
1.2.3 Why So Negative? Belief Formation and Risk-Taking
in Boom and Bust Markets
Chapter 4, coauthored with Pascal Kieren and Martin Weber, presents an ex-
perimental study of belief formation in boom and bust markets and its role
on financial risk-taking. Various studies in financial economics find that in-
vestors’ risk-taking varies over time and in particular across market cycles
(Malmendier and Nagel, 2011; Weber et al., 2013; Guiso et al., 2018). Investors
take more risk during boom markets and less risk during recessions. While
there is broad empirical consensus on how investment behavior differs across
macroeconomic cycles, there is more of a controversy why this is the case. In
particular, the literature is at odds whether differential risk-taking over time
is caused by changes in investors’ risk aversion and/or by changes in investors’
beliefs.
One strand of literature argues in favor of time-varying, instable risk pref-
erences. In these models, the utility function of the representative agent is
usually modified such that it accounts for the countercyclical equity risk pre-
mium which effectively generates countercyclical risk aversion (Campbell
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and Cochrane, 1999; Barberis et al., 2001). The notion “countercyclical risk
aversion” describes that individuals become more risk averse during bust
markets, and consequently demand a higher risk premium, whereas they
become less risk averse during boom markets, demanding a lower risk pre-
mium. Experimental evidence for countercyclical risk aversion is found by
Cohn et al. (2015), while survey evidence is presented by Guiso et al. (2018).
A key assumption of these models is that the representative agent forms
rational expectations according to Bayes’ Theorem which means that follow-
ing the countercyclical nature of risk premiums the agent should have more
pessimistic return expectations during boom markets (i.e. the relatively high
asset prices during booms markets will lead on average to lower future re-
turns) and more optimistic return expectations during bust markets (i.e. the
relatively low asset prices during bust markets will lead on average to higher
future returns).
However, Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) have shown that reported ex-
pectations of investors are inconsistent with “rational” expectations. They
are highly correlated with past returns and as such exactly opposite to what
rational expectation models assume. Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) find
survey evidence that investors’ subjective return expectations are more opti-
mistic during boom markets and more pessimistic during bust markets. In
essence, they seem to be pro-cyclical rather than countercyclical. This find-
ing is in line with recent evidence by Amromin and Sharpe (2014) as well
as Giglio et al. (2019) who use survey data to show that stock return expecta-
tions are pro-cyclical. Weber et al. (2013) also challenge the notion of counter-
cyclical risk aversion by observing that changes in return expectations rather
than changes in risk attitude explain changes in risk-taking of a sample of
online-broker customers over the financial crisis of 2008. This is in line with
König-Kersting and Trautmann (2018) who cannot replicate the findings on
countercyclical risk aversion by Cohn et al. (2015) within a student subject
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pool.
Taken together, there is an ongoing debate on what drives changes in risk-
taking over time. While there is much more work on risk preferences in the
economics literature so far (see also Benjamin, 2019), research on beliefs has
been continuously catching up over the recent years. This is mainly due to
the easier accessibility of survey data and the decreasing, initial skepticism
against survey data being too noisy.
Chapter 4 contributes to this debate by showing that distorted belief
formation rules can explain differences in risk-taking across recessions and
boom markets. In particular, we aim to answer the following main research
questions: (1) How do different learning environments affect the forma-
tion of return expectations? (2) How do systematic differences resulting
from different learning environments affect risk-taking? (3) Do different
learning environments affect not only investors’ beliefs, but also their risk
preferences?
To answer these questions, we run two experiments. The general idea
of all experiments is to combine an abstract belief formation (forecasting)
task in an adverse (bust) or favorable (boom) learning environment with an
incentive-compatible investment task in a financial environment. In the fore-
casting task, participants learn to form beliefs about the quality of a risky
asset in an environment which resembles either key characteristics of a boom
market (Experiment 1: only positive returns, Experiment 2: positive expected
return) or a bust market (Experiment 1: only negative returns, Experiment 2:
negative expected return). Importantly, while the outcomes of the lotteries
from which participants learn are framed differently, the underlying proba-
bility distributions are exactly the same in both learning environments. In the
subsequent, independent investment task, we develop a between-subject mea-
sure of belief- and preference-based risk-taking. In particular, we randomly assign
participants to either an ambiguous lottery with unknown probabilities or a
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risky lottery with known probabilities. The risky lottery is used as a measure-
ment tool for possible changes in risk aversion across learning environments,
whereas the ambiguous lottery intentionally provides participants with room
to form beliefs about the underlying probability distribution which may then
translate to the investment in the ambiguous lottery. The design allows us to
isolate the effect of differences in beliefs from differences in risk aversion on
financial risk-taking conditional on the boom or bust learning environment.
We predict a pessimism bias in participants’ beliefs in the forecasting task
which is that they report significantly more pessimistic beliefs in the bust as
compared to the boom treatment and significantly more pessimistic beliefs
compared to Bayes, extending work by Kuhnen (2015). With respect to the
investment task, we predict lower investments in the ambiguous lottery in
the bust treatment than in the boom treatment and no significant differences
across treatments for the risky lottery.
The results can be summarized as follows. We confirm our hypotheses
and find that the induced pessimism from adverse learning environments
translates to lower investments in the ambiguous lottery. However, we do
not find any differences in investment across treatments for the risky lottery
which implies that risk preferences remain unaltered by the environments
in which participants formed beliefs. Further analyses provide evidence for
beliefs and the biased way in which they are formed being the underlying
mechanism for our main finding.
To conclude, Chapter 4 provides and tests an alternative channel to
countercyclical risk aversion that can also lead to the empirically observed
changes in risk-taking over time. We show that biased belief formation
rules caused by different learning environments can induce overly pes-
simistic expectations which translate to lower risk-taking. This finding is
consistent with survey evidence reporting pro-cyclical expectations. How-
ever, we do not find that adverse learning environments affect participants’
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risk aversion. Our findings and the reported mechanism have important pol-
icy implications. If investors are overly pessimistic in recessions, they may
expect lower returns and reduce their equity share. This, in consequence,
may amplify the intensity and length of recessions.
1.2.4 Can Agents Add and Subtract When Forming Beliefs?
Chapter 5, coauthored with Pascal Kieren and Martin Weber, presents
an experimental study on how individuals incorporate confirming and
disconfirming information signals when sequentially updating their beliefs
about the quality of a risky asset. Thereby, we test in the standard updating
paradigm whether individuals follow a simple, but fundamental counting
rule, implied by Bayes’ Theorem, when forming beliefs. This common
updating task is characterized by subjects receiving binary information
signals about a risky asset that can be in one of two states of the world
(Grether, 1980). The rule we are testing within this framework states that
two opposite-directional signals should cancel out such that prior beliefs
remain constant.
Probabilistic beliefs are essential in various economic problems such as
for example investments in the stock market or purchasing insurance. Tra-
ditional models in economics assume that individuals update their beliefs
promptly and correctly, according to Bayes’ Theorem, when new informa-
tion arrives. However, a large body of studies in psychology and economics
has shown that individuals’ beliefs often deviate from what Bayes’ Rule im-
plies. In other words, there is consensus in the literature that individuals
are not perfect Bayesian. Instead, they do under- or overinfer from new in-
formation. However, there is less of a consensus on the question when one
may expect to observe one versus the other. The literature is in need of a
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clarification of when people update too much or too little and seeks for a par-
simonious model that can explain when one versus the other is more likely
to occur.
Benjamin (2019) proposes in a recent overview on errors in probabilistic
reasoning and judgment biases that by and a large, people update too little
in the above-sketched updating paradigm. He also proposes that there are
exceptions: When signals go in the same direction or when priors are ex-
treme and signals go in the opposite direction of the priors, people overinfer
and update too much. Given the large and often apparently inconsistent ev-
idence in the literature and the unifying suggestion by Benjamin (2019), it is
imperative to develop a framework and to systematically test and identify
when individuals are more likely to over- and when they are more likely to
underreact to new information. We take a step in this direction by investi-
gating whether and in which situations individuals follow the simple counting
rule, implied by Bayes’ Theorem and if not, in which situations they deviate
and instead over- or underreact.
We first develop a simple empirical framework and then test the hypothe-
ses derived from this framework experimentally. A key feature of our frame-
work is that we aim to investigate how individuals react to (i) a single discon-
firming signal (i.e. opposite-directional signal) conditional on the number of
previously observed confirming signals (i.e. same-directional signals) and
how they react to (ii) a confirming signal which directly follows the discon-
firming signal (i.e. a reversion of the disconfirming signal). We define a con-
firming signal as a signal which confirms the underlying state of the world
and a disconfirming signal as a signal which does not confirm the underly-
ing state of the world. Additionally, we define three phases of how Bayesian
beliefs can evolve over a sequence of outcomes. Phase 1 (“confirming sig-
nals”) is characterized by a sequence of at least two same-directional signals,
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Phase 2 (“disruptive signal”) resembles the period in which the disconfirm-
ing signal occurs, and Phase 3 (“correction”) defines the situation when a
previously observed disconfirming signal gets directly reverted. The count-
ing rule makes clear predictions how participants should update their beliefs
in Phase 2 and Phase 3: an agent should reduce his prior probability estimate
after a disconfirming signal by the same magnitude than he increased it after
the previous confirming signal.
We test this prediction using the standard, incentivized updating
paradigm by Grether (1980). Participants learn over six periods about the
quality of a risky asset from binary signals (good or bad) which are drawn
either from a “good distribution” or a “bad distribution”. We exogenously
manipulate the period in which the disconfirming signal occurs. This
provides us with twelve stratified price paths (six for the good and six for
the bad distribution).
Our main findings are as follows. Participants violate the simple count-
ing rule and strongly overreact whenever a sequence of confirming signals is
interrupted by a single disconfirming signal. The documented overreaction
is relatively independent of the number of previously observed confirming
signals, occurs already after a sequence of only two confirming signals, and
thus does not critically depend on participants having extreme priors. Inter-
estingly however, participants adhere to the counting rule and fully correct
their prior overreaction when the disconfirming signal gets directly reverted.
In addition to this, participants generally underinfer in situations in which
they cannot or do not violate the counting rule. This is the case when there
are only signals of same direction or signals of alternating sign.
Our findings have implications for various fields of research, in particular
on belief formation in financial market, trading behavior and asset prices.
It contributes to the early literature on over- and underreactions (Bondt
and Thaler, 1985; Barberis et al., 1998; Daniel et al., 1998; Hong and Stein,
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1999) as well as to the recent literature on extrapolative beliefs (Barberis and
Shleifer, 2003; Greenwood and Shleifer, 2014; Barberis et al., 2015, 2018),
by showing that participants seem to already over-extrapolate from and
as such overreact to a single opposite-directional signal which interrupts a
sequence of previous same-directional signals. Thus, our findings suggest
that individuals even over-extrapolate from a single opposite-directional
signal (e.g. bad earnings news) if it occurs after a relatively long prior history
of same-directional signals (e.g. many good earnings news) and as such in
situations in which they state and should be quite sure about the underlying
state of the world. This in turn might add to a better understanding of the
empirically observed high trading volume in stock markets in general and
during bubbles in particular (Hong and Stein, 2007) as well as the excessive
volatility of stock prices (Shiller, 1981).
In summary, Chapter 5 contributes to one important objective in research
on probabilistic belief formation which is – according to Benjamin (2019) –
to identify when individuals update too much and when they update too
little. Within the common paradigm of Grether (1980), our results coherently
suggest that individuals update too much whenever they violate the simple
counting rule, implied by Bayes’ Theorem. Across all of our experiments,
this is the case in situations when a sequence of same-directional signals is
interrupted by a single opposite-directional signal.
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Chapter 2
Closing A Mental Account: The
Realization Effect for Gains and
Losses ∗
2.1 Introduction
Many risky endeavors, be it a night at the casino or an investment in a stock,
involve instances in which individuals must decide whether to continue,
to abandon, or to double down on a previous decision. They often view
such episodes in isolation, even though normative theory suggests integrat-
ing them into a broader perspective of total wealth. They instead engage in
mental accounting (Thaler, 1985, 1999), which refers to a cognitive process
to categorize outcomes by their source or purpose. Prior outcomes within a
mental account, perceived as a gain or a loss, obtain special relevance for this
account and affect subsequent risk-taking (Thaler and Johnson, 1990).
∗ Authors: Christoph Merkle, Jan Müller-Dethard, and Martin Weber. Christoph Merkle is
at the Aarhus University BSS. Jan Müller-Dethard and Martin Weber are at the University
of Mannheim. For valuable comments, we thank Nick Barberis, Peter Bossaerts, Michaela
Pagel, Yuval Rottenstreich, participants of the Experimental Finance 2018, the Research in
Behavioral Finance Conference 2018, the Tiber Symposium on Psychology and Economics
2018, the Annual Meeting of the Society for Judgment and Decision Making 2018, and semi-
nar participants at the University of Basel, the Max Planck Insitute in Bonn, and the Univer-
sity of Mannheim. We especially thank Alex Imas for his comments. We gratefully acknowl-
edge financial support by the Stiegler Foundation and the German Research Foundation
(DFG grant WE 993/15-1). The paper is forthcoming in Experimental Economics.
30 Chapter 2. Closing A Mental Account
The direction of this influence has been subject to a long-standing de-
bate. After losses, many studies find that individuals become more risk-
seeking (Coval and Shumway, 2005; Weber and Zuchel, 2005; Langer and
Weber, 2008; Andrade and Iyer, 2009), while others report they become more
risk-averse (Massa and Simonov, 2005; Shiv et al., 2005; Frino et al., 2008).
Similarly, after gains, investors will either exhibit more risk-seeking behav-
ior (Thaler and Johnson, 1990; Weber and Zuchel, 2005; Suhonen and Saasta-
moinen, 2018) or more risk-averse behavior (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;
Clark, 2002; Coval and Shumway, 2005).
Existing theory can account for these different reactions by a variety
of models or arguments. On the one hand, risk-seeking behavior after a
prior loss and risk-averse behavior after a prior gain are often explained by
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). After a loss, the relevant
part of the prospect theory value function to evaluate further outcomes is
convex, which implies risk-seeking behavior. In contrast, a prior gain will
situate a person in the gain domain for which the value function is concave,
which implies risk-averse behavior.
On the other hand, more risk-seeking behavior after gains and more risk-
averse behavior after losses can be motivated by the house money effect
(Thaler and Johnson, 1990) and the hedonic editing hypothesis (Thaler, 1985).
The house money effect describes a situation in which prior gains can be used
to wager in subsequent gambles. People find it easier to part with money not
coming from their own pocket. In addition, hedonic editing allows them to
offset future losses against earlier gains. For losses, it is argued that they be-
come more painful when they follow on the heels of prior losses (Barberis
et al., 2001).
A unifying framework to resolve the conflicting evidence has been re-
cently proposed by Imas (2016). It builds on the distinction between realized
and unrealized outcomes, whereby a realization is defined “as an event in
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which money or another medium of value is transferred between accounts”
(Imas, 2016, p. 2091). He argues that individuals behave differently depend-
ing on whether a loss is realized or whether it is still unrealized (a paper
loss). Experimentally, he replicates prior findings that participants become
more risk-averse after a realized loss, while they become more risk-seeking
after a paper loss. He labels the difference in risk-taking between paper and
realized losses the “realization effect” and explains its occurrence with cumu-
lative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) and choice bracketing
(Read et al., 1999; Rabin and Weizsäcker, 2009), an idea directly related to
mental accounting.
The proposed framework sheds light on why both, risk-averse as well
as risk-seeking behavior, can be observed after the same prior outcome.
However, drawing general conclusions from realization for subsequent
risk-taking requires some caution. First, Imas’s (2016) theoretical and
experimental elaboration focuses exclusively on losses, and second, it tests
the realization effect for an investment opportunity with a positively skewed
distribution of outcomes. We argue that the literature is still in need of
empirical and theoretical clarification about how prior outcomes – losses as
well as gains – affect subsequent risk-taking, and in particular, under which
conditions a distinction between paper and realized outcomes leads to
differential risk-taking behavior. In this study, we contribute to this goal by
examining two major research questions: (1) Does the realization effect exist
for gains as well? (2) Does the realization effect depend on the skewness of
the underlying investment opportunity?
To this end, we derive theoretical predictions for risk-taking behavior af-
ter gains and investment opportunities with positive skewness, no skewness,
and negative skewness. We model loss-averse investors who open a mental
account at the beginning of an investment episode and close it upon real-
ization. Paper gains and losses alter the balance of the mental account and
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can thereby affect risk-taking. Paper gains act as a cushion against future
losses and thus invite higher risk-taking, which is absent after gains are re-
alized. We thus predict a realization effect for gains. Skewness comes into
play mainly via the size of potential gains and losses relative to the account
balance. With non-positive skewness, losses become less probable but larger.
They threaten to exceed the paper gain cushion, attenuating the realization
effect after gains. Likewise, after paper losses, more probable but smaller
gains take away the potential to break even, which is a major motivation for
higher risk-taking after losses. We thus predict a smaller or absent realization
effect for non-positively skewed lotteries.
We conduct three well-powered experiments to test these predictions. In
the first experiment, we replicate the main experiment by Imas (2016) us-
ing an identical design, which examines a series of positively skewed in-
vestment opportunities. The importance of replication for scientific progress
in economics has been highlighted recently (Maniadis et al., 2014; Camerer
et al., 2016; Christensen and Miguel, 2018). At the same time, the experi-
ment allows us to address the first research question about a realization effect
for gains. Not only is risk-taking after gains arguably as important as after
losses, but it shares a similar conflict in previous empirical results and the-
ory. If there is evidence for a realization effect in the gain domain as we pre-
dict, the proposed framework would have broader implications than those
already suggested for the loss domain.
To answer the second research question, we analyze in two further experi-
ments boundary conditions for the realization effect. In particular, we depart
from positively skewed lotteries used so far and examine how symmetric
or negatively skewed lotteries affect risk-taking behavior after paper and re-
alized outcomes. Not only does positive skewness encourage risk-seeking
behavior as it is often associated with gambling (e.g., lotteries or casinos),
but the underlying distributions of most financial investment opportunities
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(e.g., stocks or funds investments) are less or not at all positively skewed. In
order to establish the validity of the realization effect for these settings, it is
essential to confirm whether the effect is indeed reduced as theory predicts.
The first experiment, which replicates study one by Imas (2016), involves
a sequence of four positively skewed lotteries, each of which represents the
throw of a die. One lucky number (out of six) wins seven times the stake
invested in the lottery, while the stake is lost for all other outcomes. Up
to EUR 2.00 can be invested in each lottery. After the third lottery, previ-
ous earnings are either paid out to participants or remain unrealized, which
defines the two treatments in the experiment (realization treatment and pa-
per treatment). The relevant comparison then is what participants do in the
fourth and final lottery depending on realization. We use a larger sample size
(N=203) than the original study to ensure sufficient statistical power and to
be able to examine outcome histories that occur less frequently.
We first confirm that participants take less risk after a realized loss com-
pared to a paper loss. However, the difference of 16 cents in average invested
amounts between treatments is smaller than in the original experiment (38
cents), and the realization effect is not statistically significant. While we con-
firm a decrease in risk-taking in the realization treatment, we cannot corrob-
orate an increase in risk-taking in the paper treatment. Standard replication
measures show that the replication is at least partially successful.
Exploiting observations in which participants have obtained a gain at the
time of realization, we find a similar investment pattern as for losses. Partic-
ipants take significantly less risk after a realized gain than after a paper gain.
The realization effect is larger for gains than for losses with a difference of
22 cents in average investment between treatments. In the paper treatment,
participants seem to gamble with the house’s money, while in the realization
treatment, they have closed the mental account and regard gains from the
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lottery as their personal money. Given the consistent direction of the realiza-
tion effect for gains and losses, we test for the realization effect unconditional
of a particular outcome history. The results show a positive and strongly sig-
nificant realization effect (p < .01) in the full sample.
In addition to our own experimental data, we analyze data from the orig-
inal study by Imas (2016) with respect to gains.1 Although limited in the
number of observations, the realization effect for gains is strong and consis-
tent with our results. Thus, we find evidence for a realization effect for gains
in two independent samples. Moreover, pooling the data from both stud-
ies, we find a positive and strongly significant realization effect (p < 0.001)
for gains and losses. To test for the theoretical relation between the realiza-
tion effect after gains and the house money effect, we examine the invested
amounts after a paper gain. In almost all cases, participants do not invest
more than what they have gained in the lotteries. This implies that they
gamble with the house’s money, but do not touch their initial experimental
endowment.
In experiments two and three, we examine how other distributions of out-
comes affect risk-taking behavior after paper and realized gains and losses.
We keep the basic experimental setup but change the probability of gains.
Instead of a positively skewed lottery, participants invest in a symmetric or
negatively skewed lottery, respectively. By construction this also increases
the heterogeneity of outcome histories prior to realization. We find neither
in the symmetric lottery nor in the negatively skewed lottery a statistically
significant realization effect for gains or losses (total sample size N=304). In
contrast to the positively skewed environment in the first study, participants
tend to invest similarly after a paper outcome and a realized outcome. This
finding is in line with theoretical work by Barberis (2012) and Imas (2016) in
1 The data is publicly available via the AER website. Imas (2016) restricts his analysis to par-
ticipants, who have lost in all lotteries up to round three (when realization takes place).
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which individuals form contingent plans over a sequence of lotteries.
The results across all experiments suggest boundary conditions for the
realization effect. Figure 2.1 depicts the magnitude of the realization effect
we find, conditional on the outcome history as well as the skewness of the
investment opportunity.
Figure 2.1: The Realization Effect Across All Experiments
Note: The figure displays average changes in risk-taking after paper and realized outcomes
unconditional of the prior outcome history, and split by loss and gain for positively skewed,
symmetric, and negatively skewed lotteries. Reported are 90%-confidence intervals.
Increased risk taking after paper gains and losses requires positive skew-
ness, while decreased risk taking after realized gains and losses does not.
The absence of the realization effect for non-positively skewed lotteries is
thus primarily driven by an absence of increased risk taking after paper out-
comes. This includes the absence of loss chasing, which seems to be limited
to positive skewness environments.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we de-
rive theoretical predictions for the experiments, in particular for risk-taking
behavior after gains and lotteries with different skewness, and review the
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prior literature. Section 2.3 presents the experimental design and the main
results. A final section concludes.
2.2 Theory and Literature
To understand the behavior of participants in the experiments, we build on
the model by Barberis et al. (2001). In addition to standard consumption-
based utility, they consider utility derived directly from the fluctuations of
financial wealth. In particular, agents react to gains and losses from their
risky assets, which makes the model suitable for the analysis of behavior after
gains and losses. Prior theory used to motivate the realization effect does not
generate clear predictions for risk-taking behavior after gains. We introduce
two departures from the main model in Barberis et al. (2001), which are the
distinction between paper outcomes and realized outcomes, and a different
value function after losses. The first is a natural extension to accommodate
the treatment of paper and realized outcomes, the second takes into account
the empirically observed behavior in the loss domain.
2.2.1 Basic Framework
The full utility specification in Barberis et al. (2001) includes utility from
consumption u(Ct) and utility derived from fluctuation of financial wealth
v(Xt, Bt, Zt). We concentrate on the latter as it represents the important part
of evaluating risk-taking behavior after gains and losses. Xt is the gain or
loss a participant experiences in lottery t.2 Bt is the bet size a participant
selects for lottery t. And Zt is a mental account, which reflects whether
a participant perceives himself up or down in the game. Mental account-
ing describes the cognitive processes people use to organize and evaluate
their financial activities (Thaler, 1985, 1999). A key implication is that people
do not consider money across different mental accounts as perfect substi-
tutes, but rather categorize money based on its origin or purpose and assign
2 The original model defines Xt+1 as the outcome over the time period from t to t + 1. As we
deal with discrete events, we use t to refer to successive lotteries.
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it to separate accounts. Outcomes within a mental account are evaluated
jointly, whereas outcomes in different mental accounts are evaluated sepa-
rately (Thaler, 1999).
The three variables Xt, Bt, and Zt, jointly determine the utility derived
from fluctuations of financial wealth. A difference to the more general model
arises from the fact that only part of a participant’s endowment is invested
in the risky lottery. Still, Bt can be interpreted as a participant’s risky asset
holdings. The outcome of lottery t is Xt = RtBt− Bt with gross return Rt. We
abstract from a risk-free rate, as no return is paid on money not invested in
the lottery. If a participant loses in the lottery, then Xt = −Bt. If a participant
wins, then Xt = (x − 1)Bt with x > 1 as the multiple that is applied to a
winning bet. The lottery will thus either generate a loss or a gain. Besides
these potential outcomes, participants take their prior gains and losses into






While Barberis et al. (2001) leave open what exactly this mental account
(or “historical benchmark”) is, in our context, we will assume that it is the
sum of prior gains and losses. A participant can thus be in the gain domain
(Zt > 0), in the loss domain (Zt < 0), or at break-even (Zt = 0). In partic-
ular, Z1 = 0 as no lottery has yet been played. In this situation, utility from
changes in financial wealth is described by:
v(Xt, Bt, 0) =
Xt for Xt ≥ 0λXt for Xt < 0 (2.2)
The parameter λ > 1 captures loss aversion. We further assume that re-
alizing a gain or a loss resets the benchmark to zero as the mental account is
closed. The intuition is that when a stock is sold, the proceeds are mentally
transferred from the account investment to consumption. Paper losses may
consequently not be regarded as final and possess the potential to rebound
(Shefrin and Statman, 1985). The idea that realization affects decision making
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has been tested in an experimental asset market (Weber and Camerer, 1998).
When stocks are automatically sold after each period, the disposition effect is
significantly reduced. The automatic selling procedure closes existing men-
tal accounts, and stocks are no longer charged by prior experiences of gains
or losses.3 This means that after realizing lottery outcomes, a participant is
effectively in the same decision situation as before entering the first lottery:
H1. After a gain or a loss is realized, risk-taking behavior will be similar as
in a decision without prior history.
Barberis and Xiong (2009) study the implications of realized and paper
outcomes as well. In two alternative models, they define prospect theory
preferences either over total gains and losses or realized gains and losses.
They discover that the model based on realized outcomes predicts the dispo-
sition effect more reliably.
2.2.2 Behavior After Gains
One main idea of the model is that prior gains serve as a cushion against
losses that are felt less severely as long as they do not exceed prior gains.
This is consistent with the “house money effect,” predicting that people take
more risk in the presence of a prior gain (Thaler and Johnson, 1990). When
offered a risky lottery, individuals evaluate prior paper gains (house money)
and the risky prospect jointly within the same mental account. Since the
house money is integrated with future outcomes, losses can be offset and are
perceived as less painful than usual.4 Formally, losses up to the level of prior
gains are not subject to loss aversion:
3 Barberis et al. (2001) consider this plausible although they exclude this possibility for their
analysis: “However, larger deviations – a complete exit from the stock market, for example
– might plausibly affect the way [Zt] evolves. In supposing that they do not, we make a
strong assumption, but one that is very helpful in keeping our analysis tractable (p.13).” We
assume that realizing all gains or losses is perceived similarly to an exit from the market.
4 The idea is consistent with Arkes et al. (1994) who argue that windfall gains are spent more
readily than other types of assets and Peng et al. (2013) who argue that the psychological
value of losing parts of a prior gain is relatively low.
2.2. Theory and Literature 39
v(Xt, Bt, Zt) =
Xt for Xt ≥ −Ztλ(Xt + Zt)− Zt for Xt < −Zt (2.3)
This means that losses up to Zt are evaluated at the gentler rate of 1 in-
stead of λ. Accordingly, a paper gain reduces loss aversion when compared
to a realized gain. This is particularly true for small bet sizes Bt < Zt, which
do not jeopardize the whole gain cushion. Realization closes the respec-
tive mental account for prior gains and triggers the internalization of house
money. Prior gains are no longer available to offset potential losses. Without
integration, individuals evaluate a risky lottery separately from the previous
gain and do not use the gentler rate of 1 instead of λ anymore. This reasoning
is also graphically illustrated in Panel A of Figure 2.2. We hypothesize:
H2. After a paper gain people are more prone to take risks than after a real-
ized gain.
H2a. They avoid bet sizes that run the risk to lose more than the sum of prior
gains.
Hypothesis 2 may shed light on seemingly contradictory results in the
empirical literature: Less risk taking after a prior gain versus more risk taking
after a prior gain. While the house money effect predicts a higher propensity
to gamble after a prior gain than before (or after a loss), the disposition effect
describes the opposite behavior. Investors show a tendency to sell winning
stocks too early and to keep losing stocks too long (Shefrin and Statman, 1985;
Odean, 1998; Weber and Camerer, 1998). Intuitively, the trading behavior
behind the disposition effect is in line with prospect theory (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979). A winning stock moves an investor into the gain domain of
the prospect theory value function. As the value function is assumed to be
concave for gains, it implies risk-averse behavior and a higher likelihood of
selling the stock.
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Figure 2.2: Risk-Taking After Paper and Realized Outcomes
Note: The figure illustrates risk-taking after gains in Panel A and after losses in Panel B de-
pending on realization. For illustrative purposes, only two rounds of a lottery are displayed,
and outcomes are either on paper (left diagrams) or realized after the first round (right di-
agrams). Each diagram plots the round of the lottery on the x-axis and the earnings on the
y-axis. Endowments are the same in t=0, which then adjust depending on the outcome of
the first lottery in t=1. In round two, the chosen investment B2 determines the potential
earnings indicated by the horizontal bars. Color coding shows whether outcomes are eval-
uated as gains (green) or losses (red). Whether an outcome is evaluated as a gain or loss
depends on the mental account and its reference point. For example, in the left diagram of
Panel A, the paper gain from the first lottery enters a newly opened mental account shown
in yellow. Outcomes in round two are evaluated against this previous gain which offsets
potential losses. The right diagram of Panel A shows the same situation when instead the
gain is realized. The respective mental account is closed, the previous gain is internalized,
and the reference point shifts to the new wealth level. In round two, there is no cushion
against a potential loss which is indicated in red.
Further tests are similarly inconclusive for risk taking after gains. We-
ber and Zuchel (2005) show in lottery experiments that participants become
more risk-seeking after a gain, while Franken et al. (2006) find in a gam-
bling task that previous gains lead to less risk-taking. Clark (2002) does not
find evidence in either direction following gains in a public goods experi-
ment. However, bettors on the horse track take more risk after a previous
gain (Suhonen and Saastamoinen, 2018), as do novice investors in the stock
market (Hsu and Chow, 2013). Recently, Lippi et al. (2018) support this find-
ing by showing that clients of an Italian bank engage in more risk-seeking
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behavior after unrealized gains. However, Coval and Shumway (2005) ana-
lyze the trading behavior of futures traders and find that traders with gains
in the morning take less risky positions in the afternoon. In a similar setting,
Frino et al. (2008) report the opposite result.
2.2.3 Behavior After Losses
When a mental account is in the red, i.e., a participant has experienced an
overall loss, then the outcomes of a lottery are evaluated in the following
way:
v(Xt, Bt, Zt) =
−λZt + (Xt + Zt) for Xt ≥ −ZtλXt for Xt < −Zt (2.4)
The expression represents the mirror image of the situation after gains
and again reflects the idea of an open mental account in which a loss is not
final. Gains that make up for prior losses are particularly attractive and are
valued at a rate of λ. Barberis et al. (2001) assume that losses on the heels
of prior losses are more painful than usual and let loss aversion rise in Zt.
However, the results by Imas (2016) for paper losses question this idea, as
people take more risk after a series of losses. The traditional view inspired
by prospect theory also favors higher risk-taking after losses (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979). While the channel in prospect theory is higher risk tolerance,
in the piecewise linear (risk-neutral) utility function used here, it could man-
ifest in a decreasing loss aversion parameter (consistent with a learning ef-
fect documented by Merkle (2020)). We thus depart from the assumption of
higher loss aversion after a prior loss and instead propose a constant loss
aversion parameter. The extent of loss chasing will depend on how people’s
preferences react to prior losses.
When offered a risky lottery, individuals evaluate prior paper losses and
the risky lottery jointly within the same mental account. They thus evaluate
further losses at the same rate as gains reducing these losses. By contrast,
realization closes the respective mental account, internalizes the prior losses,
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and resets the reference point to Zt = 0 (see also Panel B of Figure 2.2). Note
that equations 2.3 and 2.4 simplify to equation 2.2 in this case. We thus expect
participants to take more risk when confronted with a paper loss (mental
account still open) than with a realized loss (mental account closed):
H3. After a paper loss people are more prone to take risks than after a real-
ized loss.
H3a. They favor bet sizes that give them the opportunity to break even.
For risk-taking after losses similarly inconclusive empirical evidence as
for gains has been found. There is strong empirical support for an increase in
risk-taking after experiencing a loss, which has been demonstrated in the lab
(Gneezy and Potters, 1997; Weber and Zuchel, 2005; Langer and Weber, 2008;
Andrade and Iyer, 2009) as well as in the field (Coval and Shumway, 2005;
Meier et al., 2020). Such loss chasing has been identified as a source for gam-
bling problems (Zhang and Clark, 2020), and might be driven by impulsive
action (Verbruggen et al., 2017). On the other hand, several studies report
a decrease in risk-taking after losses (Massa and Simonov, 2005; Shiv et al.,
2005; Frino et al., 2008). Imas (2016) points out how the different results can
be reconciled by distinguishing paper losses and realized losses (in line with
H3). The presented findings almost exclusively rely on positively skewed
gambles, for other skewness environments, there is hardly any evidence (see
also Nielsen, 2019).
Hypothesis 3a does not follow directly from the introduced theory, as
gains are treated equally up to the point where they exceed prior losses
(Xt > −Zt). However, already Thaler and Johnson (1990) report such a
break-even effect. Moreover, there is evidence that finally realizing an out-
come is associated with an immediate burst of utility (Barberis and Xiong,
2012; Frydman et al., 2014). Such realization utility implies that agents also
care about the level of Zt, in particular when they anticipate that the re-
spective mental account will be closed. In the experiment, the final lottery
represents the last opportunity to influence cumulative outcomes ZT which
2.2. Theory and Literature 43
are automatically realized at the end of the experiment. Lotteries that allow
changing the sign of ZT should be especially attractive. A sufficiently large
multiplier x, as found in positively skewed lotteries, usually allows to break
even. Depending on accumulated losses, it might not even be necessary to
increase risk.
2.2.4 The Realization Effect and Skewness
In our model, a positively skewed lottery is prone to the realization effect
as it offers a high potential gain and limited loss. In the gain domain, the
cushion provided by Zt will be able to absorb most of a possible loss and
induce risk-taking unless the mental account is closed. In the loss domain,
the lottery almost always offers the chance to break even, as the multiplier
x applied on the bet Bt is sufficiently high. This also induces risk-taking,
which is why a strong realization effect can be expected for positively skewed
lotteries independent of the prior outcome.
In contrast, symmetric and negatively skewed lotteries are characterized
by a lower but more probable gain and a higher but less probable loss. A
reasonable assumption is that probabilities and payoffs of the lotteries are al-
tered simultaneously so that their expected payoff remains (about) constant.5
It is then more likely that previous gains cannot completely cushion a poten-
tial loss, which might deter people from risk-taking. Figure 2.2 illustrates this
by the size of the mental account balance Z2 in period two relative to the bet
size B2 in period two. The smaller account balance Z2 after an initial gain
only allows for smaller bets if people do not want to risk their endowment.
We predict no reaction to skewness for risk-taking behavior after realized
gains, as it is independent of prior history (see H1). Consequently, the real-
ization effect should be reduced.
In the loss domain, symmetric or negatively skewed lotteries offer less
potential to break even. Initial losses (−Z2) are larger relative to potential
5 Changing skewness without adjusting payoffs would just make the lottery more and more
attractive. This would increase risk-taking across the board and represents a less interesting
case to study.
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gains xB2. However, it is still possible to recoup prior losses at least partly,
making the lottery somewhat more attractive than after losses are realized
and mental accounts are closed.
H4. The realization effect is reduced or absent for symmetric and negatively
skewed lotteries.
Previous empirical studies have shown in various domains that skew-
ness influences risk-taking and that positively skewed lotteries tempt indi-
viduals to engage in more risk-taking. For example, individual investors
have a preference for lottery-type stocks, characterized by low prices, high
volatility, and large positive skewness (Kumar, 2009). Further evidence for
positive skewness-loving investment behavior comes from horse race betting
and state lotteries (Golec and Tamarkin, 1998; Garrett and Sobel, 1999). This
is in line with Grossman and Eckel (2015), who find increased risk-taking in
an experimental study with positively skewed lotteries. While most of the lit-
erature on dynamic risk-taking concentrates on positively skewed lotteries,
there are many situations in every-day decision making in which outcome
distributions are less or not at all positively skewed. For example, investors
in the stock market or corporate managers usually face less lottery-like in-
vestment opportunities. Given this gap in the literature on risk-taking for
non-positively skewed lotteries, the second objective of this study is to in-
vestigate whether the realization effect can be generalized to symmetric and
negatively skewed lotteries.
Our model is broadly consistent with the theory provided by Imas (2016).
The common prediction is that risk-taking after a paper loss is higher than
a) before a paper loss and b) after a realized loss. However, we explicitly
model a mental account (represented by Zt), while Imas (2016) invokes a
mere shift in the reference point. This difference becomes apparent when
deriving predictions for the gain domain. An agent with a paper gain might
take less risk in his model compared to an agent with a realized loss or no
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history.6 As this defies, for example, the presence of a house money effect,
we find this approach not appealing for understanding behavior after gains.
In the main model by Imas (2016), the proof for the general existence of
a realization effect after losses relies on features of a positively skewed lot-
tery. The effect is not necessarily absent for symmetric or negatively skewed
lotteries, but in these cases depends on preferences (e.g., the degree of loss
aversion). Similar to our model, a reduced aggregate realization effect can
be expected in a population with heterogeneous preferences. Both models
rely on myopic decision makers, who take only the next round of a lottery
into account. An alternative is allowing for people to make contingent plans
on their investments after gains and losses (e.g., Barberis, 2012). Contingent
plans may alter the existing skewness of asset returns, for example, make
them more positively skewed by planning to cut losses. In Online Appendix
A.1, we discuss such models in more detail.
2.3 Experimental Design and Results
The design of the experiments is based on Imas (2016), who studies a version
of the investment lottery by Gneezy and Potters (1997). Participants receive
a total endowment which can be invested over several rounds in the same
lottery. In each round, participants can invest a maximum amount E in the
lottery, which is a constant fraction of the total endowment. They thus decide
on their lottery investment (Bt) and how much they want to invest risk-free
(E− Bt). For simplicity, the risk-free investment provides no interest. With
probability p, the lottery returns the invested amount times a multiple x, with
probability 1− p the investment is lost. A participant can thus either make a
gain of (x− 1)Bt or a loss of −Bt. The expected payoff in each round is:
p · (xBt + E− Bt) + (1− p) · (E− Bt) = E + (px− 1)Bt. (2.5)
6 This depends on the chosen parameters. As Imas (2016) considers only risk-taking behavior
after losses, he does not explicitly derive these predictions. His model is neither intended
nor tested to work in the gain domain.
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Lotteries are structured in such a way that px > 1, which means that the lot-
tery has a positive expected payoff, and the expected payoff increases in the
bet size Bt. Otherwise, the lottery would be unattractive to risk-averse par-
ticipants. After the investment decision is made, the outcome of the lottery
is determined and revealed to participants. In the following round, the same
lottery is played again. Importantly, investment possibilities in later rounds
do not depend on prior payoffs as the maximum investment E is a constant
fraction of the total endowment.
The total number of lottery rounds in all experiments is four. In the re-
alization treatment, participants invest over three rounds, and outcomes are
realized at the end of the third round. After this, an additional lottery takes
place. In the paper treatment, all four rounds are played consecutively, and
there is no special significance of the turn between the third and final round.
However, to keep information between treatments constant, participants in
both treatments are informed about their earnings on the screen at the end of
the third round. The main analysis thus relies on the risk-taking behavior in
the final round, as the first three rounds are identical between treatments.
2.3.1 Experiment 1
Design and Participants
In the first experiment, we replicate the original design by Imas (2016). In
each round, participants decided how much to invest in a positively skewed
lottery. The lottery succeeded with a probability of 1/6 and paid seven times
the invested amount, or it failed with a probability of 5/6 and the invested
amount was lost. Considering this experimental design, the conditions un-
der which the realization effect occurs turn out to be arguably restrictive.
Imas (2016) focuses his attention on sequences of prior losses, excluding all
histories involving a gain.7 In addition, the nature of the lotteries is such
that participants bet on the throw of a six-sided die and win (seven-fold) if
their predetermined “lucky number” comes up. This results in a positively
7 In expectation, only (5/6)3 = 58% of observations enter the analysis.
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skewed lottery. In the first experiment, we extend the analysis to the gain
domain, while in experiments two and three, we introduce different types of
skewness.
Participants were randomly assigned to either a realization treatment or a
paper treatment as described above. After entering the laboratory, each par-
ticipant received an envelope which contained the endowment of EUR 8.00.
The instructions asked participants to count the money (see Online Appendix
A.2 for the experimental instructions). The lotteries were framed in terms of
the throw of a six-sided die and always proceeded in the same way. First,
each participant was randomly assigned a success number between 1 and
6, which was displayed on the computer screen. Then participants decided
how much to invest in the lottery up to a maximum of EUR 2.00. As soon
as all participants had entered the amount, the experimenter rolled a large
die in front of the room. All participants received the opportunity to check
whether the die was fair. If the success number matched the rolled num-
ber, the participant won the lottery and obtained seven times the invested
amount (plus the amount invested risk-free). If the success number did not
match the rolled number, the participant lost the invested amount and kept
the amount not invested. For the next round, a new success number was as-
signed. As in the original experiment, all results of the die roll were written
on a board in front of the room.
In the realization treatment, outcomes were realized at the end of the third
round. Participants who lost money by that time took the lost amount out of
the envelope and handed it back to the experimenter. Participants who won
received additional money from the experimenter. After this, participants
made one last investment decision in a final round and were paid accord-
ingly. In the paper treatment, outcomes were not realized at the end of the
third round. Outcomes were merely communicated on the screen as in the
realization treatment, but no physical transfer of money took place.8 At the
end of round four, all outcomes were realized for both groups. As in the
8 Screenshots of a representative lottery round in the experiment and of the earnings update
after round three for both treatments are provided in the Online Appendix A.2.
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original experiment, the time between rounds was normalized across treat-
ments. Consistent with hypotheses H2 and H3, we predict that participants
in the paper treatment (after gains and losses) will invest more in the final
lottery than participants in the realization treatment.
Experiment one was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and con-
ducted in the Mannheim Experimental Laboratory (mLab). We selected a
sample size of N > 200 participants to obtain statistical power of at least
90% to detect an effect of the size of the original realization effect at the 5%
significance level (Camerer et al., 2016). We recruited 203 people via ORSEE
(Greiner, 2015) from a university-wide subject pool to participate in a study
on decision making. Participants were on average 23 years old, and the num-
ber of female (n = 108) and male (n = 95) participants was relatively similar
(see Table 2.1).
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of Experiment Participants
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
mLab mLab mLab & AWI Lab
Number of participants 203 95 209
Gender (male=1) 0.47 0.43 0.43
Age 22.7 22.1 23.3
Semesters studied 6.00 5.38 6.61
Risk aversion (0−10) 5.22 4.28 4.10
Loss aversion 2.13 1.86 1.82
Time preference (0−10) 7.68 6.92 6.31
Financial literacy (0−8) 5.16 4.45 3.73
Illusion of control (1−5) 2.15 2.36 2.10
Cognitive reflection (0−7) 5.16 3.64 3.60
Note: The table presents means of demographic variables, preferences, and cognitive vari-
ables for participants in experiments 1-3. Gender is an indicator variable (male=1), age is
measured in years, and a semester corresponds to half a year of study (at least undergradu-
ate level). Risk aversion, loss aversion, time preference, financial literacy, illusion of control,
and cognitive reflection are measured as described in Online Appendix A.3
Replication Results
We first examine the replication of the realization effect for losses. The anal-
ysis centers on the change of investment between rounds three and four, as
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realization takes place before round four. To test for the realization effect, we
are mainly interested in three comparisons: The difference in the change of
investment between the paper and realization treatment (between-treatment
comparison) and the change of investment for each treatment separately
(within-treatment comparisons). Panel A of Table 2.2 shows the amounts
invested in the lottery for participants who have a total loss by the end of
round three, which means that they lost in each of the first three rounds.9
Investments do not differ significantly across treatments over the first three
rounds. In the final round, participants in the paper treatment invest slightly
more, while participants in the realization treatment invest less. This pattern
is consistent with a realization effect as stated in hypothesis H3, which
predicts a positive difference in differences (DiD = 0.16, t(113) = 1.58,
p = 0.12).
However, compared to results of study one by Imas (2016) (DiD = 0.38,
t(51) = 3.19, p < 0.01), our data show a less pronounced effect with respect
to economic and statistical significance. The found effect size is 42% of the
original effect size, which is smaller than the mean replicated effect size of
66% reported by Camerer et al. (2016) in a large-scale study on the replica-
bility of laboratory experiments in economics. To further assess replicability,
we apply confidence intervals and a meta-analysis they propose as standard
measures. The original effect size is outside, but close to the upper bound of
the 95% confidence interval of the replicated effect size [−0.04, 0.34].
Interestingly, when focusing on the investment behavior within treat-
ment, the realization effect we find is primarily driven by a decrease in
risk-taking in the realization treatment (−0.12, t(57) = 1.64, p = 0.11), while
the effect in the original data is primarily driven by an increase in risk-taking
in the paper treatment. We can confirm that participants tend to take less
risk after a realized loss, but we cannot replicate that participants increase
risk-taking after a paper loss (0.04, t(56) = 0.57, p = 0.57). The magnitude of
the decrease in risk-taking after a realized loss in the original study (−0.15)
9 We follow Imas (2016) who restricts the sample to those participants who experienced three
consecutive losses. Most participants who won once ended up in the gain domain due to
the positive skewness of the lottery.
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Table 2.2: Risk-Taking in the Positively Skewed Lottery
Panel A: Risk-taking after losses
Invested amount Change
Treatment Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 R4−R3 N
Paper 0.98 0.91 0.78 0.82 0.04 57
(0.57)
Realization 0.90 0.73 0.80 0.68 −0.12 58
(1.64)
Difference 0.08 0.18 −0.02 0.14 0.16
(0.72) (1.56) (0.13) (1.05) (1.58)
Panel B: Risk-taking after gains
Invested amount Change
Treatment Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 R4−R3 N
Paper 0.94 0.73 0.71 0.84 0.13 35
(1.75)
Realization 0.71 0.77 0.73 0.64 −0.09 36
(1.27)
Difference 0.23 −0.04 −0.02 0.20 0.22
(1.78) (0.22) (0.13) (1.32) (2.16)
Note: The table shows the average invested amounts in the lottery for all rounds of exper-
iment 1 (in Euro). Panel A is restricted to participants who lost in the first three rounds
of the experiment, Panel B shows averages for all participants with at least one gain in the
first three rounds. Both panels show results by treatment (paper and realization) and dif-
ferences between treatments. Change is the difference between the investment in the final
round and round three. N provides the number of participants for each treatment-outcome
combination. T-values of a two-sided t-test are shown in parentheses.
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is well inside the 95% confidence interval in the replication [−0.25, 0.02].
However, the increase in risk-taking after a paper loss in the original study
(0.23) is not compatible at the 95% confidence level with the replication
[−0.09, 0.17].
In other words, we do not find loss chasing in the paper treatment, which
ultimately explains the overall less pronounced realization effect for losses
as compared to Imas (2016). One reason for the non-robust results after
paper losses might be that the positively skewed lottery offers participants
the chance to break even without necessarily having to increase risk-taking.
Whether or not some participants still increase their risk-taking will depend
on their prospect theory preference parameters.10
When comparing the invested amount in round four to the invested
amount in round one, we find that participants are more risk-averse after a
realized loss than without any prior outcome (−0.22, t(57) = 2.49, p = 0.02).
This is inconsistent with hypothesis H1, but in line with the idea of Barberis
et al. (2001), who argue that individuals become more sensitive to future
losses after a previous loss. In general, the changes in risk-taking between
rounds three and four are not particularly large when compared to the
changes observed for earlier rounds (see Online Appendix A.4). We find
some significant results for earlier rounds across all three experiments, but
we cannot identify a systematic pattern behind these changes. Significance
occurs mostly between round one and round two, which suggests that
participants try out the lottery first before making considerable adjustments
to their bet size. Importantly, by round three, risk-taking behavior is very
similar between treatments.
As a further test for replication, we pool our data with the original data by
Imas (2016). Thus, we are able to obtain a meta-analytic estimate of the effect
(Camerer et al., 2016). In the pooled data we obtain a strongly significant
realization effect after losses (DiD = 0.24, t(165) = 3.10, p < 0.01). We
conclude that the evidence on the outcome of the replication is mixed. We
10 The result that loss chasing is parameter-dependent, but risk-taking after a realization is not
is also present in the framework by Barberis (2012) and Imas (2016).
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find a weaker but directionally consistent realization effect after losses.
Results For Gains
Next, we examine participants with a gain at the end of the third round.
Given the considerable upside potential of the lottery, most participants who
succeeded in at least one lottery faced positive net earnings at the end of the
third round. The overall sample of 203 participants splits into 115 partici-
pants with a loss by the end of round 3 analyzed above, 71 participants with
a gain by the end of round three, and 17 participants who have zero net earn-
ings by the end of round three (due to not investing in the lottery at all). Of
the 71 participants with a gain, 65 won the lottery once, and 6 won twice.11
Panel B of Table 2.2 shows the invested amounts for these participants. In
most cases, changes in investment in rounds one to three do not differ sig-
nificantly across treatments.12 Consistent with Hypothesis H2, the change in
risk-taking between rounds three and four is significantly different between
the paper and the realization treatment (DiD = 0.22, t(69) = 2.16, p = 0.03).
This realization effect for gains is somewhat larger than the replicated effect
for losses. Within treatment, participants in the paper treatment take signif-
icantly more risk (0.13, t(34) = 1.75, p = 0.09), while participants in the
realization treatment take less risk (−0.09, t(35) = 1.27, p = 0.21), yet statis-
tically insignificant. However, in line with hypothesis H1, individuals invest
similarly after a realized gain compared to the case of no prior outcome. The
difference between the invested amount in round one and round four after a
realized gain is insignificant (0.06, t(35) = 0.61, p = 0.54).
To back-up this finding, we turn again to the original data by Imas (2016),
which has not been analyzed with regard to risk-taking after gains. As be-
fore, we only use observations of participants with a gain at the end of round
three. Despite the relatively small sample size (N=24), we nevertheless find
evidence for a realization effect after gains in his data. As shown in Table 2.3,
11 Table A.4 in Online Appendix A.4 provides more details about participants’ average earn-
ings after round three conditional on the outcomes in each round.
12 We also do not find significant changes in investment before and after the round in which a
participant wins across treatments; see Online Appendix A.4, Table A.5.
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participants take more risk in the paper treatment than the realization treat-
ment considering changes between rounds three and four. Consistent with
the results from our experiment, the realization effect is positive and statis-
tically significant (DiD = 0.55, t(22) = 2.29, p = 0.03). Within treatment,
participants take more risk after a paper gain (0.47, t(8) = 1.99, p = 0.08)
and tend to take less risk after a realized gain (−0.08, t(14) = 0.67, p = 0.51).
Table 2.3: Risk-Taking After Gains in Imas (2016) Study 1
Invested amount Change
Treatment Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 R4−R3 N
Paper 0.81 0.78 0.75 1.22 0.47 9
(1.99)
Realization 0.83 0.68 0.83 0.75 −0.08 15
(0.67)
Difference −0.02 0.10 −0.08 0.47 0.55
(0.17) (0.54) (0.38) (2.00) (2.29)
Note: The table shows the average invested amounts in the lottery for all rounds of the ex-
periment (in US-Dollar) for all participants with at least one gain in the first three rounds.
Data are obtained from the AER website. Displayed are results by treatment (paper and
realization) and differences between treatments. Change is the difference between the in-
vestment in the final round and round three. N provides the number of participants for each
treatment. T-values of a two-sided t-test are shown in parentheses.
When we pool the data from both studies, we find a strong realization ef-
fect for gains (DiD = 0.29, t(93) = 2.96, p < 0.01). We thus find experimental
evidence for a realization effect for gains in two independent samples. The
studies were conducted with student populations from different universi-
ties, in different countries, and at different points in time. While the p-value
in both samples is similar (p = 0.03), the combined evidence provides far
stronger support to hypothesis H2.
Irrespective of whether the prior outcome is a gain or loss, risk-taking
is thus higher when outcomes remain unrealized. This finding allows us to
analyze the existence and strength of the effect independent of the sign of
the prior outcome. Therefore, we run OLS regressions for the entire sam-
ple with the change in invested amount between rounds three and four as
the dependent variable. We include a treatment indicator taking a value of
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one for the realization treatment. Table 2.4 shows in column (1) the results
of the baseline regression. We observe a strong realization effect, with those
in the realization treatment taking significantly less risk. Unsurprisingly, the
economic magnitude is in between those estimated for gains and losses sepa-
rately. The positive constant provides evidence for an increase in risk-taking
in the paper treatment. Controlling for gains and losses after round three by
a gain indicator (gain=1) does not affect the main result (Column 2). Interact-
ing the treatment and gain variables allows us to test whether the realization
effect is stronger after previous gains or losses. The negative but insignifi-
cant coefficient of the interaction term hints at a stronger realization effect
after gains.
Table 2.4: The Realization Effect for Gains and Losses
Data from Experiment 1 Data from Imas (2016)
Change in invested amount Change in invested amount
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Realization −0.182∗∗∗ −0.183∗∗∗ −0.165∗∗ −0.420∗∗∗ −0.437∗∗∗ −0.390∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.066) (0.082) (0.107) (0.108) (0.128)
Gain 0.046 0.071 0.134 0.231
(0.069) (0.097) (0.118) (0.183)
Gain x Realization −0.051 −0.166
(0.138) (0.240)
Constant 0.083∗ 0.068 0.059 0.295∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.051) (0.056) (0.077) (0.082) (0.088)
Observations 203 203 203 81 81 81
R2 0.037 0.039 0.039 0.163 0.177 0.182
Note: The table shows the results of OLS regressions with the change in the invested amount
between rounds three and four as the dependent variable based on data from experiment 1
and data from Imas (2016) study 1. Realization is an indicator variable taking a value of one
for the realization treatment. Gain is an indicator variable taking a value of one for partic-
ipants with a prior gain. Gain x Realization is the interaction between the two variables.
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
We run the same regressions on the data from Imas’s (2016) study 1.
Columns (4) to (6) in Table 2.4 display the results. A strong realization ef-
fect also exists in his data independent of prior gains and losses. The effect in
his data is even more pronounced in economic magnitude than in our data.
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The combined effect independent of the prior outcome in the pooled data is
(DiD = 0.25, t(283) = 4.38, p < 0.001).
A relevant assumption about the realization effect is that people are less
loss averse for money they keep in the mental account for house money (pa-
per gains) than for their own money that they keep in a different mental
account (realized gains). This assumption has testable implications for the
amount people are willing to bet (hypothesis H2a). We predict that partic-
ipants avoid bet sizes that run the risk losing more than the sum of prior
gains. Since participants can invest up to EUR 2.00 in each round and lose at
a maximum their invested amount, the subsample of interest are participants
who have earnings between EUR 8.00 and EUR 10.00 after round three (i.e.,
gains between EUR 0 and EUR 2). If mental accounting is important, partic-
ipants are expected not to invest more than their current paper gains (house
money) in round four. Figure 2.3 plots the earnings after round three against
the invested amount in round four. The maximum invested amount of par-
ticipants in this subsample was EUR 1.00. All dots above the line represent
participants who invest less than their house money in round four, which re-
stricts their potential losses to less than their previous gains. Dots below the
line represent participants who risk to lose more than their prior gains. Con-
sistent with hypothesis H2a, 11 out of 12 participants invest less or exactly as
much money as they previously gained.
Essential for the realization effect is that the used realization mechanism
is effective in closing a mental account. We tested an alternative realization
mechanism in two versions of an online experiment, one of which is an iden-
tical replication of the online study in Imas (2016). As a physical transfer of
money is not feasible online, participants in the realization treatment initi-
ate a transfer of money between accounts by typing the command “closed.”
We successfully replicate the realization effect using this alternative realiza-
tion mechanism in the original design by Imas (2016) but discover that the
effect is rather fragile when modestly changing the design. We find that the
framing of how the last round is related to the preceding three matters for
whether risk-taking increases or decreases in the realization treatment of the
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online experiment.13 We conclude that in an online environment, proper re-
alization is more difficult to achieve, and mental accounts may remain open
using the described procedure. Complete results are reported in Online Ap-
pendix A.5.
Figure 2.3: Testing the Mental Accounting Assumption
Note: The figure plots the earnings by the end of round three against the investment in round
four for each participant who has earnings between EUR 8.00 and EUR 10.00 by the end of
round three. Participants with earnings below EUR 8.00 are excluded as they made a loss
and participants with earnings above EUR 10.00 are excluded as they cannot lose more than
what they previously gained (given than the investment per round cannot be more than EUR
2.00 which also presents the highest possible loss per round). All dots above the diagonal
line represent participants who invest less than what they previously gained, and all dots
below the diagonal line represent participants who invest more than what they previously
gained.
2.3.2 Experiment 2 and 3
Design and Participants
Experiment two and three address the question of whether the realization ef-
fect depends on the skewness of the underlying investment opportunity. We
13 Effects of different exchange media (cash, tokens, e-coins) are examined in a similar experi-
mental paradigm by Stivers et al. (2020). They find that reduced moneyness alters risk-taking
behavior as well.
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take the same experimental design as in experiment one except for the invest-
ment opportunity, which we change to either a symmetric (experiment two)
or a negatively skewed lottery (experiment three). In line with hypothesis
H4, we predict a reduced or absent realization effect in these settings.
Participants were again endowed with EUR 8.00 at the beginning of the
experiment and could invest up to EUR 2.00 in each of four subsequent lot-
tery rounds. In experiment two (symmetric lottery), participants could invest
in a lottery that succeeded with a probability of 1/2 and paid 2.33 times the
invested amount. With a probability of 1/2, the lottery failed and the in-
vested amount was lost. Instead of one success number for the role of the
die, participants received three success numbers. In experiment three (neg-
ative skewness), participants could invest in a lottery which succeeded with
a probability of 5/6 and paid 1.4 times the invested amount or failed with
a probability of 1/6. Instead of a success number, they received one failure
number.
The multiplier for the gain case was adjusted to keep the expected payoff
of each lottery equal to the expected payoff of the lottery in experiment one.
While the objective of experiment three was to create a mirror image of the
original positively skewed lottery, a complete reversal of gains and losses
was infeasible as losses cannot exceed the endowment (by laboratory rules).
Instead of a seven-fold loss, we thus have to restrict the loss to the invested
amount. Still, participants are expected to experience many small gains and
occasionally (relatively) large losses.
As before, participants were randomly assigned to either a realization
treatment, in which outcomes were realized by the end of the third round
or a paper treatment. The procedure in the two treatments was the same as
in experiment one. Both experiments were conducted in the Mannheim Ex-
perimental Laboratory (mLab) and the AWI Experimental Laboratory at the
University of Heidelberg.14 We recruited 304 participants in total, 95 of them
were assigned to experiment two and 209 to experiment three. A smaller
14 The additional lab was added to obtain a larger subject pool. Participants who had already
participated in experiment one were excluded.
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sample size was required in experiment two as a symmetric lottery generates
sufficient observations for gains and losses more easily. The demographics of
participants in experiments two and three are similar to those in experiment
one (see Table 2.1).
Results of Experiment 2 (Symmetric Lottery)
We first analyze the investment behavior of participants who accumulate a
loss by the end of round three. Panel A of Table 2.5 presents the invested
amounts for those participants. Investments do not differ significantly across
treatments in the first three rounds. Comparing the changes in investment
between rounds three and four across treatments, the realization effect points
in the expected direction (DiD = 0.08, t(35) = 0.54, p = 0.59), but is small
and statistically insignificant. When analyzing the invested amounts within
each treatment, we find that participants who have a paper loss by the end
of round three do not increase their investment (0.00), and participants who
have a realized loss tend to slightly decrease their investment (−0.08, t(14) =
0.73, p = 0.48). Participants thus seem not to invest differently after a paper
or a realized loss. In particular, we do not observe more risk-taking after
paper losses.
Panel B of Table 2.5 shows the invested amounts of participants with an
accumulated gain by the end of round three. Similar to losses, the realization
effect cannot be observed in the symmetric lottery setting (DiD = −0.03,
t(55) = 0.18, p = 0.86) for gains. The change in investment between rounds
three and four in the paper treatment (−0.11, t(26) = 0.69, p = 0.50) and the
realization treatment (−0.08, t(29) = 0.89, p = 0.38) points in the same direc-
tion. After a paper as well as a realized gain, participants tend to invest sim-
ilarly. Consistent with hypothesis H4, we find no evidence for a realization
effect after gains or losses when the investment opportunity is symmetric.
Looking at investments on participant level, we find that 53% of the par-
ticipants do not change their invested amount between rounds three and four
(fairly independent of treatment). Any overall effect would thus have to rely
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on a subset of participants to make strong changes in their investments. We
also find that the absence of the realization effect does not depend on the
round(s) in which participants win in the lottery.
Table 2.5: Risk-Taking in the Symmetric Lottery
Panel A: Risk-taking after losses
Invested amount Change
Treatment Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 R4−R3 N
Paper 1.40 1.37 1.45 1.45 0.00 22
(0.00)
Realization 1.57 1.50 1.53 1.45 −0.08 15
(0.73)
Difference −0.17 −0.13 −0.08 0.00 0.08
(0.94) (0.67) (0.39) (0.04) (0.54)
Panel B: Risk-taking after gains
Invested amount Change
Treatment Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 R4−R3 N
Paper 1.35 1.15 1.19 1.08 −0.11 27
(1.75)
Realization 1.43 1.56 1.38 1.30 −0.08 30
(1.27)
Difference 0.08 −0.41 −0.19 −0.22 −0.03
(0.55) (2.97) (1.17) (1.16) (0.18)
Note: The table shows the average invested amounts in the lottery for all rounds of experi-
ment 2 (in Euro). Panel A is restricted to participants who have a loss by the end of round
three, Panel B shows averages for all participants who have a gain by the end of round three.
Both panels show results by treatment (paper and realization) and differences between treat-
ments. Change is the difference between the investment in the final round and round three.
N provides the number of participants for each treatment-outcome combination. T-values
of a two-sided t-test are shown in parentheses.
Finally, we test whether participants in the paper treatment do not in-
crease their investment after a loss because their losses are too high to break
even in the final lottery. In contrast, the positively skewed lottery always
allowed to break even. We split the sample of participants with accumu-
lated losses into those who have earnings by the end of round three that are
smaller than EUR 5.34 and those who have earnings between EUR 5.34 and
EUR 8.00 (the highest possible gain in the final lottery is 2.33 ∗ 2− 2 = EUR
2.66). Despite the resulting small sample size, we find that participants with
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paper losses tend to invest differently depending on whether break-even is
possible or not. Those who cannot break even tend to decrease the invested
amount in round four by on average EUR 0.38, whereas participants who can
break even tend to increase the invested amount by EUR 0.11. That people
favor bet sizes that allow them to break even is consistent with hypothesis
H3a. However, given the small sample size of participants with a paper loss
(N=22), the effect remains insignificant and has to be interpreted with cau-
tion.
Results of Experiment 3 (Negatively Skewed Lottery)
We again start by examining the investment behavior of participants who
accumulated a loss by the end of round three. Most of these participants
lost only once but remained in the loss domain. Panel A of Table 2.6 shows
the investments in all rounds for these participants by treatment. Levels
and changes in investment between rounds do not differ significantly across
treatments. Considering the difference of the changes in investment from
round three to round four across treatments, the realization effect points in
the expected direction (DiD = 0.05, t(68) = 0.36, p = 0.72), but is small and
statistically insignificant. Participants in both treatments react similarly to a
loss by slightly reducing their investments (−0.04, t(31) = 0.45, p = 0.66 and
−0.09, t(37) = 1.17, p = 0.25).
The investments for participants with gains by the end of round three
are displayed in Panel B of Table 2.6. As for losses, we do not find a sig-
nificant realization effect for gains in this setting. Participants do not invest
differently after a paper and a realized gain (0.00 and 0.00). In fact, the in-
vestments on average do not change at all between round three and round
four. Results change very little if we restrict the sample to those participants
who experience three successes in a row (N=121). In line with hypothesis
H4, we do not find evidence for a realization effect when participants invest
in a negatively skewed lottery. This supports theoretical predictions that the
realization effect depends on the positive skewness of the lottery.
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Table 2.6: Risk-Taking in the Negatively Skewed Lottery
Panel A: Risk-taking after losses
Invested amount Change
Treatment Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 R4−R3 N
Paper 1.53 1.66 1.67 1.63 −0.04 32
(0.45)
Realization 1.70 1.79 1.78 1.69 −0.09 38
(1.17)
Difference −0.17 −0.13 −0.11 −0.06 0.05
(1.24) (1.11) (0.91) (0.49) (0.36)
Panel B: Risk-taking after gains
Invested amount Change
Treatment Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 R4−R3 N
Paper 1.45 1.60 1.60 1.60 0.00 70
(0.00)
Realization 1.58 1.71 1.67 1.67 0.00 64
(0.00)
Difference −0.13 −0.09 −0.07 −0.07 0.00
(1.38) (1.15) (0.71) (0.76) (0.00)
Note: The table shows the average invested amounts in the lottery for all rounds of experi-
ment 3 (in Euro). Panel A is restricted to participants who have a loss by the end of round
three, Panel B shows averages for all participants who have a gain by the end of round three.
Both panels show results by treatment (paper and realization) and differences between treat-
ments. Change is the difference between the investment in the final round and round three.
N provides the number of participants for each treatment-outcome combination. T-values
of a two-sided t-test are shown in parentheses.
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2.4 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine whether and under which conditions a distinction
between realized and unrealized prior outcomes leads to differential subse-
quent risk-taking. We formalize our thoughts in a model of mental accounts
that people use to keep track of their paper gains and losses. A mental ac-
count is closed when an investment episode ends and outcomes are realized.
For losses, recent experimental evidence finds that individuals take less risk
after a realized loss and more risk after a paper loss, which is referred to as
the realization effect. It is tempting to conclude from this result that realiza-
tion per se has a strong effect on subsequent behavior. We first ask whether
– as our theory predicts – the finding generalizes to the gain domain, i.e.,
whether a realization effect can also be observed after gains. Second, we
identify positive skewness as a necessary condition to observe the realiza-
tion effect. As such, our results show that conclusions about the universality
of the realization effect have to be drawn with some caution.
The main objectives and findings from our study can be summarized as
follows: We replicate the result by Imas (2016) for losses, extend the anal-
ysis to gains and test the boundary conditions of the effect with respect to
the skewness of the investment opportunity. Using the same experimental
setting and a larger sample size than the original study, we show that the
realization effect also exists for gains. We thus show that the framework of
realization is independent of the sign of prior outcomes as it holds not only
for losses but also for gains. However, at the same time, the effect turns out to
be sensitive to changes in the skewness of the underlying investment oppor-
tunity. We do not find differential risk-taking after paper and realized out-
comes for non-positively skewed lotteries. This finding documents the im-
portance of learning more about the conditions under which the effect arises
and informs judgments about its external validity.
The results confirm theoretical predictions that a realization effect mostly
occurs in positively skewed lotteries. The analysis of risk-taking in non-
positively skewed lotteries, in particular, in negatively skewed lotteries has
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received less attention in the literature. One recent exception is contempo-
raneous work by Nielsen (2019), who examines risk-taking under negatively
skewed outcome distributions for realized and unrealized losses. Using a
different realization mechanism and a different investment task in which in-
dividuals can choose the skewness of their preferred option, she finds no
realization effect for negatively skewed outcomes. Her finding is in line with
our results and further supports the conclusion that the realization of out-
comes does not always induce differences in risk-taking compared to settings




The Portfolio Composition Effect ∗
3.1 Introduction
How do investors evaluate their portfolio investment decisions? In mod-
els such as portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952), portfolio evaluation reduces
to two integral parameters: expected returns and variance of returns. The
fundamental rule concerning choice of portfolio is that wealth between two
financial securities (e.g. stocks or even entire portfolios) should be allocated
such that the overall expected return is maximized for any given variance of
returns. While this is an excellent normative advice given the assumptions
of the model, various studies have shown that individuals’ actual invest-
ment behavior substantially diverges from what basic portfolio theory im-
plies (Barber and Odean, 2000; Benartzi and Thaler, 2001; Barber and Odean,
2013).
In this article, we study one specific allocation decision of the portfolio
choice problem, namely, how individuals’ investment decisions in given, pre-
determined portfolios are affected by different levels of performance infor-
mation. In particular, we ask whether investors consider information from
both, the overall portfolio level as well as the individual stock level, when evalu-
ating a portfolio’s performance and, if so, how this two-level informational
∗ Authors: Jan Müller-Dethard and Martin Weber. Jan Müller-Dethard and Martin Weber are
at the University of Mannheim. For valuable comments, we thank Alex Imas, participants
of the SPUDM 2019, Annual Meeting of the SJDM 2019, MPI Workshop 2019 in Bonn, and
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support by the Stiegler Foundation, the Reinhard Selten Scholarship by the GfeW, and the
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setup ultimately affects their portfolio investment decisions. We document a
new stylized fact about how individuals evaluate and allocate funds across
portfolios: a person’s willingness to invest in a portfolio depends on the port-
folio’s composition of winner and loser stocks. We term the effect that indi-
viduals allocate larger funds to those portfolios which consist of more winner
than loser stocks than to alternative portfolios with more loser than winner
stocks – despite identical overall realized and expected returns as well as variance
– the portfolio composition effect.
We explain its occurrence by combining two well-established frameworks
from psychology which are category-based thinking and mental accounting
(Rosch and Lloyd, 1978; Thaler, 1999; Shefrin and Statman, 1987). Investors
assign stocks to individual mental accounts, whereby they are reluctant to in-
tegrate outcomes across different accounts (Frydman et al., 2017). However,
once they evaluate a whole portfolio, and are presented with all information
together, they deviate from this strong form of narrow framing and engage in
a “semi-joint” evaluation of individual stock outcomes. This means, they as-
sign stocks based on the most salient difference across them, into one of two
categories which is either “winner” stocks or “loser” stocks. Given the com-
plexity of full integration and individuals’ reluctance to integrate outcomes
across different mental accounts which are assigned to different or one and
the same category, they simply engage in a counting heuristic to evaluate a
portfolio investment decision. This is they count the number of mental ac-
counts (i.e. stocks) which are assigned to either the “winner” or the “loser”
category, compare these values to one another, and evaluate portfolios based
on their composition of winner and loser stocks rather than their overall (ex-
pected) return and overall (expected) risk.
To test this framework and as such to investigate how different levels of
performance information influence portfolio investment decisions, we define
a simple, counting-based measure calculated from performance information
on the individual stock level. This is the number of stocks with positive re-
turn since purchase (hereafter called "winner stocks") relative to the number
of stocks with negative return since purchase (hereafter called "loser stocks").
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Using data from a series of investment experiments with almost 1200 partic-
ipants, we show that the proposed portfolio composition measure influences
participants’ willingness to invest in a pre-determined portfolio. Motivated
by this finding, we turn to financial market data and show that portfolio com-
position matters not only for individual investment decisions in an experi-
mental setting, but also for the demand of exchange-traded funds replicating
leading equity market indices.
In chronological order, we first show that the documented effect exists in
an arguably simple investment task in which realized portfolio returns are
identical. Within our baseline experimental scenario, individuals invest on
average 26% (22%) more of their endowment in a portfolio which consists of
70% winner/30% loser stocks than in an alternative portfolio with identical
realized positive (negative) return, but the reversed composition of 30% win-
ner/70% loser stocks. Participants are also more optimistic in their return ex-
pectations and report lower risk evaluations for those portfolios which con-
sist of more winner than loser stocks.
Second, we try to get rid of the effect by controlling participants’ beliefs
about expected returns and variance. In particular, we test whether the ef-
fect still persists if portfolios are identical not only with respect to realized
returns, but also with respect to expected returns and variance. We rerun the
baseline experiment, but explain the underlying data generating process of
returns to participants. In the spirit of a Bayesian updating task, participants
can now learn about the expected returns of each portfolio before they make
an investment decision. Still, we find a strong portfolio composition effect
among those participants who state the same beliefs about expected returns.
Finally, we put the effect to a severe test. This means, we (i) extent the
learning phase prior to the investment decision, (ii) provide computational
support for the calculation of expected returns, and (iii) clearly display both,
the resulting expected returns as well as the variance of each portfolio. Im-
portantly, we design portfolios in a way that there is a unique mean-variance
efficient allocation which suggests an equal split of wealth between port-
folios. Even in this setting, participants invest more in the more favorably
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composed portfolio and by doing so choose a mean-variance suboptimal al-
location. Compared to the baseline result, the effect gets even stronger with a
43% larger investment of the endowment in the 70% winner/30% loser port-
folio relative to the alternative portfolio with identical realized and expected
return as well as variance, but the reversed portfolio composition.
Taken together, we show experimentally that a portfolio’s composition of
winner and loser stocks affects an investor’s willingness to invest in a port-
folio. Specifically, this effect persists when controlling for investors’ beliefs
about expected returns and variance, and as such is not predicted by theories
that assume mean-variance efficient portfolio selection (Markowitz, 1952).
Consistent with our framework of category-based thinking and mental ac-
counting, our findings suggest that individuals evaluate overall portfolio in-
vestment decisions not only on the portfolio level, but also on the individual
stock level. It seems to matter to investors how an overall portfolio return has
been achieved with respect to the performance of its individual components.
In a next step, we apply our findings on the evaluation of portfolios from
a controlled experimental setting to real market data. In particular, we in-
vestigate whether historical fund flows of exchange-traded funds on lead-
ing European and North-American equity market indices from the period
2016-2019 are affected by the index composition of winner and loser stocks.
Leading equity market indices represent ideal portfolio settings to test our
hypothesis as they resemble relatively stable and transparent predetermined
portfolios with respect to the members of the index over time. Moreover,
market indices capture a lot of attention in the media and press of the re-
spective country since they are often referred to as indicators of a country’s
economy.
We estimate that our portfolio composition measure, defined as the num-
ber of winner stocks on day t divided by the sum of the number of winner
and loser stocks on day t, is positively correlated to fund flows on the sub-
sequent day t+1. Across all leading equity market indices in our sample,
we estimate that a portfolio composition of 100% winner stocks leads on av-
erage to $1,119,000 higher inflows on the subsequent day than a portfolio
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composition of 50% winner and 50% loser stocks. In relative terms, this in-
flow presents roughly 19% of the average daily fund inflow of an ETF in our
sample. Interestingly, when splitting our sample by region, we do not find a
similar effect for the two North-American market indices (Dow Jones Indus-
trial Average and S&P500/TSX). Several robustness analyses show that the
effect is of rather short-term, daily nature, does not crucially depend on the
tails of the portfolio composition distribution, and persists when controlling
for the mathematically related measure of return dispersion. In light of the
determinants of index ETF fund flows (Elton et al., 2004; Clifford et al., 2014),
our findings suggest that an index composition of winner and loser stocks
affects future fund flows of the underlying ETF in addition to the index re-
turn. In essence, the composition of winner versus loser stocks in a portfolio
matters not only for individual investment decisions in an experimental en-
vironment, but also for net flows of exchange-traded funds on leading equity
market indices.
Throughout this paper, we argue that the evaluation of portfolio invest-
ment decisions is impacted by information on how the entire portfolio per-
forms as well as by information on how each individual position in the port-
folio performs. However, this reasoning implies that investors receive or at
least have access to this information (on the portfolio level as well as on the
individual stock level) when they evaluate their pre-determined (e.g. index
funds) or self-selected portfolios of stocks. A look at how performance infor-
mation is displayed by most online brokers and financial websites gives indi-
cation that this is indeed the case. The left part of Figure 3.1 shows exemplary
which performance information investors usually receive by their online bro-
kers when they log into their accounts. Performance information is provided
on the overall portfolio level (e.g. the current portfolio value and the pur-
chase value) as well as on the individual asset level (e.g. the return of each
position in the portfolio). The information is similarly displayed if investors
search online for the performance of pre-determined portfolios such as for
example equity market indices. The right part of Figure 3.1 shows exem-
plary which performance information of the leading German equity market
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index DAX 30 an investor receives on the publicly available financial web-
site onvista. Again, the overall portfolio (index) performance as well as the
performance of each stock is clearly displayed.
Figure 3.1: How Portfolio Performance Information Is Displayed
Note: The left part of the figure shows a screenshot of how performance information of a
portfolio is usually displayed to investors by online brokers (here: Comdirect). The right
part of the figure shows how performance information of leading equity market indices is
presented to investors on most financial websites (here: onvista).
In addition to this, the format of how performance information is dis-
played to investors suggests that they may easily gain an impression of a
portfolio’s composition of winner and loser stocks. Especially, the color cod-
ing of gains and losses facilitates the distinction between winner and loser
stocks. Some financial websites report composition measures similar to ours.
For various equity market indices, the financial website onvista depicts the
number of "Top stocks" (i.e. winners) and "Flop stocks" (i.e. losers) of an
index in a pie chart close to the overall index performance (see Figure 3.1).
This paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, we contribute
to research on household and retail investor trading behavior in financial
markets. Research in this field has advocated – for a long time – the sim-
ple assumption that investors consider stocks in a portfolio in isolation, so to
say, detached from one another (Frydman et al., 2017). In particular, the role
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of the portfolio for investment decisions on the individual-stock level has
widely been ignored. So far, most analyses of well-known trading patterns
(e.g. the disposition effect) focus on individual assets rather than the port-
folio. This is especially questionable not at least because many households
and retail investors hold portfolios of assets (self-selected or predetermined).
A paper which takes a step in this direction and analyzes trading behavior
by taking the portfolio setting into account is Hartzmark (2015). He shows
that a selected stock in a portfolio is traded differently depending on how the
other stocks in the portfolio perform (e.g. the rank effect). In another study,
An et al. (2019) find that the portfolio’s overall return matters for individ-
ual stock trading (e.g. the portfolio-driven disposition effect). Even though,
our paper focuses on the question whether the willingness to invest in a pre-
determined portfolio depends on the performance of its stocks, our findings
may also have implications for how individual stocks are traded given the
performance of the portfolio, in particular the composition of winner and
loser stocks of the portfolio. As such, the proposed measure of portfolio
composition might not only help to better understand households’ and re-
tail investors’ buying and selling decisions of entire portfolios, but also of
individual assets within portfolios.
Beyond individual-stock trading behavior in the context of self-selected
portfolios, our findings have implications for portfolio-type assets such as
ETFs and mutual funds. So far, a vast majority of studies has examined how
retail investors evaluate and trade individual assets. The main focus, by and
large, has been on individual stocks (Odean, 1998; Barber and Odean, 2000,
2001, 2008, 2013; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000; Feng and Seasholes, 2005).1
More recently, studies started to investigate the selling behavior of investors
in and across asset classes other than single stocks, such as equity mutual
funds and index funds (Calvet et al., 2009; Boldin and Cici, 2010; Chang et al.,
2016; Bhattacharya et al., 2017). We show in our analysis that portfolio com-
position affects net fund flows of leading equity market index ETFs. A next
1 Besides stocks, trading behavior has been examined for executive stock options (Heath et al.,
1999), real estate (Genesove and Mayer, 2001), and online betting (Hartzmark and Solomon,
2012).
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step could be to investigate whether portfolio composition affects investors’
index and mutual fund trading behavior on the individual investor account
level.
Third, our findings contribute to experimental and theoretical work on
how individuals evaluate risk. Already Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968) and
more recently Anzoni and Zeisberger (2016) as well as Holzmeister et al.
(2020) find that the probability to experience losses is a much stronger pre-
dictor of risk perception than return volatility. Our findings suggest that par-
ticipants perceive portfolios with more loser stocks to be riskier than portfo-
lios with more winner stocks, although the portfolios have the identical re-
turn volatility. Our paper is also related to the work by Barberis and Huang
(2001) on risk preference specifications. They test whether narrowly framed
(individual-stock level) or broadly framed (portfolio level) fluctuations in the
value of an investment, assuming prospect theory preferences, can explain
various patterns in the time series and cross section of historical stock returns.
Our paper provides experimental evidence of some of the assumptions made
in Barberis and Huang’s (2001) model. Our findings indicate that portfolio
value fluctuations alone cannot explain participants’ investment decisions as
well as their risk assessments. As proposed by Barberis and Huang (2001)
and consistent with our experimental results, a combination of the narrowly
framed and the broadly framed risk preference specification is most likely to
fit best to how individuals evaluate risk in a portfolio setting.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, we
provide a theoretical framework and experimental evidence of the portfo-
lio composition effect. In Section 3.3, the insights from our experiments are
applied to financial market data. In the final section, we discuss the implica-
tions of the effect and conclude.
3.2 Experimental Evidence
The evaluation of portfolio investment decisions is complex. Investors are
faced with much information and should – if they take normative advice –
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solve an optimization problem. The area in psychology referred to as judg-
ment and decision-making has shown that individuals often tend to simplify
the world to cope with its complexity. Thereby, one of the strongest tenden-
cies of humans is to classify objects into categories based on some similarity
among them (Rosch and Lloyd, 1978). Already in the 1950s, Allport et al.
(1954) concludes that “categorical thinking is a natural and inevitable ten-
dency of the human mind” (p. 171). A framework which builds on this
finding is mental accounting (Thaler, 1985, 1999; Shefrin and Statman, 1987).
It describes the rules individuals engage in when grouping and evaluating
outcomes and choices.
A common assumption of mental accounting theories that are applied to
portfolio investment decisions is that investors assign each stock to a distinct
mental account (i.e. stock-by-stock accounting, see Hartzmark, 2015; Fryd-
man et al., 2017), whereby each mental account defines a separate investment
episode (Barberis and Xiong, 2012). Outcomes within one and the same men-
tal account are evaluated jointly, whereas outcomes across different mental
accounts are evaluated separately. In particular, this framework implies that
individuals are reluctant to integrate gains and losses across different mental
accounts, which – applied to a portfolio – suggests that they do not evaluate
outcomes across different stocks jointly, but rather distinctly as individual,
stock-specific gains and losses.
However, once individuals evaluate a whole portfolio of stocks, informa-
tion is often presented together, which suggests a joint rather than a sep-
arate evaluation. In situations in which information is presented together,
research in psychology has shown that individuals focus on differences be-
tween the alternatives, when comparing information (Hsee, 1996; List, 2002;
Kahneman, 2003). The most salient difference of stocks in a portfolio is prob-
ably whether a stock trades at a gain or at a loss. In terms of categorical
thinking, this suggests that mental accounts and hence stocks are assigned
to one of two distinct categories, namely “winner” stocks or “loser” stocks.
Given that the evaluation of outcomes across mental accounts – even across
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stocks which are all assigned to the same category – requires investors to in-
tegrate outcomes which they are reluctant to do and which is difficult, they
may rather follow a simple counting heuristic when they evaluate portfo-
lio investment decisions: They may count the number of distinct mental ac-
counts (i.e. stocks) they have assigned to one and the same category rather
than aggregating outcomes across different mental accounts within and/or
across different categories. As a consequence, investors compare the number
of “winner” stocks to the number of “loser” stocks rather than the overall
(expected) portfolio return to the overall (expected) portfolio risk.
To deal with large amounts of information of complex decision problems,
research in psychology has shown that individuals tend to use simplifying
decision procedures such as counting heuristics or so called "tallying strate-
gies" (i.e. equal weighting of cues) (Dawes, 1979; Rieskamp and Hoffrage,
1999). An application of this insight for finance has recently been proposed
by Ungeheuer and Weber (2020). They find that individuals understand de-
pendence between assets, but not in terms of correlation. Instead, individuals
invest as if they apply a counting heuristic for the frequency of comovement
of returns.
To test the predictions of our framework and as such the effect of a port-
folio’s composition of winner and loser stocks on the portfolio investment
choice, we define a simple, counting-based measure of portfolio composi-
tion:
Number o f winner stocks
Number o f winner stocks + Number o f loser stocks
(3.1)
A stock is counted as a winner stock, if the stock has a positive realized return
since purchase and it is counted as a loser stock, if it has a negative realized
return since purchase.2 Stocks with zero return are not included in the mea-
sure. Based on the proposed framework, we make the following predictions:
2 Later, in the fund flow analysis, we will define winner and loser stocks based on their daily
returns.
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H1: Holding overall realized returns constant across portfolios, participants
invest more in the portfolio with the larger portfolio composition mea-
sure (i.e. more winner than loser stocks).
H2: Holding overall realized and expected returns as well as variance constant
across portfolios, participants invest more in the portfolio with the
larger portfolio composition measure (i.e. more winner than loser
stocks).
To test the two hypotheses and to analyze whether portfolio composition
influences investment decisions, we conduct three investment experiments
with in total 1193 participants. In all experiments, participants are asked to
allocate an endowment between two portfolios which differ in the proposed
composition measure, but are identical with respect to overall realized re-
turns (baseline treatments in experiment 1) and in addition with respect to
overall expected return and variance (baseline treatments in experiment 2
and 3). We choose an allocation decision with only two portfolios and no
risk-free security to keep the investment task as simple as possible. Both
portfolios are similar in the sense that each portfolio consists of ten different,
equally weighted stocks and that the underlying portfolio return distribu-
tions share similar first and second moments resulting from the used return
generating process on the individual stock level, as described later on. In our
baseline treatments, portfolios only differ in the composition of winner and
loser stocks, but have identical overall realized portfolio returns (and iden-
tical overall expected portfolio returns and variance). We run further treat-
ments in which we also differ the realized (and expected) overall portfolio
returns across portfolios.
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3.2.1 Treatments in the Experiments
The first treatment dimension is the portfolio composition of winner and
loser stocks. We analyze two different portfolio compositions which are mir-
rored images of one another. The "winner" portfolio composition (Ws) con-
sists of seven winner (i.e. positive realized return) and three loser (i.e. neg-
ative realized return) stocks. The "loser" portfolio composition (Ls) consists
of three winner and seven loser stocks. Importantly, the magnitude of the re-
turns is determined such that the cross-sectional return variance is constant
across portfolios. The second treatment dimension of our experimental de-
sign is the overall portfolio return. A portfolio can either trade at a gain of
+10$ (Gp) or at a loss of -10$ (Lp). We combine the two treatment dimensions
to generate different types of portfolios. The following four types of portfolios re-
sult from all possible combinations of our treatment dimensions: GpWs, GpLs,
LpWs, and LpLs, where the first character denotes the overall portfolio return
(marked by the index p for portfolio-level information) and the second char-
acter the portfolio composition (marked by the index s for stock-level infor-
mation).
Since we are interested in within-subject comparisons, i.e. participants’
allocation decision of an endowment between two portfolios (i.e. two types
of portfolios), we combine two types of portfolio to one portfolio pair. Treatments
are then defined by portfolio pairs which in turn are defined by the differ-
ences in the respective treatment dimensions. We will first focus on the two
portfolio pairs GpWs − GpLs and LpWs − LpLs. These portfolio pairs define
our baseline treatments. They allow us to directly isolate the effect of port-
folio composition on investment decisions holding overall realized returns
constant across portfolios. In section 1.4, we will discuss the experimental
results of further treatments which result from the remaining possible com-
binations of the two treatment dimensions. Table 3.1 provides an overview
of all treatments.
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Table 3.1: Overview of Treatments in Experiment 1, 2, and 3
Treatment dimensions
Treat- Portfolio Portfolio Portfolio Portfolio Portfolio
ment return composition return displayed pair 1 pair 2
1 same different yes GpWs − GpLs LpWs − LpLs
2 same different no GpWs − GpLs GpWs − LpLs
3 different same yes GpWs − LpWs GpWs − LpLs
4 different same no GpWs − LpWs GpWs − LpLs
5 different different yes GpWs − LpLs GpWs − LpWs
6 different different no GpWs − LpLs GpWs − LpWs
Note: Each experiment has six treatments (except for experiment 3 with only one treatment).
Each treatment consists of two portfolio pairs. A portfolio pair consists of two portfolios.
Portfolios differ in one or several of three treatments dimensions which are (1) overall port-
folio return, (2) portfolio composition and (3) the display format of the portfolio return.
Portfolio pairs are described by letter pairs (e.g. GpWS − GpLS). The first letter of each pair
corresponds to the overall portfolio return (Gp: Portfolio trades at a gain, Lp: Portfolio trades
at a loss) and the second letter corresponds to the portfolio composition (WS: More winner
than loser stocks, LS: More loser than winner stocks). For example, portfolio pair 1 in treat-
ment 1 is denoted as GpWS − GpLS. The label GpWS − GpLS means that both portfolios of
this pair trade at the same gain denoted by the first letter Gp, but differ in the portfolio com-
position denoted by the second letter WS and LS. All treatments are run in experiment 1 and
2. In experiment 3 only treatment 1 portfolio pair 1 is run.
Figure 3.2 demonstrates how the pairs of portfolios are presented to par-
ticipants. Exemplary, the portfolio pair GpWs − GpLs is shown. Both portfo-
lios have the same realized positive return. Portfolio GpWs is mainly com-
posed of winner stocks, while portfolio GpLs is mainly composed of loser
stocks. The amount of information is deliberately reduced to a minimum to
ensure a simple design which focuses on the main research question. At the
same time, we ensure to provide the set of information investors usually ob-
tain on the overview page of an exemplary online broker account. There are
two levels of information. First, investors receive information on the indi-
vidual stock level. They can see a list of their stock holdings and for each
position the return in US dollar over the entire investment horizon. Second,
they receive information on the overall portfolio level. They can observe the
total return in US dollar of their portfolio which is the sum of the returns of
the individual positions. The way we present return information by color
coding gains and losses in green and red, respectively, is motivated by how
investors usually observe returns in their online broker accounts and on fi-
nancial websites (see Figure 3.1).
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Figure 3.2: Portfolio Pair GpWs − GpLs in Experiment 1 and 2
Note: The figure presents the portfolio pair GpWs − GpLs. On the left hand side, portfolio
GpWs, labeled Portfolio X, and on the right hand side portfolio GpLs, labeled Portfolio Y, are
demonstrated.
Besides the return information, participants are told about the number of
shares held of each stock, the investment horizon and other relevant informa-
tion in the introduction to the experiment. More details on the instructions
can be found in Appendix B.1.
3.2.2 The Return Generating Process
We build on experiment one in experiment two and three by keeping the ba-
sic design the same, but we reduce the degrees of freedom participants have
when forming beliefs about future returns. More precisely, while we do not
tell participants in experiment one the stochastic process of stock returns, we
introduce more structure in experiment two and three by telling them the re-
turn generating process of individual stocks. From this information and the
observed return realizations, participants can infer the expected overall port-
folio returns. This extension of the design allows us to keep both, the overall
realized return as well as the overall expected return identical across portfo-
lios. By doing so, we put the effect of portfolio composition on investment
decisions to a severe test. In essence, we test whether the effect still exists if
participants know that the portfolios will make exactly the same return on
expectation.
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The return generating process used in experiment two and three is a
Bayesian updating task motivated by Grether (1980) and recently adopted
by Kuhnen (2015). There are two types of stocks, "good" stocks that draw
returns from a good distribution and "bad" stocks that draw returns from
a bad distribution. Both distributions are binary and have symmetric
stock-specific outcomes (−Xi or Xi). In the good distribution, the probability
that stock i increases in value by Xi is 70%, while the probability that it
decreases in value by Xi is 30%. In the bad distribution, the probabilities are
reversed, i.e. stock i increases in value by Xi with probability of 30%, while
it decreases in value by Xi with probability of 70%. The expected return can
easily be calculated and is 0.4Xi for a good stock and −0.4Xi for a bad stock.
At the beginning of the experiment, participants do not know whether a
stock draws from the good or bad distribution, i.e. it is equally likely that
a stock draws from either of the two distributions. Over the course of the
experiment, participants observe stock return realizations from which they
can learn about a stock’s type and thus its expected return. From this infor-
mation and the fact that stocks are equally weighted, they can calculate the
expected return of the portfolio from the expected returns of the individual
stocks within the portfolio. The computer helps subjects to do the calcula-
tions. In particular, subjects are asked to assess a stock’s quality and then,
based on the assessment, the computer calculates the expected return of the
stock. We want to emphasize that while subjects do not need to do the cal-
culations on their own, we explain to them and also test their understanding
of how the computer calculates expected returns by the answers they give to
comprehension questions at the beginning of the experiment (see Appendix
B.1).
Besides expected returns, we design portfolios such that the portfolio re-
turn volatility (i.e. the variance of portfolio returns in the time series) is also
identical across portfolios. In other words, we ensure that the portfolios in
our baseline treatments share identical expected risk-return characteristics
measured by an identical expected Sharpe ratio. As a consequence of this
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design feature, we can also easily mathematically demonstrate how an ex-
pected utility maximizing agent with mean-variance preferences should in-
vest given the data generating process and the chosen portfolio options in
our experiments. Based on standard portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952), an
agent achieves the largest Sharpe ratio by investing equal amounts in each of
the two portfolios in our baseline treatments.3
Figure 3.3: Portfolio Pair GpWs − GpLs in Experiment 3
Note: This figure presets the portfolio pair GpWs − GpLs. On the left hand side, portfolio
GpWs, labeled Portfolio X, and on the right hand side portfolio GpLs, labeled Portfolio Y, are
presented. For each stock, the binary outcomes are displayed in parentheses, the number of
positive return days, the number of negative return days and the total change in value are
shown.
In experiment two and three, portfolio composition is now defined by the
number of good (i.e. positive expected return) stocks relative to bad (i.e. neg-
ative expected return) stocks. In experiment two, we use the same composi-
tion ratios and the same number of return realizations as in experiment one
to allow direct comparability between experiments (winner portfolio: seven
good/three bad stocks, loser portfolio: three good/seven bad stocks). In ex-
periment three, we also use the same composition ratios, but increase the
number of return realizations from one to thirty. This extension of the design
ensures that the uncertainty about a stock’s type, and consequently the un-
certainty about its expected return, is reduced close to zero. This means that
participants can be sure about the expected portfolio returns they calculate
after observing thirty realizations per stock. Since we provide participants
3 Appendix Part B.3 provides more details.
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in experiment three with more return realizations than in experiment one
and two, we have to adjust the way information is presented to participants.
Figure 3.3 shows how information is displayed to participants in experiment
three. Participants can see for each stock the number of positive return re-
alizations, the number of negative return realizations, and the resulting total
change in value of each stock. Summing up these individual changes in value
leads to the total change in portfolio value, which is clearly displayed below
all portfolio holdings.
3.2.3 Experimental Procedure, Participants, and the Third
Treatment Dimension
In all experiments, participants are told to imagine that they have invested
$1000 in each of two equally weighted portfolios of stocks one month ago (at
t = -1) and that they can now (at t = 0) observe the performance of their in-
vestment over the last month. Afterwards, they make an investment decision
(i.e. they allocate $1000 between the two portfolios) for another one-month
investment period (till t = 1) at the end of which all returns are realized. They
are told that each portfolio consists of ten different stocks and that they in-
vested equal amounts of money in each stock. In experiment one, each par-
ticipant sees two pairs of portfolios one after the other in randomized order.
In experiment two and three, the number of portfolio pairs is reduced to one
pair per participant.
In all experiments, there are two periods framed as months: a learning
period of one month and an investment period of one month. In experiment
one and two, participants are presented one return realization per stock per
month. In experiment three, we increase the number of observations from
one to thirty per month (similar to daily returns assuming trading on the
weekend). The learning period as well as the investment period consist of
thirty daily return realizations per stock instead of one monthly return real-
ization. Furthermore, portfolios are re-balanced and the end of the learning
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period to ensure equal weights of stocks when participants make the invest-
ment decision.
At the beginning of all experiments, we explain to participants how the
performance of stocks has to be read. We clearly tell them that returns are
shown as absolute changes in value of each stock over one month (one day).
We repeat this information each time stock returns are displayed to ensure
that participants know how to read the returns.
Besides the investment decision, we elicit additional variables. We ask
participants to estimate the expected portfolio return and to assess the riski-
ness of the portfolio. In experiment one, we also ask participants about their
satisfaction with the performance of the portfolio and about the confidence
in their investment decision.
On each screen, we first show participants the portfolios. Then, we ask
one of the above-listed questions including the investment task. Each ques-
tion was displayed on a separate screen and participants could not return to
change a previous answer. At the end of all experiments, participants’ de-
mographics, statistics skills, stock market experience and risk aversion were
asked.4
Besides portfolio composition and overall realized/expected portfolio re-
turn, we also investigate whether providing portfolio-level performance in-
formation to subjects affects investment choice. In particular, we add a third
treatment dimension that is whether overall portfolio returns are explicitly
displayed or not. Taken together, this results in four baseline treatments
(GpWs − GpLs with portfolio returns displayed, GpWs − GpLs without port-
folio returns displayed, LpWs − LpLs with portfolio returns displayed, and
LpWs − LpLs without portfolio returns displayed). We run all of these treat-
ments in experiment one and two. In experiment three, we only run the
treatment GpWs − GpLs with portfolio returns displayed, but conduct two
different conditions with respect to whether the expected portfolio variance
is displayed in addition to the expected portfolio returns.
4 Screenshots of the experiments can be seen in Appendix B.2
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We conducted all experiments online with 1193 participants from Ama-
zon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). MTurk facilitates access to a wide and diverse
pool of participants. Furthermore, there are studies showing that the data
obtained via the online platform is at least as reliable as those obtained via
traditional methods (Buhrmester et al., 2011). The average time it took par-
ticipants to finish experiment one (experiment two, experiment three) was
4 minutes and 20 seconds (10 minutes, 18 minutes). 61% (66%, 68%) of the
participants were male and the mean age of all participants was 34.7 years
(33.9 years, 32.6 years).
3.2.4 Results Experiment 1: The Portfolio Composition
Effect
In experiment one we test the effect of varying portfolio compositions on
portfolio investment decisions holding realized portfolio returns constant.
In line with Hypothesis H1, we expect that participants invest more in the
portfolio with the more favorable portfolio composition.
Our first main result provides evidence that this is indeed the case. Figure
3.4 shows the average investments in each portfolio for the baseline treatment
in which the overall portfolio returns are not explicitly displayed to partic-
ipants (left part of the figure) and for the baseline treatment in which the
overall portfolio returns are explicitly displayed to participants (right part of
the figure). We first discuss the results of the treatment in which the overall
portfolio return is not explicitly displayed. For those portfolios which have
the same realized gain (GpWs − GpLs), participants invest on average $265
out of $1000 (t(77)=6.24, p<0.001) more in the portfolio with the larger num-
ber of winner relative to loser stocks. The difference in average investment is
smaller for those portfolios which have the same realized loss (LpWs− LpLs).
In the loss case, participants invest on average $187 out of $1000 (t(77)=4.22,
p<0.001) more in the more favorably composed portfolio.
Is the effect simply caused by the fact that it is not obvious to participants
that both portfolios have identical realized returns? To test his, we also run
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Figure 3.4: Investment in Experiment 1 (Baseline Treatments)
Note: The figure shows participants’ mean investments in US dollar in each portfolio for the
two portfolio pairs GpWs − GpLs and LpWs − LpLs. The blue bars refer to Portfolio X which
corresponds to the first two letters of each portfolio pair (e.g. GpWs for the first portfolio
pair) and the red bars refer to Portfolio Y which corresponds to the second two letters of
each portfolio pair (e.g. GpLs for the first portfolio pair). Displayed are 95% confidence
intervals.
the baseline treatment with overall portfolio returns clearly displayed. We
still find a strong portfolio composition effect. If both portfolios realized the
same gain and this information is clearly displayed, participants invest on
average $258 out of $1000 (t(78)=6.37, p<0.001) more in the portfolio which
consists of more winner stocks. If both portfolios realized the same loss and,
again, this same loss is clearly displayed, participants invest on average $224
(t(78)=5.12, p<0.001) more in the portfolio which consists of more winner
stocks. As such, we can confidentially rule out that the effect depends on
whether the overall portfolio return is displayed or not. Even if the identical
overall realized return is shown to participants, they are still more willing
to invest in the portfolio with the larger number of winner than loser stocks.
In addition, the effect size, measured by the magnitude of the differences
in investment, is remarkably high in economic terms with 26% in the gain
domain and 23% in the loss domain.
Besides the investment, we also elicit participants’ satisfaction with the
performance of the portfolios, their beliefs about expected portfolio returns
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and the risk of the portfolios. We find that all of these variables are consistent
with participants’ investment decisions. Figure 3.5 summarizes participants’
average satisfaction levels (measured on a Likert scale from 1: low to 7: high).
Irrespective of whether the portfolio return is displayed or not, we find that
satisfaction levels are higher for those portfolios which consist of more win-
ner than loser stocks, even though realized portfolio returns are identical.
Figure 3.5: Satisfaction in Experiment 1 (Baseline Treatments)
Note: The figure shows participants’ mean satisfaction levels for each portfolio elicited on
a Likert scale from 1: low to 7: high for the two portfolio pairs GpWs − GpLs and LpWs −
LpLs. The blue bars refer to Portfolio X which corresponds to the first two letters of each
portfolio pair (e.g. GpWs for the first portfolio pair) and the red bars refer to Portfolio Y
which corresponds to the second two letters of each portfolio pair (e.g. GpLs for the first
portfolio pair). Displayed are 95% confidence intervals
In addition, we find that participants tend to provide more optimistic re-
turn expectations as well as lower risk assessments for those portfolios which
have more winner than loser stocks. Panel A of Figure 3.6 present partici-
pants’ average return expectations and Panel B their risk assessment. Taken
together, the composition of winner and loser stocks affects individuals’ port-
folio investment decision. In line with the investment decision, participants
also report more optimistic return expectations and lower risk assessments
for those portfolios which consist of more winner than loser stocks.
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Figure 3.6: Return Expectations and Risk Assessment in Experiment 1
(Baseline Treatments)
Note: Panel A shows participants’ mean expected returns in US dollar and Panel B shows
participants’ mean risk perception for each portfolio elicited on a Likert scale from 1: low
to 7: high for the two portfolio pairs GpWS − GpLS and LpWS − LpLS. The blue bars refer
to Portfolio X which corresponds to the first two letters of each portfolio pair (e.g. GpWs for
the first portfolio pair) and the red bars refer to Portfolio Y which corresponds to the second
two letters of each portfolio pair (e.g. GpLs for the first portfolio pair). Displayed are 95%
confidence intervals.
3.2.5 Results Experiment 2: Learning About Expected
Returns I
In a simple investment task, we have shown that a portfolio’s composition of
winner and loser stocks affects investors’ willingness to invest in a portfolio.
In experiment two, we aim to replicate the main finding from experiment
one, but under the important modification that we keep not only the over-
all realized returns constant across portfolios, but also the overall expected
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returns (and variance). In line with Hypothesis H2, we expect that partici-
pants invest more in the portfolio with a more favorable portfolio composi-
tion.
Figure 3.7: Investment in Experiment 2 (Baseline Treatments)
Note: The figure shows participants’ mean investments in US dollar in each portfolio for the
two portfolio pairs GpWS−GpLS and LpWS− LpLS. The blue bars refer to Portfolio X which
corresponds to the first two letters of each portfolio pair (e.g. GpWS for the first portfolio
pair) and the red bars refer to Portfolio Y which corresponds to the second two letters of
each portfolio pair (e.g. GpLS for the first portfolio pair). Displayed are 95% confidence
intervals.
We replicate the findings from experiment one. Figure 3.7 depicts partici-
pants’ average investments in each portfolio. Again, the left part of Figure 3.7
presents average investments when total portfolio returns are not displayed
and the right part when total portfolio returns are displayed. Irrespective of
whether the portfolio returns are displayed or not, we find that participants
invest significantly more in the portfolio which consists of more winner than
loser stocks. For the treatment in which both portfolios have the same real-
ized and expected positive return, participants invest on average $339 ($436
if portfolio returns are not displayed) more in the portfolio with the larger
number of winner to loser stocks (t(50)=6.62, p<0.001; t(49)=7.25, p<0.001).
For the treatment in which both portfolios have the same realized and ex-
pected negative return, participants invest on average $240 ($322 if portfolio
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returns are not displayed) more in the portfolio with the larger number of
winner to loser stocks (t(54)=4.46, p<0.001; t(40)=4.74, p<0.001). In the en-
tire sample, unconditional of subjects’ self-reported beliefs about expected
returns, we find as in experiment one a portfolio composition effect.
To test whether the effect still persists if subject’s self-reported beliefs
about expected returns are identical, we rerun the analysis on the subsample
of subjects who report – as Bayes’ rule implies – the same expected returns
for both portfolios. Even though, the sample size decreases quite signifi-
cantly with this restriction, we find for those participants who report exactly
the same beliefs about expected portfolio returns, a portfolio composition
effect. Figure 3.8 reports the average investment for this subsample.
Figure 3.8: Investment in Experiment 2 Conditional on Return
Expectations (Baseline Treatments)
Note: The figure shows participants’ mean investments in US dollar in each portfolio of
those participants who state the same expected returns for the two portfolios of a pair. The
portfolio pairs are GpWS − GpLS and LpWS − LpLS. The blue bars refer to Portfolio X which
corresponds to the first two letters of each portfolio pair (e.g. GpWS for the first portfolio
pair) and the red bars refer to Portfolio Y which corresponds to the second two letters of
each portfolio pair (e.g. GpLS for the first portfolio pair). Displayed are 95% confidence
intervals.
For the treatment in which portfolios have the same positive realized
return and participants report the same beliefs about expected portfolio
returns, we find that participants invest $356 more in the portfolio with more
winner than loser stocks (t(35)=4.38, p<0.001). For the treatment in which
portfolios have the same negative realized return and participants report
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the same beliefs about expected portfolio returns, we find that participants
invest $254 more in the portfolio with more winner than loser stocks than
in the alternative portfolio with more loser than winner stocks (t(34)=3.60,
p=0.001).
Besides the investment decisions and the return expectations, we also
elicit participants’ perception of risk. The results are reported in Appendix
B Figure B.13. Participants rate those portfolios which consist of more loser
than winner stocks to be riskier than those portfolios which consist of more
winner than loser stocks. The results are in line with the investment decisions
and replicate findings from experiment one.
3.2.6 Results Experiment 3: Learning About Expected
Returns II
In experiment three, we further test the robustness of our findings from our
two previous experiments. We build on experiment two (same realized and
expected portfolio returns), but extend the learning phase such that partici-
pants can learn from a larger number of return realizations before they make
their investment decision. In addition to that, we explicitly display to one
group of participants not only the calculated expected returns, but also the ex-
pected portfolio return volatility. This modification allows us to test whether the
documented portfolio composition effect still exists if subjects’ beliefs about
expected portfolio returns as well as their beliefs about expected portfolio
return volatility are identical across portfolios.
Figure 3.9 reports the average investment in each portfolio pooled and
split by condition (portfolio volatility not displayed and displayed) uncondi-
tional of participants’ beliefs. Figure 3.10 displays the results for those partic-
ipants who report beliefs about expected returns that are in line with Bayes.
In the entire sample, unconditional of participants’ beliefs about expected
returns, we find a strong portfolio composition effect. Participants invest on
average $2994 (out of $10000) more in the portfolio which consists of more
winner than loser stocks (t(101)=7.86, p<0.001). This finding is independent
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Figure 3.9: Investment in Experiment 3
Note: The figure shows participants’ mean investments in US dollar in each portfolio for the
portfolio pair GpWS −GpLS. The blue bar refers to Portfolio X which corresponds to the first
two letters of the portfolio pair (e.g. GpWS for the first portfolio pair) and the red bar refers
to Portfolio Y which corresponds to the second two letters of the portfolio pair (e.g. GpLS for
the first portfolio pair). Displayed are 95% confidence intervals.
of whether the portfolio variance is displayed or not. If we restrict the sam-
ple to those participants who report beliefs about expected returns which are
in line with Bayes, the effect persists and gets even stronger. Participants in
this subsample invest on average $4295 (out of $10000) more in the portfolio
with more winner than loser stocks than in an alternative portfolio with more
loser than winner stocks (t(58)=9.49, p<0.001). Again, and interestingly, this
finding is unaffected by whether the identical portfolio variance is displayed
to subjects or not. In other words, the portfolio composition effect persists
even in situations in which we can confidentially rule out that differences in
participants’ beliefs about expected portfolio returns and expected portfolio
return volatility can drive the observed differences in investments.
In addition to the investment choice and the beliefs about expected
returns, we also ask participants about a risk assessment for the portfolios.
Figure B.14 in Appendix B displays the average risk assessments uncondi-
tional of subjects’ expected portfolio returns and Figure B.15 in Appendix
B for those subjects who report identical beliefs about expected portfolio
returns. Consistent with results from previous experiments, we find that
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Figure 3.10: Investment in Experiment 3 Conditional on Expected Returns
Note: The figure shows participants’ mean investments in US dollar in each portfolio of
those participants who state the objective expected returns for the two portfolios of a pair.
The portfolio pair is GpWS − GpLS. The blue bar refers to Portfolio X which corresponds to
the first two letters of the portfolio pair (e.g. GpWS for the first portfolio pair) and the red bar
refers to Portfolio Y which corresponds to the second two letters of the portfolio pair (e.g.
GpLS for the first portfolio pair). Displayed are 95%confidence intervals.
participants evaluate the portfolio with more winner than loser stocks to
be less risky by 1.77 scores than the portfolio with more loser than winner
stocks (t(102)=9.55, p<0.001). If we restrict the sample to those subjects who
report identical beliefs about expected returns and volatility, we interestingly
still find that subjects evaluate the portfolio with more winner than loser
stocks to be less risky than the portfolio with more loser than winner stocks.
The difference in risk evaluation is even larger with 2.59 scores for this group
of participants (t(58)=11.77, p<0.001).
3.2.7 Further Experimental Results
Besides our baseline treatments (GpWs − GpLs and LpWs − LpLs), we run
four additional treatments in experiment one and two (see Table 3.1). The
additional treatments allow us to further test the robustness of the portfo-
lio composition effect. In the first two additional treatments, we hold the
portfolio composition identical across portfolios and differ the overall re-
alized (expected) portfolio return (GpWs − LpWs and GpLs − LpLs). In the
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second two additional treatments, we differ both, the portfolio composition
and the overall realized portfolio return across portfolios (GpWs − LpLs and
GpLs − LpWs).
These additional treatments allow us to make several within- and
between-treatment comparisons to better understand how portfolio invest-
ment decisions are affected by portfolio compositions and overall portfolio
returns: (1) How strong is the effect of differences in portfolio composition
on investment decisions as compared to the effect of differences in overall
realized and expected portfolio returns? (2) How does "consistent" perfor-
mance information (the portfolio with a positive realized return consists
mainly of winner stocks and the portfolio with a negative realized return
consists mainly of loser stocks) affect investment decisions as compared
to "inconsistent" performance information (the portfolio with a positive
realized return consists mainly of loser stocks, while the portfolio with a
negative realized return consists mainly of winner stocks)?
Figure 3.11 displays the mean investment in each portfolio for the four ad-
ditional treatments in experiment one.5 First, we find for those treatments in
experiment one in which we keep the portfolio composition constant and dif-
fer the overall realized portfolio return (i.e. GpWs − LpWs and GpLs − LpLs)
that participants invest on average $550 more in the portfolio with a positive
realized return than in the alternative portfolio with a negative realized re-
turn. This difference is unaffected by whether both portfolios consist mainly
of winner stocks or whether both portfolios consist mainly of loser stocks
(∆GpWs−LpWs versus ∆GpLs−LpLs).
Second, we provide further evidence of the portfolio composition effect
by comparing differences between the portfolio pairs GpWs − LpLs and
GpLs − LpWs. Across both portfolio pairs, we keep the difference in overall
realized (and expected) portfolio returns constant, but flip the portfolio
composition (i.e. the portfolio with a positive realized and expected return
consisting mainly of winners/losers is changed to the portfolio with a neg-
ative realized and expected return consisting mainly of losers/winners). As
5 The results of experiment two are similar and reported in Appendix B Figure B.19.
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Figure 3.11: Investment in Experiment 1 (Additional Treatments)
Note: The figure shows participants’ mean investments in US dollar in each portfolio for
the four portfolio pairs GpWS − LpWS and GpLS − LpLS (Panel A) and GpWS − LpLS and
GpLS − LpWS (Panel B). The blue bars refer to Portfolio X which corresponds to the first two
letters of each portfolio pair (e.g. GpWS for the first portfolio pair) and the red bars refer to
Portfolio Y which corresponds to the second two letters of each portfolio pair (e.g. LpWS for
the first portfolio pair). Displayed are 95%confidence intervals.
an alternative test of the portfolio composition effect, we compare differences
in investment across two portfolio pairs instead of the investment between
two types of portfolios within one portfolio pair (see baseline treatments). If
portfolio composition does not matter for investment decisions, we expect
to observe no significant difference between participants’ mean investment
decisions across the portfolio pairs (∆GpWs−LpLs = ∆GpLs−LpWs). However,
we find significant differences in investment decisions. In particular, par-
ticipants in experiment one invest on average $633 more in portfolio GpWs
than in portfolio LpLs. This difference in investment reduces significantly
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by $171 (t(83)=3.60, p<0.001) to $462 for the portfolio pair GpLs − LpWs.
The resulting difference of the differences in investment provides further
evidence of a portfolio composition effect.
Table 3.2: Investment Behavior Across All Treatments
Dependent Variable Investment
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gain 311.2*** 260.6*** 264.9*** 220.0***
(17.61) (24.99) (21.52) 30.61
Winner 116.5*** 131.9*** 147.3*** 151.5***
(16.17) (23.60) (20.49) 30.41
Gain x Winner 28.08 41.73 36.17 62.12
(21.82) (31.72) (27.57) 39.43
Display −28.43 −22.72
(19.82) (23.36)
Display x Gain 101.2*** 88.89**
(35.00) (42.70)
Display x Winner −30.75 −8.746
(32.20) (40.94)
Display x Gain x Winner −27.30 −54.89
(43.58) (54.90)
Constant 279.1*** 293.3*** 284.8*** 296.4***
(9.919) (14.50) (11.67) (16.93)
Observations 1,936 1,936 1,213 1,213
R2 0.346 0.353 0.323 0.327
Note: The table shows the coefficients of OLS regressions of investment on a gain dummy
variable (1 if portfolio trades at a gain), a winner dummy variable (1 if portfolio has more
winner than loser assets), the interaction term of gain and winner, a display dummy variable
(1 if total portfolio return is displayed) and multiple interaction terms of the display, gain
and winner dummy variable. Regression (1) and (2) are run with data from experiment 1,
regression (3) and (4) are run with data from experiment 2. We cluster standard errors on
the individual investor level and on the portfolio pair level, standard errors are reported in
parentheses, and *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
We also run multivariate ordinary least squared regressions to test for a
portfolio composition effect across all treatments of experiment one and ex-
periment two. The dependent variable Investmentij is the invested amount
of subject i in portfolio j, Gainj is a dummy variable which is one if portfolio j
made a gain, Winnerj is a dummy variable which is one if portfolio j has more
winner than loser stocks and Displayj is a dummy variable which is one if
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the overall portfolio return is displayed. We use robust standard errors and
cluster on the subject and the portfolio pair level. Table 3.2 reports the results
for each experiment individually. In both experiments, we find a strong port-
folio composition effect. Subjects invest on average $116.50 ($147.30) more in
the portfolio which is mainly composed of winner stocks than in the portfo-
lio which is mainly composed of loser stocks. The effect is slightly stronger if
the total return is not displayed, although not statistically different.
Like in the baseline treatments, we find that participants’ self-elicited
level of satisfaction with the performance of the portfolios, their beliefs about
expected returns and risk assessment are in line with the observed invest-
ment decisions. Appendix B.4 displays the results.
3.3 From the Experiment to Financial Market Data
In a series of experiments, we have identified that participants make port-
folio investment decisions as if they evaluate portfolios based on a simple
counting heuristic of their compositions of winner and loser stocks. In what
follows, we take this finding outside the laboratory environment and test
whether portfolio composition also plays a role in how portfolio-like securi-
ties are bought and sold in financial markets. More precisely, we investigate
whether the demand for leading equity market index funds is influenced by
the proposed composition measure.
Leading equity market indices of national economies represent ideal port-
folio settings for our analysis. First, leading equity market indices are rela-
tively stable and transparent predetermined portfolios with respect to the
members of the index over time. There are clear rules when a stock leaves
or enters a national equity market index and these changes of the members
are communicated. Second, leading equity market indices capture a lot of
attention in the daily media as well as press of a national economy since
they are often referred to as indicators of a country’s overall economic condi-
tion. Moreover, various publicly available financial websites as well as news
channels on television report not only the overall performance of a national
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equity market index, but also the performance of its individual stocks (see
websites such as finanzen.net and onvista.com or news channels such as n-tv
and CNN). The information needed to calculate our portfolio composition
measure are thus easily assessable and even prominently placed for retail as
well as professional investors.
As a measure for investor demand, we use fund flows of exchange-traded
funds replicating the respective equity market index. The exchange-traded
fund industry has grown tremendously over the past decade and exchange-
traded funds (ETFs) have become a popular financial security to invest in
usually broad indices at relatively low costs. Moreover, ETFs have distinct
advantages compared to usual index mutual funds. ETFs are traded on an
intraday basis with a continuously observable price, while mutual funds can
only be traded once a day at their NAV. However, this also comes with a
key difference between the ETF’s and mutual fund’s investment mechanism.
While for ordinary mutual funds, investors can directly buy shares at the
end-of-trading-day NAV (i.e. they exchange cash for shares), for ETFs, the
authorized participants (AP) and not the individual investors directly deal
with the ETF (i.e. the AP buys a portfolio of the ETF’s underlying stocks
and exchanges it for shares of the ETF). Although, this mechanism effectively
separates investors from ETFs, fund flows of ETFs can still be interpreted as
net investor demand for an ETF given that the AP usually creates ETF shares
if demand exceeds supply and redeems ETF shares otherwise (Clifford et al.,
2014).
Building on Hypothesis H1 and the experimental findings, we expect that
portfolio composition affects net fund flows of exchange-traded funds repli-
cating leading equity market indices. Like in our experiments, the positive
relationship we expect between our portfolio composition measure and fu-
ture net fund flows should even hold after controlling for the fund’s return.
In other words, we test whether future net fund flows are affected by the
composition of winner and loser stocks of an equity market index in addi-
tion to the index return.
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H3: A more favorable portfolio composition (i.e. more winner relative to
loser stocks) leads to larger future net fund flows. This relation should
hold even after controlling for a fund’s overall return.
There is a large body of literature on the relation between fund flows
and fund returns. Several studies find return chasing behavior of actively-
managed mutual fund investors indicated by the positive relation between
future net flows of mutual funds and their returns (Ippolito, 1992; Gruber,
1996; Warther, 1995; Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Edelen and Warner, 2001; Coval
and Stafford, 2007; Ben-Rephael et al., 2011). Besides actively-managed mu-
tual funds, return-chasing behavior has even been observed for index mu-
tual funds (Elton et al., 2004). For ETFs, the return-flow relation has received
much less attention in the literature so far and from those studies which ex-
ist, there is less clear-cut evidence of whether ETF flows are influenced by
returns. Clifford et al. (2014) use monthly data to test drivers of ETF flows
and find return-chasing behavior by investors, while Kalaycıoğlu (2004) does
not find return-chasing behavior for ETFs at the daily level. Our paper con-
tributes to the relatively unexplored literature of ETF investor return-chasing
behavior.
3.3.1 Data
We test our hypothesis using fund flow data of leading equity market index
ETFs for the period 2016-2019. Our sample consists of twelve leading equity
market indices. Table 3.3 summarizes all market indices in our sample.
Our sample comprises ten European equity market indices as well as two
North-American equity market indices. For each national economy in our
sample, we chose the leading equity market index of the respective country
(e.g. the CAC 40 for France, the IBEX 35 for Spain, the DAX 30 for Germany)
and then search for ETFs replicating the index. Importantly, ETFs only enter
the sample if their investment objective is to replicate the index as closely as
possible. We exclude all index ETFs which use hedging strategies or claim in
98 Chapter 3. The Portfolio Composition Effect
Table 3.3: Summary of Equity Market Indices and ETFs in the Sample
Market Index Country Number of stocks Number of ETFs
ATX Austria 20 3
BEL 20 Belgium 20 1
CAC 40 France 40 5
DAX 30 Germany 30 10
Dow Jones US 30 4
Euro STOXX 50 Eurozone 50 20
FTSE 100 Great Britain 100 8
FTSE MIB 40 Italy 40 4
IBEX 35 Spain 35 1
PSI 20 Portugal 18 1
S&P/TSX 60 Canada 60 2
SMI Switzerland 20 2
Note: The table lists the leading equity market indices of various European and North-
American countries, the number of stocks of the index and the number of ETFs in our sample
replicating the respective index.
their investment objective that they use other strategies to systematically de-
viate from the index (e.g. minimum variance, excluding financial industry).
We verify the investment objective of all index ETFs in our sample by hand
on the ETF provider’s website. As seen in Table 3.3, the number of ETFs per
index varies from ten for the DAX 30 to one for the IBEX 35 which depends
on the availability of fund flow data from Morningstar. We use daily data for
our analyses and test for a direct relation between our portfolio composition
measure on a respective day and the index ETFs’ net fund flow on the next
day. In addition to our analyses with daily data, we also run our regression
models with weekly data. For these analyses, we define a weekly composi-
tion measure which is the average of the daily portfolio compositions within
a week.
We obtain fund-level data from Morningstar. For each ETF (identified by
its SecId and FundId), we download the ETF’s daily net asset value (NAV),
index return, number of shares outstanding, total net assets (TNA) and the
total expense ratio. We calculate net fund flows following Morningstar and
common in the literature as difference between two consecutive day TNAs
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(calculated as number of shares outstanding times NAV) adjusted for the re-
spective day’s index return.6 For the calculation of our portfolio composition
measure, we download stock return data from Thomson Reuters Datastream.
Each day, we define each stock as either a winner stock (positive daily return)
or a loser stock (negative daily return). Stocks with zero daily return do not
enter the composition measure on that day. Indices change their stocks from
time to time. To account for these changes, we hand collect from Bloomberg
the days on which an index in our sample experiences a change in its stocks
and identify which stock leaves and which enters the index. Based on the
stock return data and the changes of the members of an index, we calculate
our portfolio composition measure as defined in section 3.2.
Before we turn to the main analysis, we provide summary statistics for
our measure of portfolio composition. All summary statistics are calculated
based on daily data as well as weekly data. Figure 3.12 displays the distri-
bution of the portfolio composition measure for all market indices pooled.
The distribution of our composition measure of winner and loser stocks is
relatively normally distributed for all equity market indices pooled as well
as individually.
Figure 3.12: Distribution of the Portfolio Composition Measure
Note: The figure shows the distribution of our portfolio composition measure for the sample
of twelve leading equity market indices. We show daily data in the left part of the figure and
weekly data, i.e. the average portfolio composition over all trading days within a week, in
the right part of the figure.
6 Net cash flow on day t = (Shares on day t * NAV on day t) – (Shares on day t− 1 * NAV on
day t− 1) * (1+ return on day t), see estimated net cash flow methodology by Morningstar.
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Next, we take a look at how our measure of portfolio composition is re-
lated to index returns. Figure 3.13 illustrates the relation between our port-
folio composition measure and the index return in a dot plot. As expected,
there is a positive relation between the index return on a given day and its
portfolio composition. A more favorable portfolio composition is related to
a larger index return. However, and crucial for our study, there is a consider-
able variability in the portfolio composition for a given (fixed) index return.
That means an index return can be achieved with different portfolio composi-
tions. The left part of Figure 3.13 shows that a daily index return of 1.00% can
be achieved by mainly winner stocks (i.e. a composition of more than 90%
winner stocks) or by more loser than winner stocks (i.e. a composition of 80%
loser stocks). Using weekly data as in the right part of Figure 3.13, there is
still a considerable variability in the portfolio composition. For example, a
1.00% weekly index return can be achieved by more than 80% winner stocks
or by up to 80% loser stocks. As a side remark, the portfolio compositions
used in our experiments (e.g. 70% winners versus 30% winners for a port-
folio return of 1.00%) are comparable to the empirically observed portfolio
compositions in our sample.
Figure 3.13: Relation Between Portfolio Composition and Index Return
Note: The figure shows the relation between our portfolio composition measure and the
index return for the sample of twelve leading equity market indices. We show daily data
in the left part of the figure and weekly data, i.e. the average portfolio composition over all
trading days within a week, in the right part of the figure.
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3.3.2 Main Result
Our unique dataset of fund-level as well as stock-level data allows us to test
our hypothesis. We run the following regression model (similar to Clifford
et al., 2014 and Staer, 2017):










In the panel regression, the dependent variable Flowi,j,t represents the net
fund flow of ETF i on index j on day t, FundReturni,j,t−l represents the fund
(index) return of ETF i on index j on day t− l, where l represents the number
of lags, and CompositionMeasurei,j,t−l represents the value of the composi-
tion measure of ETF i on index j on day t− l, where l represents the number
of lags. The panel model includes fund and day fixed effects. We cluster
residuals by index and use robust standard errors. The results are summa-
rized in Table 3.4.
For our sample of leading equity market indices, we find a positive rela-
tion between the portfolio composition and net fund flows. In particular, we
find that today’s net fund flows of an equity market index ETF are affected
by yesterday’s composition of winner and loser stocks of the index. Across
all leading equity market indices in our sample, we estimate that a portfolio
composition of 100% winner stocks leads on average to 1,119,000 US dollar
higher inflows on the subsequent day than a portfolio composition of 50%
winner and 50% loser stocks. In relative terms, this inflow presents roughly
19% of the average daily fund inflow of an ETF in our sample. The effect re-
mains statistically significant and decreases only slightly in magnitude when
controlling for the index return (column 2). We estimate that a portfolio com-
position of 100% winner stocks leads on average to 808,000 US dollar higher
inflows on the subsequent day than a portfolio composition of 50% winner
and 50% loser stocks. In relative terms, this inflow presents roughly 14% of
the average daily fund inflow of an ETF in our sample. The results change
only marginally if we include the portfolio composition and the index return
of the day of the observed net fund flow to the regression model (columns
102 Chapter 3. The Portfolio Composition Effect
Table 3.4: Portfolio Composition and ETF Fund Flows – Daily Data
Dep. Variable NetFlowt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Compositiont 24240.1 374159.1
(0.03) (1.16)
Compositiont−1 2238859.2** 1616734.1** 2274420.5** 1648174.4**
(2.66) (2.23) (2.72) (2.29)
Compositiont−2 2750528.8 2294166.7 2799108.8 2329743.1
(1.23) (1.04) (1.24) (1.05)
Compositiont−3 3289634.8 2998568.9 3261656.1 2980088.7









Constant −825335.9 318431.2 −859524.6 78955.2
(−0.67) (0.18) (−0.70) (0.05)
Observations 68332 65327 68223 65207
R2 0.018 0.019 0.018 0.019
Fund FE YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES
Note: The table summarizes results of panel regressions of the dependent variable Net Flow
on day t on a Composition variable on day t and up to three days lagged and a Fund Return
variable on day t and up to three days lagged. T-statistics are reported in parentheses, and *,
**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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3 and 4). Moreover, we find a tendency of return-chasing behavior for ETF
investors which in line with Clifford et al. (2014) and with several studies on
mutual fund flow data (Ippolito, 1992; Gruber, 1996; Warther, 1995; Sirri and
Tufano, 1998; Edelen and Warner, 2001). Compared to the effect of portfo-
lio composition on future net fund flows, the effect of past index returns on
future fund flows is economically considerably larger. Overall, our findings
confirm Hypothesis H3.
3.3.3 Robustness Analyses
We run several robustness analyses in this section. Can the effect be observed
in weekly data, too? Does the effect exist for both, European and North-
American equity market indices? What drives the effect? How is the effect
related to comparable measures such as the return dispersion of a portfolio
(i.e. the cross-sectional variance of stock returns within an index)?
First, we replicate the main finding using weekly instead of daily data. We
calculate the weekly portfolio composition measure as the arithmetic mean
of all daily portfolio compositions over a week. Table 3.5 reports the results.
We find two main results: The portfolio composition of week t is positively
related to the net fund flows of week t. In numbers, a weekly portfolio com-
position of 75% winner and 25% loser stocks leads on average to a 5,568,000
US dollar higher inflow in this week than a portfolio composition of 50%
winner and 50% loser stocks. In relative terms, this inflow presents roughly
30% of the average weekly fund inflow of an ETF in our sample. The effect
remains statistically significant and decreases only marginally in size when
controlling for the index return. Interestingly, the previous week’s portfo-
lio composition has no significant effect on this week’s net fund flows. This
result hints that the effect is short-living. People may rather remember and
act upon the observation that the majority of stocks of an index achieved a
positive daily return yesterday and potentially also two days ago, but may
have problems to remember and do not act anymore upon the same obser-
vation one week ago. Additionally, we find return-chasing behavior of ETF
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investors when using weekly data. Net fund flows tend to be larger in a
given week if the index return of the previous week was larger. This find-
ing is consistent with the above-cited literature on return-chasing behavior
of ETF as well as mutual fund investors.
Table 3.5: Portfolio Composition and ETF Fund Flows – Weekly Data
Dep. Variable NetFlowt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Compositiont 24177218.8*** 22592605.2*** 24775876.3*** 22273359.8***







Constant −10229770.8 −9517556.7 −9356166.9 −3738440.2
(−1.09) (−1.14) (−1.29) (−0.70)
Observations 17340 17340 17255 17255
R2 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.018
Fund FE YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES
Note: The table summarizes results of panel regressions of the dependent variable Net Flow
in week t on a Composition variable in week t and one week lagged and a Fund Return
variable in week t and one week lagged. T-statistics are reported in parentheses, and *, **,
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Second, we examine whether there are regional differences of the effect.
We mean by regional differences whether the effect exists for European eq-
uity market indices as well as for North-American equity market indices.
To test this, we split our sample into a European sample consisting of ten
European national equity market indices and a North-American sample con-
sisting of two North-American national equity market indices. We run the
same panel regression model as run on the pooled sample, but now for each
sample individually. The results are reported in Table 3.6 for the European
market indices and in Table 3.7 for the North-American market indices.
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Table 3.6: Portfolio Composition and ETF Fund Flows for European
Market Indices
Dep. Variable NetFlowt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Compositiont 645485.5** 577509.6**
(3.41) (2.50)
Compositiont−1 1153508.8*** 1068401.1*** 1186908.3*** 1109099.2***
(5.47) (5.71) (5.61) (5.85)
Compositiont−2 393176.9 318625.1 396590.9 324963.3
(1.11) (0.74) (1.11) (0.75)
Compositiont−3 975472.4** 847429.0* 988932.4** 861908.8*









Constant 698347.8 576787.3 670390.8 576752.9
(1.39) (1.27) (1.32) (1.29)
Observations 60045 57344 59964 57253
R2 0.024 0.025 0.024 0.025
Fund FE YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES
Note: The table summarizes results of panel regressions of the dependent variable Net Flow
on day t on a Composition variable on day t and up to three days lagged and a Fund Re-
turn variable on day t and up to three days lagged. The sample is restricted to European
market indices. T-statistics are reported in parentheses, and *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3.7: Portfolio Composition and ETF Fund Flows for
North-American Market Indices
Dep. Variable NetFlowt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Compositiont −12847118.9** −6843806.4
(−50.66) (−0.76)
Compositiont−1 5414442.7 502328.0 4435847.1 1224740.8
(1.55) (0.05) (1.44) (0.17)
Compositiont−2 16640010.8 7850856.6 16932770.4 9107176.2
(5.88) (3.45) (6.15) (2.95)
Compositiont−3 12189596.4** −245854.0 12882808.2** 706072.1









Constant −9331621.2 40078961.5** −8326689.1 33932165.3
(−1.29) (29.19) (−1.38) (4.42)
Observations 6402 6233 6374 6204
R2 0.155 0.160 0.156 0.161
Fund FE YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES
Note: The table summarizes results of panel regressions of the dependent variable Net Flow
on day t on a Composition variable on day t and up to three days lagged and a Fund Return
variable on day t and up to three days lagged. The sample is restricted to North-American
indices. T-statistics are reported in parentheses, and *, **, and *** indicate statistical signifi-
cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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While we find a statistically highly significant portfolio composition effect
in our sample of European market indices, we do not find a significant effect
of portfolio composition on future net fund flows in our sample of North-
American market indices. As such, the effect in our pooled sample seems
to be primarily driven by the European market indices. One potential rea-
son for the non-existence of the effect in the North-American sample could
be a power issue as the observations in this sample are only 10% of those in
the European sample. On the contrary, we find a more pronounced return-
chasing behavior in the North-American sample than in the European sam-
ple. Apart from potential power issues, this might be one reason why we do
not observe a portfolio composition effect in the North-American sample.
Third, we analyze potential drivers of the portfolio composition effect.
One potential driver of the effect could be macroeconomic news. We want to
understand whether the portfolio composition effect is primarily driven by
days on which macroeconomic news are priced in. We argue that macroe-
conomic news such as for example a political event (e.g. the passing of a
trade agreement, the declaration of war, etc.), the announcement of a base
rate change by the Federal Reserve Bank of America or the European Central
Bank, or the spread of a disease are likely to affect all stocks of an index in a
similar direction. As such, it is likely that macroeconomic news lead to ex-
treme portfolio compositions. After unexpected bad macroeconomic news,
it is likely that all stocks of an index trade at a daily loss, whereas after un-
expected good macroeconomic news it is likely that all stocks of an index
trade at a daily gain. The reason for these changes in portfolio composition
are likely to be systematic (in the sense that all stocks are affected) rather
than firm-specific. In what follows, we analyze whether our effect is primar-
ily driven by these systematic changes in our portfolio composition measure
or whether idiosyncratic changes caused by firm-specific information drive
the documented portfolio composition effect. To test this, we include an "all-
winner-dummy" for days on which all stocks of an index trade at a gain to
our regression model and an "all-loser-dummy" for days on which all stocks
of an index trade at a loss. We also add these dummies lagged by one, two,
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and three days. The results are reported in Table 3.8. We find that none
of the all-winner/all-loser-dummies gains statistical significance. Even af-
ter controlling for days with extreme portfolio composition, the coefficient of
the one-day lagged portfolio composition variable remains statistically sig-
nificant and changes only slightly in economic magnitude compared to the
result from Table 3.4.
Finally, we exclude that the portfolio composition measure introduced in
our study proxies for return dispersion. More precisely, we analyze to what
extent the cross-sectional standard deviation of stock returns of an index cap-
tures something similar to our measure of portfolio composition. There is lit-
erature on the impact of return dispersion on fund returns (Stivers and Sun,
2010; Liu et al., 2019). The composition measure we investigate is mathemat-
ically related to return dispersion. If the daily standard deviation of returns
of the index members is large, it is also likely that the portfolio composition
measure reflects the high return dispersion by neither being close to zero (i.e.
all stocks exhibit a loss) nor being close to one (i.e. all stocks exhibit a gain).
However, while return dispersion measures the absolute deviations of stock
returns from the cross-sectional mean return of the index, the portfolio com-
position measure takes the direction into account. In other words, a small
return dispersion can result from many winner stocks, many loser stocks,
or even winner and loser stocks which all have a similar return. As such,
our portfolio composition measure is likely to capture more than return dis-
persion. We examine whether the portfolio composition effect persists once
we control for the return dispersion of an index. The results are shown in
Table 3.9. We find that the portfolio composition effect persists even after
controlling for the return dispersion of the index. While none of the included
cross-sectional standard deviation variables gains statistical significance, the
coefficient of the one-day lagged portfolio composition remains statistically
significant, but decreases in magnitude.
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Table 3.8: Portfolio Composition and ETF Fund Flows with Extreme
Portfolio Composition Dummies
Dep. Variable NetFlowt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Compositiont 224485.5 535205.8
(0.36) (1.47)
Compositiont−1 2418668.1** 1791111.4* 2446369.2** 1815214.7**
(2.47) (2.18) (2.51) (2.25)
Compositiont−2 2530589.0 2129727.2 2581434.9 2166800.2
(1.25) (1.04) (1.26) (1.05)
Compositiont−3 3291765.6 2968248.8 3266929.0 2949603.8
(1.50) (1.35) (1.48) (1.35)
AllWinnert −223863.4 −72152.9 −462818.2 −257578.9
(−0.22) (−0.07) (−0.52) (−0.31)
AllWinnert−1 −2029012.8 −2175879.6 −1994955.8 −2143162.4
(−1.26) (−1.27) (−1.25) (−1.26)
AllWinnert−2 1012316.9 1170430.5 1003359.0 1164442.2
(0.60) (0.70) (0.59) (0.69)
AllWinnert−3 −1151365.9 −1428280.0 −1157479.5 −1429012.9
(−0.81) (−0.92) (−0.79) (−0.90)
AllLosert 1944337.3 2203534.4 1982511.0 2162818.6
(1.42) (1.46) (1.50) (1.60)
AllLosert−1 −12920.9 106484.1 −229768.3 −125118.9
(−0.07) (0.56) (−1.47) (−0.71)
AllLosert−2 −2139776.7 −2249652.1 −2127471.9 −2230290.9
(−1.17) (−1.18) (−1.15) (−1.16)
AllLosert−3 −395123.0 −627694.0 −417019.3 −665206.2









Constant −972241.1 1105880.5 −1012963.3 915338.1
(−1.59) (0.57) (−1.66) (0.51)
Observations 68332 65327 68223 65207
R2 0.018 0.019 0.018 0.019
Fund FE YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES
Note: The table summarizes results of panel regressions of the dependent variable Net Flow
on day t on a Composition variable on day t and up to three days lagged, All Winner dummy
which is one if all stocks are winners on day t and the dummy lagged up to three days, All
Loser dummy which is one if all stocks are losers on day t and the dummy lagged up to
three days and a Fund Return variable on day t and up to three days lagged. T-statistics are
reported in parentheses, and *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level, respectively.
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Table 3.9: Portfolio Composition and ETF Fund Flows with































Fund FE YES YES
Time FE YES YES
Note: The table summarizes results of panel regressions of the dependent variable Net Flow
on day t on a Composition variable on day t and up to three days lagged, the cross-sectional
standard deviation on day t and up to three days lagged and a Fund Return variable on
day t and up to three days lagged. T-statistics are reported in parentheses, and *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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3.4 Conclusion
We run three experiments to investigate how individuals evaluate portfolio
investment decisions. Across all experiments, we find that participants are
more willing to invest in a portfolio with a larger number of winner rela-
tive to loser stocks than in an alternative portfolio with a larger number of
loser relative to winner stocks, although the portfolios have realized identi-
cal overall returns. The documented effect persists, if we keep the expected
returns and volatility across portfolios identical. The observed investment
decisions are consistent with our proposed theoretical framework of cate-
gorical thinking and mental accounting which implies that individuals use a
counting heuristic to evaluate portfolio investment decisions.
We then use our well-identified experimental evidence on individuals’
evaluation of portfolio investment decisions to test whether portfolio com-
position also matters in financial markets. In particular, we analyze the re-
lation between net fund flows of national equity market index ETFs and our
measure of portfolio composition for leading European and North-American
equity market indices over the period 2016-2019. Consistent with our experi-
mental evidence, we find that historical fund flows of leading equity market
index ETFs are affected by the index previous-day composition of winner
and loser stocks. Importantly, the effect remains stable and statistically sig-
nificant even after controlling for the index return.
To better understand how individuals evaluate a portfolio and conse-
quently how they make portfolio investment decisions, this paper proposes
a simple measure: the composition of winner and loser stocks of a portfolio.
This measure is arguably simple since it ultimately boils down to a counting
heuristic. However, doesn’t this measure capture an impression about the
performance of a portfolio which people can easily and quickly gain? Win-
ner stocks can easily be distinguished from loser stocks such that people can
gain a good impression of how many stocks in their portfolio or of an index
are winners relative to how many stocks are losers.
While the counting heuristic proposed in this paper can be grounded in
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well-established psychological frameworks, we do not claim that our mea-
sure of portfolio composition is the only performance measure that can be
thought of when testing how performance information on the individual-
stock level and performance information on the overall-portfolio level affect
portfolio investment decisions. Future research may identify alternative or
even complementary performance measures to deepen the understanding of




Belief Formation and Risk-Taking
in Boom and Bust Markets ∗
4.1 Introduction
How do individuals form expectations about future stock returns? The an-
swer to this question is crucial to understand differences in risk-taking over
time and in particular across market cycles. A key assumption in models that
generate time-variation in risk-taking is that investors have rational expecta-
tions, which are immediately updated according to Bayes’ rule when new in-
formation arrives (Barberis et al., 2001; Campbell and Cochrane, 1999; Gross-
man and Shiller, 1981). Their authors assume implicitly that agents know the
objective probability distribution in equilibrium and are as such fully aware
of the counter-cyclical nature of the equity risk premium (Nagel and Xu,
2019). Yet, a number of recent surveys of investors’ expectations show that
this is not the case, and that investors – if anything – have rather pro-cyclical
expectations: they are more optimistic in boom markets and less optimistic
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University of Mannheim. For valuable comments, we thank Nick Barberis, Camelia Kuh-
nen, Oliver Spalt, Stefan Trautmann, Georg von Weizsäcker, as well as participants of the
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2020, the Lynne & Andrew Redleaf Foundation Graduate Student Conference 2020 at Yale
University, and seminar participants at the University of Mannheim. We gratefully acknowl-
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in recessions (Amromin and Sharpe, 2014; Giglio et al., 2019; Greenwood and
Shleifer, 2014).
In the light of this inconsistency, it is imperative to obtain a deeper un-
derstanding of how investors incorporate new information when they form
expectations, and whether this could ultimately explain differences in risk-
taking across macroeconomic cycles. Prior research has shown that investors
put too much probability weight on new information, if the information
looks representative of previously observed data (Kahneman and Tversky,
1972). Gennaioli and Shleifer (2010) as well as Gennaioli et al. (2012, 2015)
show that such a representativeness can generate and amplify boom/bust
financial crises based entirely on investors’ beliefs. Besides the representa-
tiveness of the outcome history, Kuhnen (2015) shows that agents learn dif-
ferently from outcomes in the negative domain than from the same outcome
history in the positive domain. Both findings together and individually can
lead to systematic distortions in how investors learn from outcomes and how
they incorporate beliefs in their decision-process.
In this study, we investigate whether distorted belief formation rules (i.e.
systematic violations of Bayes’ rule) can explain differences in risk-taking
across recessions and boom markets. To examine this relation, we conduct
an experimental study with two different learning environments that closely
resemble key characteristics of financial market cycles. The first learning en-
vironment characterizes a market setting in which subjects exclusively learn
either in the positive (i.e. boom) or in the negative (i.e. recession) domain.
The second learning environment characterizes a potentially more realistic
market setting in which subjects learn from mixed-outcome distributions
with either positive expected value (i.e. boom) or negative expected value
(i.e. bust). We test 1) how different learning environments affect the forma-
tion of return expectations, 2) how systematic differences in beliefs resulting
from different learning environments translate to risk-taking, and 3) whether
different learning environments not only affect subjects’ beliefs but also their
risk preferences.
While recent survey data on expectations are helpful to establish a link
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between subjective beliefs and investment decisions, they do not allow in-
ference about how investors depart from rational expectations without im-
posing strong assumptions. In an experiment however, we can establish a
setting in which we have direct control over objective (rational) expectations
and can compare them to participants’ subjective beliefs. This allows us to
document systematic errors in the belief formation process, which we can
then relate to the subjects’ investment choice.
In our experiment, we combine an abstract Bayesian updating task (sim-
ilar to Grether, 1980; and more recently adopted by Glaser et al., 2013, or
Kuhnen, 2015) with an unrelated incentive-compatible investment task in a
financial environment. In the Bayesian updating task, subjects have to in-
corporate a sequence of information signals into their beliefs to estimate the
likelihood that an asset pays dividends drawn from one of two distributions.
Depending on the learning environment, the information subjects receive is
either exclusively positive (boom treatment) or negative (bust treatment) in
Experiment 1, or both positive and negative but drawn from distributions
with either positive (boom treatment) or negative expected value (bust treat-
ment) in Experiment 2. The underlying probability distribution, however,
from which the information is drawn, is completely identical in both learn-
ing environments. In other words, a Bayesian agent should make identical
forecasts, irrespective of whether he learns in the positive or negative envi-
ronment.
After subjects completed the forecasting task, they make an unrelated in-
vestment decision in either a risky or an ambiguous lottery, which serves as
a between-subject measure of belief- and preference-based risk-taking. In the am-
biguous lottery, we purposefully give participants room to form subjective
beliefs about the underlying true probability distribution. In the risky lot-
tery, we have perfect control over subjects’ return and risk expectations since
both probabilities and outcomes are known. As such, investments in the am-
biguous lottery are affected by both subjects’ risk preferences and their beliefs
about the underlying probability distribution, while investments in the risky
lottery serve as a measurement tool for risk aversion. The between-subject
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comparison finally allows us to isolate the effect of belief-induced risk-taking
caused by outcome-dependent learning environments.
Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, we find that subjects
who learn to form beliefs in adverse market environments take significantly
less risk in an unrelated ambiguous investment task than subjects who learn
to form beliefs in favorable market environments. Once there is room to form
subjective beliefs, subjects in the bust treatment invest on average 20% less
in the ambiguous lottery compared to subjects in the boom treatment. In
line with their lower willingness to take risks, subjects who have learned
to form beliefs in adverse market environments are also substantially more
pessimistic about the success probability of the ambiguous lottery (by about
19 percentage points). In the risky lottery, when expectations are fixed, we
can directly test whether adverse learning environments also affect the sub-
jects’ risk aversion. However, we do not find any significant difference be-
tween treatments on subjects’ investment in an unrelated risky investment
option. This indicates that subjects’ risk preferences (i.e. their risk aver-
sion) remained stable and were unaltered by the environment in which they
learned to form beliefs. Effectively, this finding suggests that when individ-
uals form expectations in adverse learning environments (as is frequently
the case in recessions), they become substantially more pessimistic about fu-
ture prospects. However, this pessimism only translates to lower risk-taking
when there is uncertainty in the investment process.
Second, we investigate how adverse learning environments induce pes-
simism in subjects’ return expectations. We find that subjects who forecast
the probability distribution of an asset in an adverse learning environment
(bust treatment) are significantly more pessimistic in their average probabil-
ity estimate than those subjects who forecast the identical probability distri-
bution in a favorable learning environment (boom treatment). This indicates
that the frame of the learning environment crucially affects subjects’ belief
formation, although the actual learning task is identical. In other words, in
our setting a Bayesian forecaster would make identical probability forecasts
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irrespective of the underlying learning environment. The resulting asym-
metry in belief formation resembles a pessimism bias as subjects’ beliefs in
the bust treatment show larger deviations from Bayesian beliefs compared
to subjects’ beliefs in the boom treatment. This finding is independent of
whether subjects learn exclusively from negative outcome lotteries (Experi-
ment 1) or from mixed-outcome lotteries with negative expected value (Ex-
periment 2), and extends previous work by Kuhnen (2015).
Third, we seek to better understand the link of how forecasting in dif-
ferent learning environments affects risk-taking and for whom the effect is
most pronounced. We find that those subjects who show above-median fore-
casting ability in the learning task of the experiment critically drive the re-
sults. In particular, these subjects show a stronger link between the pes-
simism induced by the initial adverse learning environment and the subse-
quent (lower) risk-taking. However, and importantly, even these subjects
still exhibit a pronounced pessimism bias in their probability assessment,
which subsequently translates to more pessimistic beliefs about the success
probability of the ambiguous asset. To rationalize why the risk-taking of the
seemingly better performing agents is more affected by the learning environ-
ment, we test whether they share particular socio-demographic characteris-
tics or whether they are more involved in the experimental task. We find
that above-median forecasters spend significantly more time on reading the
instructions and make significantly less basic, directional wrong updating er-
rors than below-median forecasters. As such, our analyses rather support the
latter argument, which suggests that the effect reported here might be even
stronger in the real economy, where stakes and involvement are presumably
higher.
Finally, we provide evidence that the pessimism induced by adverse
learning environments within our experimental setup even affects subjects’
return expectations in the real economy. When asked to provide a return
forecast of the Dow Jones Industrial Average, subjects in the bust treatment
are significantly more pessimistic about the future performance of the index
than their peers in the boom treatment. In addition to the more pessimistic
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expectations, we find that subjects who learn in adverse financial conditions
provide negative return estimates, while those learning in rather favorable
financial conditions provide positive return estimates. Given that we are
able to systematically manipulate return expectations for real world market
indices even in a short-living learning environment as in our experiment,
we believe that the effect reported here is even more generalizable in the real
economy.
Our findings contribute to several strands of literature. Most importantly,
our results provide a direct and causal link of how systematic distortions in
investors’ expectations can affect their willingness to take financial risks. The
most prominent rational expectations models that generate high volatility of
asset prices and the countercyclical equity risk premium introduce modifica-
tions into the representative agent’s utility function, which effectively gen-
erates countercyclical risk aversion (Campbell and Cochrane, 1999; Barberis
et al., 2001). This implies that during bust markets investors become more
risk averse and consequently demand a higher risk premium, and they be-
come less risk averse during boom markets, thus demanding a lower risk
premium. Recently, Cohn et al. (2015) present experimental evidence sup-
porting this notion, while Guiso et al. (2018) present survey evidence in line
with this argument.1
However, in our experimental design, we can confidently rule out that a
change in preferences can explain our findings. Instead, we show that expec-
tations and how they are formed can generate similar feedback loops as im-
plied by countercyclical risk aversion without having to assume unstable risk
preferences. If bust markets systematically induce pessimistic expectations
about future returns for a substantial subset of investors, this may reduce the
aggregate share invested in risky assets of an economy, which in turn gen-
erates downward pressure on prices due to excess supply. In line with our
results, Amromin and Sharpe (2014) find that households’ lower willingness
1 There are also recent papers who challenge the notion of countercyclical risk aversion as
tested in Cohn et al. (2015) such as Alempaki et al. (2019) and König-Kersting and Trautmann
(2018).
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to take risks during recessions is rather driven by their more pessimistic sub-
jective expectations than by countercyclical risk aversion. Similarly, Weber
et al. (2013) show that changes in risk-taking of UK online-broker customers
over the financial crisis of 2008 were mainly explained by changes in return
expectations and to a lesser degree by changes in risk attitudes.
Furthermore, our study also relates to the findings reported in recent sur-
veys of investor return expectations (Amromin and Sharpe, 2014; Giglio et al.,
2019; Greenwood and Shleifer, 2014). A common finding is that survey ex-
pectations of stock returns are pro-cyclical (i.e. investors are more optimistic
during boom markets and more pessimistic during recessions), and as such
inconsistent with rational expectation models. A first attempt to reconcile
this puzzling finding was made by Adam et al. (2020), who test whether al-
ternative expectation hypotheses proposed in the asset pricing literature are
in line with the survey evidence. However, they reject all of them. In our
study, we also find that investors’ expectations are pro-cyclical, as they are
more optimistic when learning in favorable environments then when learn-
ing in adverse environments. As such, the belief formation mechanism tested
in our study may provide an interesting starting point for alternative theories
of belief updating featuring pro-cyclical expectations.
Finally, our finding also relates to the literature on investors’ experience
(Graham and Narasimhan, 2004; Malmendier and Nagel, 2011, 2015; Mal-
mendier and Tate, 2005; Malmendier et al., 2011). The literature posits that
events experienced over the course of an investor’s life have persistent and
long-lasting effects. In the spirit of this literature, learning rules, if more fre-
quently applied throughout investors’ lives, may exert a greater influence on
the way they form beliefs and ultimately on their willingness to take risks.
For example, investors who experienced the Great Depression in their early
career were more frequently exposed to negative stock returns, which might
have affected the way they form beliefs about future economic events. As
a result, these investors are more pessimistic in their assessment of future
stock returns and less willing to take financial risks compared to those who
experienced the post-war boom until the 1960s in their early life.
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The mechanism reported here and its effect on risk-taking may have im-
portant policy implications. For example, if investors exhibit overly pes-
simistic expectations in recessions, they may expect lower returns and reduce
their equity share. As a consequence, the pro-cyclical nature of beliefs result-
ing from partly distorted belief formation rules reported in our study may
amplify the intensity and the length of market phases.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we
outline the experimental design, and briefly discuss the most important de-
sign aspects. In Section 4.3, we state our hypotheses, while in Section 4.4
we describe summary statistics of our sample and randomization checks. In
Section 4.5, we present our findings, and in Section 4.6 we conclude.
4.2 Experimental Design
Seven-hundred fifty-four individuals (458 males, 296 females, mean age 34
years, 10.3 years standard deviation) were recruited from Amazon Mechani-
cal Turk (MTurk) to participate in two online experiments. MTurk advanced
to a widely used and accepted recruiting platform for economic experiments.
Not only does it offer a larger and more diverse subject pool as compared
to lab studies (which frequently rely on students), but it also provides a re-
sponse quality similar to that of other subject pools (Buhrmester et al., 2011;
Goodman et al., 2013).
Both experiments consist of two independent parts, a forecasting task
(Bayesian updating) and an investment task (see Figure 4.1). The experi-
ments differ with respect to the forecasting task, but are identical with re-
spect to the investment task. In the forecasting task, we create a learning
environment which resembles key characteristics of boom and bust markets.
In Experiment 1, we focus on the domain (positive vs. negative returns)
in which subjects primarily learn across different market cycles. As such, we
let subjects learn from either exclusively positive outcome-lotteries (boom-
scenario) or negative outcome-lotteries (bust-scenario). However, even in
recessions agents occasionally observe positive returns, but the magnitude is
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Figure 4.1: Structure and Flow of the Experiments
Note: this figure documents the structure and the flow of our two experiments. Subjects
do a forecasting task which is followed by an investment task. At the beginning, subjects
are randomly assigned to either a boom treatment or a bust treatment (here the lotteries of
Experiment 1 are illustrated). In the first stage of the experiment, they make 16 forecasts
in total split in two blocks of eight rounds. In the second stage of the experiment, they are
assigned either to invest in an ambiguous lottery (unknown probabilities) or a risky lottery
(known probabilities) and are asked to make a 6-month return forecast for the Dow Jones
Industrial Average (DJ) as well as to answer a 10-item life orientation test (LOT).
on average smaller than the magnitude of observed negative returns. During
the last two financial crises, the frequency of observing a negative monthly
return of the MSCI AC World index was 66.67 % for the DotCom Crisis and
68.42 % for the 2008 Financial Crisis, while the average realized monthly re-
turn was −1.17 % and −2.11 %, respectively, as displayed in Figure 4.1.2
To account for this fact, we conduct another experiment with an even
more realistic learning environment. In Experiment 2 subjects learn from
mixed outcome-lotteries, which either have a positive expected value (boom-
scenario) or a negative expected value (bust-scenario).
4.2.1 Detailed Description of the Experiment
In the forecasting task of both experiments, subjects receive information
about a risky asset, whose payoffs are either drawn from a “good distri-
bution” or from a “bad distribution”. Both distributions are binary with
2 Business cycles are defined using the NBER Business Cycle Expansion and Contractions
Classification.
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Figure 4.2: Characteristics of Boom and Bust Market Phases
Note: This figure documents both the relative frequency of observing a negative monthly
return of the MSCI All Country World Index as well as the average monthly return for the
last two financial recessions. Recessions are defined according to the NBER US Business
Cycle Contraction classification. The left y-axis refers to the relative frequency of negative
returns. The right y-axis (reversed scale) refers to the average monthly realized returns.
identical high and low outcomes. In the good distribution, the higher payoff
occurs with a 70 % probability while the lower payoff occurs with a 30 %
probability. In the bad distribution, the probabilities are reversed, i.e. the
lower payoff occurs with a 70 % probability while the higher payoff occurs
with a 30 % probability. The actual payoffs depend on both the experiment
and the treatment to which subjects are assigned. In both experiments,
subjects are randomly assigned to either a “boom” treatment or a “bust”
treatment. In the first experiment, the payoffs of the risky asset are either
exclusively positive or negative, which resembles domain-specific learning.
The payoffs in the boom treatment are either +15, or +2, whereas they are−2,
or −15 in the bust treatment. In the second experiment, the payoffs of the
risky asset are drawn from mixed-outcome lotteries, with either a positive or
a negative expected value. The payoffs in the boom treatment are either +15,
or −2, whereas they are +2, or −15 in the bust treatment. While the payoffs
across treatments are mirrored, the underlying probability distributions of
the risky asset from which outcomes are drawn are identical.
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In both experiments, subjects make forecasting decisions in two consecu-
tive blocks each consisting of eight rounds. At the beginning of each block,
the computer randomly determines the distribution of the risky asset (which
can be good or bad). In each of the eight rounds, subjects observe a payoff
of the risky asset. Afterwards, we ask them to provide a probability estimate
that the risky asset draws from the good distribution and how confident they
are about their estimate. As such, subjects will make a total of 16 probability
estimates (8 estimates per block). To keep the focus on the forecasting task
and to not test their memory performance, we display the prior outcomes in
a price-line-chart next to the questions. At the beginning of the experiment
and before they could continue, subjects had to correctly answer three ques-
tions the answers to which indicated their understanding of the experiment
(see Appendix C).
In the second part of each experiment, the investment task, subjects were
randomly assigned to invest in either an ambiguous or a risky lottery with an
endowment of 100 Cents (Gneezy and Potters, 1997). In both lotteries, the
underlying distribution to win is 50 %. However, to introduce uncertainty
and to provide subjects the freedom to form beliefs, the success probability
remains unknown to them in the ambiguous lottery. In both lotteries, subjects
can earn 2.5 times the invested amount if the lottery succeeds, whereas they
lose the invested amount if the lottery fails. Subjects can keep the amount
not invested in the lottery without earning any interest. In addition to the
lottery investment, subjects in the ambiguous treatment are asked to provide
an estimate of the success probability of the ambiguous lottery. Subjects in
the risky treatment are not asked about a probability estimate as the objective
success probability is known and clearly communicated.
The experiments concluded with a brief survey about subjects’ socio-
economic background, a 10-item inventory of the standard Life Orientation
Test (Scheier et al., 1994), self-assessed statistic skills, stock trading experi-
ence and whether a participant was invested during the last financial crisis.
In addition, subjects were asked to provide a 6-month return forecast of the
Dow Jones Industrial Average index on a twelve-point balanced Likert scale.
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Both parts of the experiment were incentivized. In the first part, participants
were paid based on the accuracy of the probability estimate provided.
Specifically, they received 10 cents for each probability estimate within 10
% (+/ − 5%) of the objective Bayesian value. In the second part of the
experiment, subjects received the amount not invested in the lottery plus the
net earnings from their lottery investment. Both studies took approximately
9 minutes to complete and participants earned $1.93 on average.
4.2.2 Discussion of Important Aspects
Overall, our design allows us to test whether asymmetric belief formation
in boom and bust markets can account for time variation in risk taking. As
it is imperative for our design to ensure that risk preferences remain con-
stant and are unaffected by the forecasting task, a few aspects warrant a brief
discussion. First, feedback regarding the accuracy of subjects’ probability
estimates was only provided at the very end of the experiment. This was
done to not only avoid wealth effects, but also to ensure that subjects do not
hedge the lottery investment against their earnings from the forecasting task,
which would inevitably affect their risk-taking. Second, we abstract from
using predisposed words like “boom”, “bust”, or similar financial jargon.
This circumvents evoking negative or positive emotions (such as fear), ex-
perience effects, and other confounding factors, which would distort a clear
identification of belief-induced risk-taking. Third, by exploiting the between-
subject variation in the lottery tasks, we can directly investigate whether the
forecasting task in different domains unintentionally affects risk preferences.
More precisely, we can exclude that learning from adverse market conditions
affects risk preferences.3
3 Although we can directly control for the effect of positive and negative numbers on risk




We have two main hypotheses, one regarding the forecasting task and one
regarding the investment task. First, we test whether forecasting in adverse
learning environments systematically induces pessimism in subjects’ belief
formation. In the first experiment, we investigate the effect of domain-
specific learning environments on subjects belief formation as originally
tested by Kuhnen (2015). In the second experiment, we examine whether
this effect is restricted to domain-specific learning or whether it generalizes
to mixed-outcome learning environments as frequently observed in both
boom markets and in recessions.
H1: Pessimism Bias
Subjects in the bust treatment are significantly more pessimistic in their
average probability forecast both relative to the objective Bayesian fore-
cast and relative to the subjects in the boom treatment.
Next, we investigate the main treatment effect of our study. In particular,
we aim to examine whether asymmetric belief formation in boom and bust
markets could explain differences in risk-taking. To do so, we introduce a
between-subject measure of belief- and preference-based risk-taking. In the
risky treatment, we have perfect control over subjects’ return and risk expec-
tations since both probabilities and outcomes are known and clearly commu-
nicated. As such, the risky treatment serves as a measurement tool for risk
aversion. In the ambiguous treatment however, we intentionally give partic-
ipants room to form subjective beliefs as there is uncertainty about the true
probability. If the induced pessimism leads to more pessimistic expectations,
we should observe a stronger treatment effect in the ambiguity treatment as
the absence of perfect certainty about the success probability of the ambigu-
ous lottery leaves more room for expectations (Klibanoff et al., 2005).
H2a: Belief-Induced Risk-Taking
Subjects in the bust treatment invest significantly less in the ambiguous
lottery than subjects in the boom treatment.
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H2b: Preference-Based Risk-Taking
Investments in the risky lottery should not significantly differ across
treatments.
4.4 Summary Statistics and Randomization
Checks
Table 4.1 presents summary statistics, Panel A for Experiment 1 and Panel
B for Experiment 2. Overall 754 subjects participated in our studies, with
an average age of 35.15 years in Experiment 1 (33.53 years in Experiment
2). Forty-five percent (thirty-four percent) were female. Subjects reported
average statistical skills of 4.19 out of 7 (4.47) and are medium experienced
in stock trading, with a self-reported average score of 3.64 out of 7 (3.94).
Roughly thirty-nine percent (forty-four) were invested during the 2008 Fi-
nancial Crisis.
Additionally, we tested whether our randomization successfully resulted
in a balanced sample. Table 4.1 also reports the mean and standard deviation
of each variable split by treatment. Differences were tested using rank-sum
tests, or χ2-tests for binary variables. As we find no significant difference
between our treatments for any variable, our randomization was successful.
As such, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the socio-economic back-
ground of the subjects is balanced between our boom and bust treatment.
4.5 Results
We present answers to the following questions: 1) Do agents learn to form be-
liefs differently across market cycles?; 2) if belief formation is systematically
different across market cycles, do the resulting beliefs translate to systematic
differences in risk-taking?; 3) what is the mechanism behind the effect?; 4)
who is most affected?; and 5) what are the boundaries?
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics on Subjects
Panel A: Experiment 1 Full Sample Boom Bust Differ- p-value
Variable (N=350) (N=174) (N=176) ence
Age 35.15 34.76 35.54 0.78 0.76
(11.52) (11.18) (11.86)
Female 0.45 0.47 0.43 0.04 0.44
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Statistical Skills 4.19 4.22 4.16 0.06 0.91
(1.62) (1.51) (1.72)
Experience Stock Trading 3.64 3.73 3.56 0.17 0.42
(1.88) (1.84) (1.92)
Invested Financial Crisis 0.39 0.39 0.39 0 1
(0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
Panel B: Experiment 2 Full Sample Boom Bust Differ- p-value
Variable (N=403) (N=207) (N=196) ence
Age 33.53 32.73 34.37 1.63 0.07
(9.03) (8.46) (9.55)
Female 0.34 0.33 0.35 0.02 0.69
(0.48) (0.47) (0.48)
Statistical Skills 4.47 4.40 4.55 0.15 0.42
(1.67) (1.69) (1.65)
Experience Stock Trading 3.94 3.89 3.98 0.09 0.52
(1.99) (1.95) (2.03)
Invested Financial Crisis 0.44 0.41 0.47 0.06 0.24
(0.50) (0.49) (0.50)
Note: This table shows summary statistics for our experimental data. Reported are the mean
and the standard deviation (in parentheses) for the whole sample (Column 1) and split across
treatments (Column 2 and 3). Column 4 presents randomization checks. Differences in mean
were tested using rank-sum tests, or χ2-tests for binary variables. The p-value is reported in
Column 5. Female is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a participant is female. Statistical
skills denotes participants’ self-assessed statistical skills on a 7-point Likert scale. Experience
in stock trading is the self-reported experience participants have in stock trading, assessed by
a 7-point Likert scale. Invested financial crisis is an indicator that equals 1 if participants were
invested in the stock market during the last financial crisis.
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4.5.1 Distorted Belief Formation
First, we examine whether belief formation in bust markets differs from be-
lief formation in boom markets and to what extend the effect depends on the
underlying characteristic of the learning environment. While participants
learn exclusively from either only positive or negative outcome lotteries (i.e.
domain-specific learning) in Experiment 1, they learn from mixed outcome
lotteries with either positive or negative expected value (i.e. mixed-outcome
dependent learning) in Experiment 2. Figure 4.3 displays the average prob-
ability estimate over eight rounds for good and bad distributions, separated
by treatment and experiment.
Figure 4.3: Pessimism Bias
Note: This figure documents the pessimism bias. It depicts participants’ average probability
forecasts split by the underlying distribution they had to forecast (good or bad), the treat-
ment they were in (boom or bust), and the experiment in which they participated (domain-
specific forecasting or mixed-outcome forecasting). Displayed are 95 % confidence intervals.
In the domain-specific learning environment (Experiment 1), we find that
subjects who forecast the distribution of an asset from negative numbers only
(i.e. bust treatment) are significantly more pessimistic in their average prob-
ability estimate than those who forecast the identical distribution from posi-
tive numbers (i.e. boom treatment). This finding is independent of the type
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of distribution subjects witnessed (good or bad) and in line with previous
work by Kuhnen (2015).
Interestingly, and perhaps more importantly for market cycles, this find-
ing is not limited to domain-specific learning environments. Instead, those
subjects who forecast distributions from mixed-outcome lotteries with neg-
ative expected value (bust treatment) are also more pessimistic in their av-
erage probability assessment than those who learn from mixed-outcome lot-
teries with positive expected value (boom treatment). In contrast, a Bayesian
forecaster would provide completely identical probability estimates irrespec-
tive of the learning environment given the identical underlying distribution
from which outcomes are drawn. To control for the objective posterior prob-
ability, we also run regressions of subjects’ probability estimates on a bust-
indicator and the objective Bayesian probability that the stock is in the good
state. Results for both experiments pooled and individually are reported in
Table 4.2.
Across both experiments, we find that beliefs expressed by subjects in
the bust treatment are on average 6.43% lower (i.e. more pessimistic) than
in the boom treatment (p < 0.001), confirming Hypothesis H1. This means
that - holding the objective posterior constant - subjects update their priors
differently when learning in adverse market environments compared to fa-
vorable environments. Remarkably, the magnitude of this pessimism bias
does not significantly differ across experiments. In other words, the reported
pessimism bias does not critically depend on whether subjects observe exclu-
sively negative outcomes or mixed outcomes drawn from a distribution with
negative expected value. In essence, our results imply that the way subjects
form beliefs is different in bust markets than in boom markets.
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Table 4.2: Pessimism Bias
Dependent Variable Probability Estimate (Subjective Posterior)
Pooled Data Domain-specific Mixed
Bust -6.425*** -6.218*** -6.742***
(-6.16) (-3.86) (-4.88)
Objective Posterior 0.378*** 0.370*** 0.384***
(23.94) (17.21) (17.09)
Constant 46.31*** 45.96*** 47.01***
(10.82) (7.02) (8.24)
Observations 12048 5600 6448
R2 0.262 0.244 0.279
Note: This table reports the results of three OLS regressions on how subjective posterior be-
liefs about the distribution of the lottery depend on the treatment. The dependent variable
in the regression model, Probability Estimate, is the subjective posterior belief that the asset
is paying from the good distribution. Independent variables include the Bust dummy, an
indicator variable that equals 1 if participants were in the bust treatment and zero other-
wise, as well as Objective Posterior, which is the correct Bayesian probability that the stock is
good, given the information seen by the participant up to trial t in the learning block. Con-
trols include age, gender, statistical skills, self-reported experience in stock trading, whether
subjects were invested in the stock market during the last financial crisis, and the order of
outcomes they experienced in the forecasting task. Reported are coefficients and t-statistics
(in parentheses) using robust standard errors. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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4.5.2 Belief Formation and Risk-Taking
So far, we have shown that belief formation is systematically distorted by
whether subjects learn during boom periods or during bust periods. Next,
we investigate whether the induced pessimism resulting from biased belief
formation in bust markets translates to lower risk-taking, without altering
risk preferences. Table 4.3 summarizes subjects’ average investment in the
ambiguous and risky lottery, split by treatment.
The results reported in Table 4.3 provide a simple first test for our main
hypothesis. In particular, while subjects in the bust treatment invest on av-
erage 36 out of 100 Cents into the ambiguous lottery, subjects in the boom
treatment invest roughly 45 Cents into the ambiguous lottery (p < 0.01, two-
sided t-test). As such, we find a significant treatment effect of learning to
form beliefs in adverse market conditions on subjects’ willingness to take
risks. That is, subjects in the bust treatment invest on average 20 % less in the
ambiguous lottery than subjects in the boom treatment. However, we find
no such effect for investments in the risky lottery. While subjects in the boom
treatment invest on average 39 Cents in the risky lottery, subjects in the bust
treatment invest roughly 43 Cents, with no significant difference between
the two (p = 0.32, two-sided t-test). Effectively, this result indicates that
the pessimism induced by adverse market environments only translates to
significantly lower risk-taking when there is room to form subjective expec-
tations (i.e. the decision involves ambiguity). However, when expectations
are fixed, risk-taking is not affected, which implies that asymmetric learning
in different market environments does not alter individuals’ inherent risk
preferences.
To jointly test our main hypotheses while controlling for demographics
and other potentially confounding factors, we specify the following regres-
sion model:




β jXij + εi
(4.1)
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Table 4.3: Risk-Taking Across Macroeconomic Cycles I
Treatment
Bust Boom Difference p-value
Investment Ambiguous 36.31 44.82 -8.51*** < 0.01
Investment Risky 42.57 39.38 3.19 0.32
Note: This table summarizes the average investments (0 - 100) of participants in the ambigu-
ous lottery and the risky lottery split by the treatment variable. Differences in investment
between the treatments with the respective p-values from two-sided t-tests are also reported.
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
where the dependent variable Investmenti is the amount individual i invested
in the risky/ambiguous asset. Busti is a dummy that denotes if a subject
learned to form beliefs in the bust treatment, while Ambiguousi is a dummy
that denotes that the investment decision was made under ambiguity (i.e.
unknown probabilities in the investment task). The interaction Busti x
Ambiguousi allows us to examine our main hypothesis, i.e. that subjects
who learned to form beliefs in adverse environments invest significantly
less in the ambiguous lottery where they have room to form subjective
expectations. Finally, Xij is a set of control variables including gender, age,
statistic skills, stock trading experience, a life orientation test, the order of
good and bad distributions in the forecasting task, and an indicator whether
subjects were invested in the last financial crisis. We estimate our regression
model using OLS with robust standard errors. However, results remain
stable if we use a Tobit model instead.
In Table 4.4, we report our main finding for each experiment pooled and
separately. In the pooled data, the negative interaction term indicates that in-
dividuals in the bust treatment invest significantly less in the ambiguous lot-
tery compared to those in the boom treatment (p = 0.011), providing further
evidence in favor of Hypothesis H2a. In the risky lottery, when expectations
are fixed, we can directly test the effect of our forecasting task on subjects’
risk aversion. However, we do not find any significant difference between
treatments on subjects’ investment in the risky lottery (p = 0.47), confirm-
ing Hypothesis H2b. This means that we cannot reject the null hypothesis
that risk aversion for subjects who learned to form beliefs in adverse market
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Table 4.4: Risk-Taking Across Macroeconomic Cycles II
Dependent Variable Investment
Pooled Data Domain-specific Mixed
Bust 2.271 3.948 -0.948
(0.72) (0.86) (-0.21)
Ambiguous 5.149* 5.540 4.473
(1.71) (1.26) (1.04)
Bust x Ambiguous -11.23** -13.57** -8.229
(-2.54) (-2.21) (-1.25)
Constant 15.82* 20.32* 10.69
(1.70) (1.67) (0.74)
Observations 753 350 403
R2 0.060 0.080 0.069
Note: This table examines subjects’ risk-taking across treatments. We report the results of
OLS regressions for the whole sample, and for each experiment individually (Experiment
1: Domain-specific; Experiment 2: Mixed). The dependent variable is Investment, which
denotes participants’ invested amount (0 - 100) in the lottery they were assigned to. Bust is
an indicator variable that equals 1 if participants were in the bust treatment. Ambiguous is an
indicator variable that equals 1 if participants were asked to invest in the ambiguous lottery,
and 0 if they invested in the risky lottery. Controls include age, gender, statistical skills, self-
reported experience in stock trading, whether subjects were invested in the stock market
during the last financial crisis, and the order of outcomes they experienced in the forecasting
task. Reported are coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) using robust standard errors.
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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environments is similar compared to subjects who learned to form beliefs in
favorable market environments.
When looking at the results of each experiment separately, we find a
strong and similar-sized effect for the domain-specific learning environment
and a weaker - albeit statistically insignificant - effect for the mixed-outcome
learning environment. Moreover, and consistent with the pooled data, we
find no effect on subjects’ risk preferences in neither the domain-specific nor
the mixed-outcome learning environment. To better understand whether the
effect in the pooled sample is primarily driven by domain-specific outcomes,
or whether other factors are at play, we will run further regressions in Section
4.5.4.
4.5.3 Mechanism
In this section, we test whether expectations are indeed the driving mecha-
nism behind our main effect. We designed the ambiguous treatment in such a
way that we can assess participants’ subjective beliefs about the success prob-
ability of the lottery and directly relate them to their investment decision. If
expectations are the main driver of differences in risk-taking, we should ob-
serve that subjects who learned to form beliefs in either the negative domain-
specific or in the negative expected value mixed-outcome learning environ-
ment are more pessimistic about the success probability of the ambiguous
lottery. In addition, we would expect a positive correlation between the sub-
jective probability estimate of the success chance of the ambiguous lottery
and the amount invested in the ambiguous lottery. In order to directly test
the implied mechanism, we estimate the following two OLS regression mod-
els for our pooled sample and for each experiment separately:




β jXij + εi (4.2)
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β jXij + εi (4.3)
where Probabilityi is the subjective success probability of the ambiguous
lottery of subject i, and InvestmentAmbiguousi is the investment of subject i in
the ambiguous lottery. Findings for the first model are reported in Table 4.5
and for the second model in Table 4.6.
Table 4.5: Relation Between Treatment Variable and Probability Estimates
Dependent Variable Success Probability Estimate of Ambiguous Asset
Pooled Data Domain-specific Mixed
Bust -18.86*** -11.83*** -25.59***
(-8.59) (-3.74) (-8.57)
Constant 55.83*** 68.72*** 41.10***
(6.15) (5.25) (3.59)
Observations 377 177 200
R2 0.241 0.176 0.349
Note: This table examines the underlying mechanism of how our treatment variable affects
subjects’ beliefs about the success probability of the ambiguous lottery. We report the results
of OLS regressions for the whole sample, and for each experiment individually (Experiment
1: Domain-specific; Experiment 2: Mixed). The dependent variable is Success Probability,
which denotes participants’ beliefs about the success probability of the ambiguous lottery.
Bust is an indicator variable that equals 1 if participants were in the bust treatment. Controls
include age, gender, statistical skills, self-reported experience in stock trading and whether
subjects were invested in the stock market during the last financial crisis. Reported are
coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) using robust standard errors. *, **, *** indicates
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
In the pooled data, we find a strong and highly significant effect of our
treatment indicator on the subjective success probability of the ambiguous
lottery. In particular, those subjects who learned to form expectations in the
bust treatment are about 19 percentage points (p < 0.001) more pessimistic
about the success probability than subjects who learned to form beliefs in the
boom treatment (average success probability estimate for boom treatment:
68 %; for bust treatment: 49 %). The finding remains stable and statistically
highly significant for each learning environment separately, even though the
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effect seems to be stronger in the mixed-outcome learning environment. As
such, the induced pessimism resulting from distorted belief formation trans-
lates to other – independent – investment environments.
Table 4.6: Relation Between Beliefs About Success Probability and
Investment
Dep. Variable Investment in Ambiguous Asset
Pooled Pooled Domain- Domain- Mixed Mixed
Data Data specific specific
Success Probability 0.412*** 0.409*** 0.365*** 0.341*** 0.470*** 0.521***
(6.45) (5.70) (3.88) (3.42) (5.47) (4.83)
Bust -0.372 -3.846 4.571
(-0.11) (-0.93) (0.82)
Constant -3.304 -2.985 -5.350 -2.458 2.166 0.00936
(-0.26) (-0.23) (-0.36) (-0.16) (0.10) (0.00)
Observations 377 377 177 177 200 200
R2 0.146 0.146 0.162 0.166 0.157 0.160
Note: This table examines whether subjects in our experiment act upon their beliefs about
the success probability of the ambiguous asset. We report the results of OLS regressions for
the whole sample, and for each experiment individually (Experiment 1: Domain-specific;
Experiment 2: Mixed). The dependent variable is Investment Ambiguous, which captures
subjects’ invested amount in the ambiguous lottery. Success Probability denotes participants’
beliefs about the success probability of the ambiguous lottery. Bust is an indicator variable
that equals 1 if participants were in the bust treatment. Controls include age, gender, sta-
tistical skills, self-reported experience in stock trading and whether subjects were invested
in the stock market during the last financial crisis. Reported are coefficients and t-statistics
(in parentheses) using robust standard errors. *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
In Table 4.6, we test whether differences in subjective expectations regard-
ing the success probability of the ambiguous lottery also translate to changes
in risk-taking. In essence, we test whether subjects adhere to a basic eco-
nomic principle: keeping everything else constant, do subjects increase their
investment in an ambiguous asset when their beliefs about the outcome dis-
tribution are more optimistic? Our results across all specifications confirm
that subjects act upon their beliefs. In other words, the more optimistic they
are about the success probability of the ambiguous asset, the more they invest
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(p < 0.01). In addition, in Columns (2), (4), and (6), we include the Bust indi-
cator as an additional control variable to exclude the possibility that our ma-
nipulation affects factors unrelated to expectations. Even after including the
Bust indicator, the effect of subjective probability estimates on investments
remains of similar magnitude and statistical significance. Moreover, we find
no additional effect of our manipulation on the investment decision. Effec-
tively, this means while our manipulation does induce pessimism, it does not
affect factors unrelated to expectations.
Taken together, our findings suggest that: 1) Learning to form beliefs in
adverse market environments induces pessimism caused by systematic er-
rors in the belief updating process. 2) This pessimism translates to lower risk-
taking even in independent investment environments when there is room to
form beliefs. 3) Pessimism causes agents to assign lower probabilities to more
favorable outcomes. 4) Learning in adverse market environments and the re-
sulting errors in the belief updating process do not affect risk preferences.
4.5.4 Who is Most Affected?
In this section, we seek to establish a more profound understanding of how
the subjects’ forecasting abilities in the first part of the experiments affect
their subsequent risk-taking. To investigate this relation, we define the
squared deviation of subjects’ probability estimate in each round from the
objective posterior probability as a measure of forecasting quality. Next, we
conduct median splits with respect to this measure to distinguish above-
median forecasters from below-median forecasters. To assess the validity
of our measure, we compare the number of correct forecasts (defined in the
payment scheme by being in the range of 10 % of the objective forecast)
between below- and above-median forecasters. Across both experiments,
those subjects who are classified as "above-median" have on average three
more correct forecasts than those classified as "below-median" (p < 0.001,
t-test). Moreover, both measures are highly correlated (Pearson correlation
of 0.57, p < 0.001).
138 Chapter 4. Why So Negative?
To better understand to what extent the resulting pessimism through
learning from adverse market outcomes is a necessary condition for belief-
induced changes in risk-taking, we repeat the previous analyses and split by
the forecasting ability of our participants. Table 4.7 reports our main finding.
Table 4.7: Risk-Taking Across Macroeconomic Cycles Split by Forecasting
Quality
Dependent Variable Investment
Pooled Data Domain-specific Mixed
Above Below Above Below Above Below
Median Median Median Median Median Median
Bust 6.126 -1.109 6.424 0.652 3.437 -2.713
(1.38) (-0.25) (0.86) (0.11) (0.59) (-0.41)
Ambiguous 10.94*** -1.448 11.48* -1.582 10.56* -2.073
(2.65) (-0.33) (1.92) (-0.24) (1.75) (-0.34)
Bust x Ambiguous -21.49*** -1.454 -22.15** -4.501 -19.14** 1.881
(-3.54) (-0.23) (-2.44) (-0.52) (-2.25) (0.19)
Constant 1.238 22.65 1.822 37.77** 5.365 4.365
(0.10) (1.58) (0.11) (2.09) (0.29) (0.20)
Observations 377 376 169 181 208 195
R2 0.095 0.072 0.139 0.070 0.119 0.114
Note: This table examines subjects’ risk-taking across treatments split by above and below
median forecasting ability as defined in the text. We report the results of OLS regressions for
the whole sample, and for each experiment individually (Experiment 1: Domain-specific;
Experiment 2: Mixed). The dependent variable is Investment, which denotes participants’ in-
vested amount (0 - 100) in the lottery they were assigned to. Bust is an indicator variable that
equals 1 if participants were in the bust treatment. Ambiguous is an indicator variable that
equals 1 if participants were asked to invest in the ambiguous lottery, and 0 if they invested
in the risky lottery. Controls include age, gender, statistical skills, self-reported experience
in stock trading, whether subjects were invested in the stock market during the last finan-
cial crisis, and the order of outcomes they experienced in the forecasting task. Reported are
coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) using robust standard errors. *, **, *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Interestingly, we find that the previously reported effect is both stronger
in absolute terms and in terms of statistical significance but only for partici-
pants with above-median forecasting ability. In other words, the risk-taking
of those agents who achieve more correct forecasts is stronger affect by the
learning environment than the risk-taking of agents who achieve less correct
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forecasts. While this effect is roughly twice as big as for the full sample, it is
also independent of the learning environment and even slightly stronger for
the mixed-outcome learning environment.
In a next step, we investigate whether the learning environment affects
the estimated success probability of the ambiguous asset differently depend-
ing on the forecasting ability. The results are reported in Table 4.8.
Table 4.8: Relation Between Treatment and Probability Estimates Split by
Forecasting Quality
Dep. Variable Success Probability Estimate of Ambiguous Asset
Pooled Data Domain-specific Mixed
Above Below Above Below Above Below
Median Median Median Median Median Median
Bust -25.58*** -13.38*** -13.55*** -11.40** -35.34*** -15.48***
(-8.20) (-4.50) (-3.09) (-2.51) (-8.57) (-3.75)
Constant 57.97*** 53.54*** 84.00*** 50.75** 33.84** 54.92***
(4.19) (4.33) (4.75) (2.57) (2.14) (3.40)
Observations 187 190 85 92 102 98
R2 0.333 0.194 0.228 0.185 0.516 0.244
Note: This table examines the underlying mechanism of how our treatment variable affects
subjects’ beliefs about the success probability of the ambiguous lottery split by above and
below median forecasting ability as defined in the text. We report the results of OLS regres-
sions for the whole sample, and for each experiment individually (Experiment 1: Domain-
specific; Experiment 2: Mixed). The dependent variable is Success Probability, which denotes
participants’ beliefs about the success probability of the ambiguous lottery. Bust is an in-
dicator variable that equals 1 if participants were in the bust treatment. Controls include
age, gender, statistical skills, self-reported experience in stock trading and whether subjects
were invested in the stock market during the last financial crisis. Reported are coefficients
and t-statistics (in parentheses) using robust standard errors. *, **, *** indicates statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Across all specifications, we consistently find that subjects in the bust
treatment are significantly more pessimistic in their assessment of the suc-
cess probability of the ambiguous asset. For the mixed-outcome learning en-
vironment, we find that above-median forecasters are even more pessimistic
in their probability assessment than below-median forecasters, which is con-
sistent with our previous findings. Across both experiments, above-median
forecasters rate the success probability on average 25 percentage points lower
if they are in the bust treatment than their peers in the boom treatment. This
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effect shrinks substantially to only 15 percentage points for below-median
forecasters. Similar to previous analyses, we also find that independently
of their forecasting ability subjects act upon their beliefs by investing more
in the ambiguous asset if they rate the success probability to be higher (see
Table C.1 in the Appendix C).
But how is it possible that the risk-taking of the seemingly better per-
forming agents (i.e. the better forecasters) is more affected by the learning
environment? One possible explanation could be that our proxy of forecast-
ing ability is related to other factors such as socio-demographic background.
Alternatively, our proxy might capture participants’ involvement in the ex-
perimental task. Effectively, this would suggest that the documented effect
is more generalizable outside of the experimental environment but limited
by the difficulty of the Bayesian updating task. To test the first explanation,
we investigate whether agents with above-median forecasting ability share
specific socio-demographic characteristics. The results are reported in Table
4.9.
Overall, neither gender nor age can explain differences in participants’
forecasting abilities. In addition, and importantly, we find no treatment dif-
ferences between both groups. As such, the share of above-median fore-
casters is rather evenly distributed among our boom and bust treatment.
Somehow surprisingly, we find differences in subjects’ self-reported statis-
tical skills. However, the sign of the coefficient is rather unexpected as the
group of above-median forecasters self-reports on average lower statistical
skills, which might hint at overconfidence. Similar findings can be observed
for subjects’ self-reported experience in stock trading. Taken together, our
results – while not conclusive – provide no basis to support the first explana-
tion.
To test whether subjects with above-median forecasting ability are more
involved in the experiment, we investigate the time it took to finish the
experiment and the strength of the pessimism bias. Interestingly, we find
that above-median forecasters spent on average 112 seconds to read the
instructions of the forecasting task, while below-median forecasters only
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Table 4.9: Socio-Demographic Determinants of Forecasting Ability
Full Above Below
sample median median Difference p-value
Variable (N=753) (N=377) (N=376)
Age 34.72 34.32 34.23 0.09 0.90
(10.28) (9.79) (10.77)
Female 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.01 0.77
(0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
Statistical Skills 4.35 4.14 4.56 0.42 < 0.01
(1.65) (1.56) (1.71)
Experience Stock Trading 3.80 3.29 4.31 1.02 < 0.01
(1.94) (1.92) (1.83)
Invested Financial Crisis 0.41 0.33 0.50 0.17 < 0.01
(0.49) (0.47) (0.50)
Bust 0.50 0.47 0.53 0.06 0.11
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Note: This table shows demographics for our sample split by above- and below-median
forecasting ability. Reported are the mean and the standard deviation (in parentheses) for
the whole sample (Column 1) and split by median (Column 2 and 3). Column 4 presents
randomization checks. Differences in mean were tested using rank-sum tests, or χ2-tests for
binary variables. The p-value is reported in Column 5. Female is an indicator variable that
equals 1 if a participant is female. Statistical skills denotes participants’ self-assed statistical
skills on a 7-point Likert scale. Experience in stock trading is the self-reported experience
participants have in stock trading, assessed by a 7-point Likert scale. Invested financial crisis
is an indicator that equals 1 if participants were invested in the stock market during the last
financial crisis. Bust is an indicator variable that equals 1 if participants were in the bust
treatment.
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spent roughly 86 seconds (p < 0.05). Additionally, the overall time to finish
the experiment is roughly 580 seconds for above-median forecasters, and
about 553 seconds for below-median forecasters (p < 0.10). The difference
is largely driven by the additional time above-median forecasters spent
to read the instructions more carefully. Besides investigating the time
subjects take to read the instructions, we also look at the number of basic
errors subjects make during the forecasting task. We define a basic error
as a situation in which a participant updates his prior belief in the wrong
direction (i.e. reporting a lower posterior probability after observing a high
outcome signal or reporting a higher posterior probability after observing
a low outcome signal). While above-median forecasters make basic errors
in roughly 11 % of their forecasts, below-median forecasters make such
errors in roughly 30 % of their forecast (p < 0.001, two-sided t-test). In
other words, below-median forecasters make a basic error in approximately
every third forecast, even though a comprehension question following the
instructions exactly tested this relation (see Appendix C). Taken together,
the lower time below median-forecasters take to read the instructions paired
with the large frequency of basic errors they make, hint at a significantly
lower involvement in the experimental task.
We also investigate the strength of the pessimism bias in both groups. The
results are reported in Table 4.10. As expected the bias is less pronounced for
subjects with above-median forecasting ability (who also have more correct
forecasts). However, and more importantly, the pessimism bias still persists
and is statistically highly significant. Across all experiments, we consistently
find that above-median forecasters exhibit a 34 % less pronounced pessimism
bias. Nevertheless, these findings show that even the above-median forecasts
suffer from a pessimism bias which subsequently translates to lower risk-
taking. One indication of this might be that the above-median forecasters
are more involved in the overall experiment and in particular the forecasting
task given the additional time they need to finish the experiment. The higher
involvement is also reflected in the high explanatory power for this partic-
ular subgroup as seen by the relatively high R2 of roughly 0.70 compared
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to the rather low R2 of around 0.10 for the subgroup of below-median fore-
casters. Given the strength of the pessimism bias even in the group of more
sophisticated forecasters paired with the higher involvement of the afore-
mentioned group in our experiment, we believe that the effect of different
learning environments on risk-taking might be even more pronounced in the
real economy.
Table 4.10: Pessimism Bias Split by Forecasting Quality
Dep. Variable Probability Estimate (Subjective Posterior)
Pooled Data Domain-specific Mixed
Above Below Above Below Above Below
Median Median Median Median Median Median
Bust -4.529*** -6.813*** -4.261*** -7.247*** -4.997*** -5.661***
(-6.13) (-4.54) (-3.72) (-3.11) (-5.18) (-2.86)
Objective Posterior 0.671*** 0.133*** 0.641*** 0.165*** 0.693*** 0.107***
(48.14) (7.46) (34.13) (6.33) (35.46) (4.37)
Constant 20.92*** 58.92*** 14.88*** 66.86*** 27.49*** 50.78***
(6.75) (9.62) (3.22) (6.82) (6.38) (6.60)
Observations 6032 6016 2704 2896 3328 3120
R2 0.69 0.10 0.68 0.08 0.70 0.12
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions on how subjective posterior beliefs
about the distribution of the lottery depend on the treatment split by above and below me-
dian forecasting ability as defined in the text. We report the results of OLS regressions for
the whole sample, and for each experiment individually (Experiment 1: Domain-specific;
Experiment 2: Mixed). The dependent variable Probability Estimate is the subjective poste-
rior belief that the asset is paying from the good distribution. Independent variables include
the Bust dummy, an indicator variable that equals 1 if participants were in the bust treatment
and zero otherwise, as well as Objective Posterior, which is the correct Bayesian probability
that the stock is good, given the information seen by the participant up to trial t in the learn-
ing block. Controls include age, gender, statistical skills, self-reported experience in stock
trading, whether subjects were invested in the stock market during the last financial crisis,
and the order of outcomes they experienced in the forecasting task. Reported are coefficients
and t-statistics (in parentheses) using robust standard errors. *, **, *** indicate statistical sig-
nificance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
4.5.5 Boundaries and External Validity
To test both the external validity and the boundaries of the induced pes-
simism resulting from asymmetric learning in boom and bust markets, we
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analyze subjects’ responses to two additional set of questions, which deal
with expectations outside the experimental setting. The first question tests
to which extent the induced pessimism translates to expectations in the real
economy. We gave subjects the at the time current level of the Dow Jones In-
dustrial Average, and asked them to provide a 6-month return forecast on a
balanced 12-point Likert scale (see Appendix C). The second set of questions
tests to which degree the induced pessimism from the underlying learning
environment permeates to different contexts. As a measure of dispositional
optimism/pessimism across different life situations, we included a 10-item
general Life Orientation Test borrowed from Scheier et al. (1994), which is
frequently used in psychological research (see Appendix C). Results for the
Dow Jones return estimate are reported in Figure 4.4 (Panel A for entire sam-
ple and Panel B split by forecast quality).
For the Dow Jones return estimates, we consistently find across all
learning environments that subjects in the bust treatment are significantly
more pessimistic in their return expectations. More strikingly, subjects in
the bust treatment provide not only lower return estimates but also negative
return estimates, while those in the boom treatment provide positive return
estimates on average. Moreover, the effect seems to be stronger in absolute
magnitude for the negative return estimates, consistent with a pessimism
bias. When split by forecast quality, we observe that the effect is again
mainly driven by subjects with above-median forecasting ability. As such,
even while above-median forecasters show a less pronounced pessimism
bias overall (see previous section), their pessimism still translates to lower
return expectations in the real economy and thus outside the experimental
setting.
For the below-median forecasters however, we do not find significant dif-
ferences even though they also suffer from a pessimism bias. This fact paired
with a potentially lower involvement may explain why we cannot observe
differences in risk-taking in the ambiguous lottery between treatments for
this subgroup. It remains to stress, that even in such a simple and short-
learning environment as in our experiment, we are able to systematically
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manipulate return expectations for real world market indices.
Finally, we investigate the boundaries of how the pessimism induced by
adverse learning environments affects subjects overall psychological well-
being. Results are reported in Figure 4.5 (Panel A for entire sample and Panel
B split by forecast quality).
Figure 4.4: Dow Jones Estimates
Note: This figure displays subjects’ self-reported return expectations of the Dow Jones In-
dustrial average. Dow Jones return expectations were assessed on a 12-point Likert scale
Results are displayed separately for subjects across treatments (boom / bust) and across
experiments. Panel A displays return expectations for the entire sample and split by experi-
ment. Panel B displays return expectations split by above- and below-forecasting ability and
by experiment. Displayed are 95% confidence intervals.
Across all experiments and splits we do not find any significant differ-
ence in dispositional optimism/pessimism depending on whether subjects
were in the boom or bust treatment. Taken together, our results suggest that
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the environment in which subjects learn strongly affects their return expec-
tations for even unrelated financial investments, but does not affect subjects’
inherent psychological traits such as neuroticism, anxiety, self-mastery, or
self-esteem as assessed by the Life Orientation Test.
Figure 4.5: Life Orientation Test
Note: This figure displays subjects’ answers to a general life orientation test. The life ori-
entation test Scheier et al. (1994) is a 10-item inventory where subjects rate statements on a
7-point Likert scale. Displayed is the cumulated score separated by treatment (boom / bust)
and by experiment. Panel A displays the cumulated score for the entire sample and split
by experiment. Panel B displays the cumulated score split by above- and below-forecasting
ability and by experiment. Displayed are 95 % confidence intervals.
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4.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we present experimental evidence on an alternative channel
to countercyclical risk aversion for time-varying risk-taking. While ratio-
nal expectations models introduce modifications in the representative agent’s
utility, we test whether systematic deviations from rational expectations can
cause the same observed investment pattern without assuming time-varying
degrees of risk aversion.
We place subjects in a learning environment which resembles key char-
acteristics of boom and bust markets and measure their risk-taking under
risk (i.e. known probabilities) or under uncertainty (i.e. unknown probabili-
ties) in an independent investment task. Subjects who learned to form beliefs
from adverse outcomes (resembling a bust market) take significantly less risk
in investments under uncertainty. However, we do not find any significant
difference in their level of risk aversion.
Overall, the mechanism described in our experiment implies that agents
may form pro-cyclical return expectations, i.e. they are more optimistic in
boom markets and more pessimistic in recessions. These results are consis-
tent with recent survey evidence on investors’ return expectations. While
traditional models (i.e. rational expectations models) assume that agents
are fully aware of the implied counter-cyclical nature of the equity premium
(Nagel and Xu, 2019), these surveys find that – if anything – investors form
rather pro-cyclical expectations.
Additionally, the investigated systematic deviation from rational ex-
pectations can produce similar self-reinforcing processes as countercyclical
risk aversion. The countercyclical nature of risk preferences implies that
investors are more risk averse during recessions, which leads investors to
reduce their equity share. This process then generates additional downward
momentum for prices. Yet, similar dynamics can also be generated assuming
time-varying changes in expectations. If bust markets systematically induce
pessimistic expectations about future returns for a substantial subset of
investors, this may reduce the aggregate share invested in risky assets of
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Can Agents Add and Subtract
When Forming Beliefs? ∗
5.1 Introduction
Probabilistic beliefs are essential to decision-making under risk in various
economic domains, including investments in financial markets, purchasing
insurance, attaining education, or when searching for employment. Standard
models assume that individuals update their prior beliefs according to Bayes’
Theorem. Besides the prescription of how individuals should form posterior
probabilities, Bayes’ Theorem has an implicit, fundamental rule of how sub-
jects should incorporate information signals of opposite direction. In the usual
case of updating about two states of the world from independent binomial
signals, two unequal signals should cancel out. Thus, taken together they
should not affect prior beliefs. Importantly, this relation is independent of
whether individuals’ prior beliefs are consistent with Bayes.
To illustrate this idea, imagine you think about visiting a restaurant which
recently opened in your city. Before making a reservation, you call two of
your friends who know the restaurant. Suppose, both of them recommend
the new restaurant, making you rather optimistic about its quality. Yet, since
the restaurant is quite expensive, you decide to call two more friends. As-
sume, the first one did not like the restaurant, whereas the second did like
∗ Authors: Pascal Kieren, Jan Müller-Dethard, and Martin Weber. All authors are at the Uni-
versity of Mannheim. We gratefully acknowledge funding by the German Research Foun-
dation (DFG grant WE993/15-1).
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it. Would you still be just as optimistic as you were after the first two calls?
In other words, are two recommendations just as good as three recommenda-
tions and one critique, as prescribed by Bayes’ Theorem?
In this article, we ask whether individuals follow this simple, counting-
based rule when updating their beliefs. To test this, we create an environ-
ment in which subjects repeatedly observe binary signals to learn about an
underlying state of the world. While such a binary decision-making prob-
lem appears to presents a specific, commonly used and simplified setting in
experimental research, it applies to many every-day decision problems (e.g.
are we in a good or bad stock market regime, should I take an umbrella for
the walk or not, or as in our example above, is the restaurant good or bad?).
Throughout this paper, we refer to signals that are in line with the true
underlying state of the world as confirming signals and otherwise as discon-
firming signals. We exogenously manipulate the number of subsequent con-
firming signals that gets interrupted by a single disconfirming signal. This
setup allows us to test (i) how subjects update their priors after a disconfirm-
ing signal conditional on the number of previously observed confirming sig-
nals; and (ii) the extent to which they revise their priors after the discon-
firming signal is followed by another confirming signal (i.e. corrected). In
both cases, Bayes’ Rule makes a simple, yet important prediction: An agent
should reduce (increase) his prior after a disconfirming (confirming) signal
by the same magnitude than he increased (reduced) it after the previous con-
firming (disconfirming) signal.
To implement this framework, we conduct three bookbag-and-poker-chip
experiments in the spirit of Grether (1980) with 1800 participants. All exper-
iments follow the same basic design. Over the course of six periods, we pro-
vide subjects with information signals about a risky asset which can either
draw from a "good distribution" or from a "bad distribution". Both distribu-
tions are binary with a high outcome of +5 and a low outcome of −5. In the
good distribution, the higher payoff occurs with 70% probability while the
lower payoff occurs with 30% probability. In the bad distribution, the proba-
bilities are reversed, i.e. the lower payoff occurs with 70% probability while
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the higher payoff occurs with 30% probability. To create situations which
are consistent with our framework, we use a stratified sample of price paths.
More precisely, we examine six price paths for the good distribution and six
price paths for the bad distribution. In each of the six periods of a price path,
subjects subsequently observe payoffs of the risky asset. After each payoff,
we ask them to provide a probability estimate that the risky asset draws from
the good distribution and how confident they are about their estimate.
In Experiment 2 and 3 we run variations of our baseline experiment to
test the robustness and underlying drivers of our findings. In Experiment
2, we change the informational content of the positive signal (i.e. the diag-
nosticity). In Experiment 3, we reduce the uncertainty about the underlying
distribution by providing subjects with the full outcome history in advance.
For comparability, the price paths we use in both variations remain identical
to the baseline experiment.
To detect whether subjects follow a simple, counting-based heuristic
when updating their beliefs after a disconfirming signal, we compare the
change in probability estimate after a disconfirming signal to the change
in probability estimate after a confirming signal which is directly observed
prior to the disconfirming signal. The same logic applies to the case when
the disconfirming signal is reverted (i.e. corrected).
Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, we consistently find
that subjects strongly overreact whenever a sequence of confirming signals
is interrupted by a single disconfirming signal. Across all experiments, sub-
jects update their prior beliefs on average by 3.54 % immediately before ob-
serving the disconfirming signal, whereas they update their prior beliefs on
average by 15.38 % after the subsequent disconfirming signal. In relative
terms, subjects update their priors by 334 % too much after a disconfirming
signal, thereby acting as if one single disconfirming signal would carry the
weight of up to three confirming signals.
Second, we find that this overreaction is almost entirely corrected once
subjects observe another confirming signal following the disconfirming sig-
nal. More precisely, after observing a confirming signal directly following the
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disconfirming signal, they update their prior beliefs again by 13.65 %, com-
pared to their initial overreaction of 15.38 %. In other words, subjects almost
completely correct their initial overreaction if the disconfirming signal gets
reverted.
Third, we find that both the overreaction and the subsequent correction
do not critically depend on subjects having extreme priors. Even with a di-
agnosticity of only 60 %, two subsequent confirming signals are sufficient to
observe a pronounced overreaction after a disconfirming signal. In such a
setting not only the experimentally observed subjective priors, but also the
objective Bayesian probabilities are low with on average 72 % and 69 %, re-
spectively.
Fourth, the observed overreaction after a disconfirming signal becomes
stronger the more confirming signals individuals previously encountered.
Even though – in absolute terms – the observed overreaction should become
smaller as subjective priors converge to one, we find that a single discon-
firming signal can completely revert up to five confirming signals the later it
occurs. This implies that – in contrast to the Bayesian prediction – signals are
not invariant to the order in which they occur. In other words, observing one
single disconfirming signal followed by five confirming signals is different
compared to observing five confirming signals that are followed by a single
disconfirming signal. Whereas subjects mostly correct their strong overreac-
tion if they can, the violation of the counting heuristic is most severe when
subjects have no opportunity to collect further information.
Motivated by previous work showing that agents react most strongly to
unexpected events, we finally investigate whether the observed overreaction
still exists if subjects (i) have little uncertainty about the underlying distribu-
tion and (ii) know in which period the disconfirming signal will occur. How-
ever, even under these circumstances subjects still strongly overreact after a
disconfirming signal.
Overall, our findings suggest that when observing a disconfirming signal
after a sequence of confirming signals subjects fail to follow the simple count-
ing heuristic implied by Bayes’ Theorem. Instead of reverting one previous
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signal, they revert up to five signals. In other words, they strongly overre-
act. Interestingly however, this is not the case, if a disconfirming signal is
immediately reverted. Then, subjects appear to follow the counting heuris-
tic and fully correct their prior overreaction. Referring to our introductory
restaurant example, a single critique would cancel out both prior recommen-
dations, while another recommendation following the critique would be con-
sidered as two recommendations.
Our paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, we contribute
to the various studies that document biases and heuristics in probabilistic
reasoning (for an overview see Camerer, 1987, 1995; Benjamin, 2019). A com-
mon finding, by and large is that people update too little, with three excep-
tions as noted by Benjamin (2019): (i) People overinfer from signals if the
diagnosticity is low, (ii) people may overinfer when signals go in the same
direction of the priors (i.e. prior-biased updating), and (iii) people may over-
infer when priors are extreme and signals go in the opposite direction of the
priors (due to base-rate neglect). Especially, (ii) and (iii) push in opposite
directions which makes it important to understand when one or the other
dominates. Our study suggests that whenever subjects violate the simple
counting heuristic implied by Bayes’ Theorem, individuals generally overre-
act to signals of opposite direction of their priors. A violation occurs when-
ever a sequence of signals that go in the same direction is interrupted by a
signal of opposite direction. Importantly, we find that this overreaction is in-
dependent of subjects having extreme priors and requires only a sequence of
two signals that go in the same direction. Conversely, we find that subjects
generally underinfer in situations in which they cannot or do not violate the
counting heuristic. This is either because there are (i) only signals of same
direction, or (ii) positive and negative signals alternate.
Second, our study also contributes to the recent literature on tipping
points. In psychology, a tipping point describes “the point at which people
begin to perceive noise as signal” (O’Brien and Klein, 2017, p. 161). In
other words, a tipping point defines the first point when people infer that
a pattern is no longer an anomaly and thus believe that one state of the
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world is more likely to be the true state (O’Brien, 2019). So far, research
has uncovered two robust findings: tipping points are asymmetric across
valence (i.e. people reach conclusions faster for negative events than for
positive events) and asymmetric across time (i.e. people predict slower
tipping points than they actually express). Our findings suggest that tipping
points regarding probabilistic beliefs about an underlying state of the world
(i.e. one of two possible probability distributions) are symmetric across
domains. One possible reason for this difference is both, the signal structure
and the underlying stochastic process. Whereas our study employs objective
and randomly distributed signals with a predefined underlying stochastic
process, previous studies employ more realistic (and thus more subjective)
signals with no clear underlying stochastic process. This distinction is in
line with the discussion on the use of neutral versus more realistic quantities
in the experimental literature on information processing (see Eil and Rao,
2011). Interestingly, our findings also suggest that individuals are quick to
revise their priors once they observe a disconfirming signal, which might
be important for the formation of tipping points and the persistence of
subsequent beliefs.
Finally, we also contribute to the literature on over- and underreactions
to unexpected news in financial markets (Bondt and Thaler, 1985; Barberis
et al., 1998; Daniel et al., 1998; Hong and Stein, 1999). Our results suggest that
the violation of a simple counting heuristic implied by Bayes’ Rule presents
a potential mechanism underlying over- and underreactions. In situations
in which agents observe a sequence of signals that go in the same direction
(e.g. consensus favorable earnings forecasts) agents initially underreact. If
such a sequence is interrupted by a single signal that goes in the opposite di-
rection (e.g. an unfavorable earnings surprise), they strongly overreact and
partly neglect previous signals. Interestingly, our findings also suggest that
the strength of the overreaction only partly depends on the underlying signal
being unexpected. In other words, the violation of a simple counting heuris-
tic in probabilistic belief updating does not crucially depend on the fact that
agents are surprised.
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Our paper is structured as follows. In Section 5.2, we present an empirical
framework, briefly review the existing literature and state our hypotheses.
In Section 5.3, we describe the experimental design and summary statistics.
Finally, in Section 5.4 we discuss our results and conclude in Section 5.5.
5.2 Empirical Framework and Hypotheses
In this section, we describe the framework which serves as a basis for our
hypotheses and the later empirical analyses and then relate the existing liter-
ature to our established framework. Suppose there is an agent who wants to
learn about the quality of a risky asset. The risky asset can either be in a good
or bad state. Over a number of periods, the agent may receive good (+) or
bad (−) signals from which he can learn about the quality of the risky asset.
This framework of how the agent’s beliefs about the asset being in the good
state should evolve can best be illustrated using the following graph.
Figure 5.1: Empirical Framework
Note: The figure illustrates the empirical framework of this study. We examine subjects’
belief updating behavior over three phases: Phase 1 describes a sequence of signals that
go in the same direction (i.e. confirming an underlying distribution). Phase 2 describes a
situation in which a sequence of previously observed same-directional signals is interrupted
by a single signal of opposite direction (i.e. disconfirming signal). Finally, Phase 3 defines
the situation when a disconfirming signal is immediately reverted (i.e. correction). The blue
dots present the objective probabilities (i.e. the beliefs according to Bayes’ Theorem) that the
asset pays from the good distribution given the sequence of signals.
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Figure 5.1 illustrates three phases of how Bayesian beliefs evolve over
a sequence of four outcomes. The first phase ("confirming signals") resem-
bles a sequence of same-directed signals. A signal which (i) confirms the
underlying distribution and (ii) follows another same-directed signal will be
referred to as a confirming signal. Thus, if a signal is to be referred as a con-
firming signal, an agent must have observed at least two signals. The second
phase ("disruptive signal") defines the situation when a sequence of confirm-
ing signals (phase 1) is disrupted by a signal of opposite direction than the
previously observed signal. A signal which disrupts a sequence of same-
directed signals will be referred to as a disconfirming signal. The third phase
("correction") resembles the case when a previously observed disconfirming
signal is reverted. A signal which follows on a disconfirming signal and has
the opposite direction than the previously-observed disconfirming signal is
referred to as a correction.
In our framework with binary information signals, an agent should up-




θδt + (1− θ)δt
, δt = gt − bt (5.1)
where PBayest is the posterior probability that the risky asset pays from the
good distribution (G) and θ refers to the diagnosticity of the good signal. The
number of good signals observed until period t is referred to as gt, while the
number of bad signals observed until period t is referred to as bt.
Applying the formula to our described framework from Figure 5.1 pro-
vides several implications on how agents should update their beliefs. Over-
all, note that the Bayesian agent in our setting is indifferent regarding the
order of the signals, since only the difference delta t is relevant. This feature
of the described framework has implications which are especially relevant
for the second and the third phase in Figure 5.1. For the second phase this
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implies that an agent should reduce the probability estimate after a discon-
firming signal by the same magnitude than he increased it after the previous
confirming signal. In other words, a Bayesian agent would report the same
probability estimate than he did two signals ago. As such he simply cancels
the previously observed confirming signal. Referring to the framework in
Figure 5.1, the Bayesian agent would state the same probability estimate as
he did after observing the first positive signal. For the third phase, a similar
logic applies. In particular, after observing a correction (i.e. the reversion of
the disconfirming signal) agents should also only cancel the previously ob-
served disconfirming signal and should again, end up with the same proba-
bility estimate as they did two signals ago. In both scenarios (disruption and
correction), a Bayesian agent would follow a counting heuristic which means
that one positive and one negative signal simply cancel out.
In contrast, agents in the first phase cannot rely on a simple counting
heuristic in determining the precise probability estimate. That means after
observing two same-directional signals, the counting heuristic does not pro-
vide any insight by how much they need to adjust the prior estimate. In other
words, to state the correct magnitude of the change in probability estimate,
the agent needs to know Bayes’ Rule.
Based on the established framework, we formulate the following
hypotheses:1
Hypothesis H1: Disruption (Phase 2)
After observing a disconfirming signal, an agent should reduce his
prior probability estimate by the same magnitude than he increased it
after the previous confirming signal.
Hypothesis H2: Correction (Phase 3)
After a previous disconfirming signal got reverted, an agent should
cancel the previously observed disconfirming signal and end up with
the same probability estimate as he did two signals ago.
1 The hypotheses are formulated for the good distribution. In the bad distribution, subjects
should adjust their priors in the opposite direction.
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It is important to stress that our framework and the later experimental
design do not crucially depend on agents being Bayesian. Instead, it is suf-
ficient for agents to know that two directionally inconsistent signals cancel
each other out. In other words, for the basic updating rule we are testing, it
is not essential that agents state the correct absolute Bayes estimate. We are
rather interested in the changes in probability estimates after subjects incor-
porate new signals into their prior beliefs.
As discussed, Bayes Theorem provides clear and testable predictions on
how individuals should revise their beliefs after a sequence of confirming
signals is interrupted by a single disconfirming signal as well as after its sub-
sequent reversal (i.e. correction). While this is perfect normative advice,
the literature on probabilistic reasoning has identified various situations in
which individuals systematically deviate from Bayes and either over- or un-
derinfer. Using bookbag-and-poker-chip experiments, some studies find un-
derinference when a new signal confirms the prior hypothesis and no or only
very little revision of beliefs when a new signal disconfirms the prior hypoth-
esis, consistent with prior-biased inference (Pitz et al., 1967; Geller and Pitz,
1968; Pitz, 1969). In contrast to this, DuCharme and Peterson (1968) observe
in experiments with normally distributed signals overinference in response
to a disconfirming signal. However, Eil and Rao (2011) as well as Möbius
et al. (2014) find no evidence for prior-biased inference at all. Recently, Char-
ness and Dave (2017) establish a conceptual framework which combines both
under- and overinference and test it experimentally. They find prior-biased
inference. In particular, they observe overinference after a confirming signal
in updating problems with equal prior probabilities of the states and high
diagnosticity of 70%. However, and opposing to Charness and Dave (2017),
Pitz et al. (1967), find for the identical level of diagnosticity underinference
after a confirming signal. In brief, while there are several studies showing
that individuals deviate from Bayes, the evidence in which way and when they
deviate is mixed and apparently inconsistent.
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5.3 Experimental Design
One-thousand-eight-hundred-and-seven individuals (1159 males, 648 fe-
males, mean age 34 years, 10 years standard deviation) were recruited from
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to participate in three online experi-
ments. MTurk advanced to a widely used and accepted recruiting platform
for economic experiments. Not only does it offer a larger and more diverse
subject pool as compared to lab studies (which frequently rely on students),
but it also provides a response quality similar to that of other subject pools
(Buhrmester et al., 2011; Goodman et al., 2013).
An environment to study the role of disconfirming information signals
requires (i) a sequential set-up with room for subjective belief formation, (ii)
control over Bayesian beliefs, (iii) variation in the number of confirming sig-
nals prior to a disconfirming signal, and (iv) an incentive-compatible belief
elicitation. Our design accommodates all of these features.
5.3.1 Baseline Design
To study the role of disconfirming information signals, we provide subjects
with information about a risky asset. In all of our experiments, the risky asset
has an initial value of 50 which either increases or decreases over the course
of six periods depending on the asset’s payoffs. The payoffs are either drawn
from a "good distribution" or from a "bad distribution". Both distributions
are binary with a high outcome of +5 and a low outcome of −5. In the good
distribution, the higher payoff occurs with 70 % probability while the lower
payoff occurs with 30 % probability. In the bad distribution, the probabilities
are reversed, i.e. the lower payoff occurs with 70 % probability while the
higher payoff occurs with 30 % probability.
Since we only focus on a single disconfirming signal within six periods,
we differentiate between six possible price paths per distribution. These price
paths resemble our treatments. The first treatment dimension depicts the
underlying distribution and therefore the domain (good or bad), while the
second treatment dimension depicts the period in which the disconfirming
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signal occurs (from period one to period six). Table 5.1 provides an overview
of all twelve treatments.
Table 5.1: Overview of Treatments
Good Distribution
Treatment 1 2 3 4 5 6
G-1 − + + + + +
G-2 + − + + + +
G-3 + + − + + +
G-4 + + + − + +
G-5 + + + + − +
G-6 + + + + + −
Bad Distribution
Treatment 1 2 3 4 5 6
B-1 + − − − − −
B-2 − + − − − −
B-3 − − + − − −
B-4 − − − + − −
B-5 − − − − + −
B-6 − − − − − +
Note: This table provides an overview of all treatments in our experiments. Overall, there
are twelve treatments, six in the good distribution and six in the bad distribution, defined
by the period in which the disruptive signal occurs. The "−" sign represents a negative (bad)
signal and the "+" sign a positive (good) signal.
For example, in treatment G-3, the risky asset pays from the good distri-
bution and the disconfirming signal appears in period three after two con-
firming signals (i.e. the sequence would be: positive, positive, negative, pos-
itive, ... signal). A key feature of our design is that we shift the single dis-
confirming signal between a sequence of six signals. That allows us to test
how subjects update their beliefs after observing a single disruptive, discon-
firming signal conditional on the number of previously observed confirming
signals. Additionally, the design makes it possible to investigate how sub-
jects update their beliefs after the disconfirming signal is reverted.
Across all experiments, subjects make forecasting decisions in six consec-
utive periods. At the beginning of the experiment, the computer randomly
determines the distribution of the risky asset (which can be good or bad) and
the period in which the disconfirming signal will occur (which can be from
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one to six). In each of the six rounds, subjects observe a payoff of the risky
asset. After each round, we ask them to provide a probability estimate that
the risky asset draws from the good distribution and how confident they are
about their estimate. To keep the focus on the forecasting task and to not test
their memory performance, we display the prior outcomes in a price-line-
chart next to the questions. To ensure that subjects have a sufficient under-
standing of the forecasting task, they had to correctly answer four compre-
hension questions before they could continue (see Appendix D.1).
The experiment concluded with a brief survey about subjects’ socio-
economic background, self-assessed statistic skills, as well as a measure of
risk preferences and financial literacy adopted from Kuhnen (2015). Subjects’
belief elicitation was incentivized. Participants were paid a participation
fee and a variable fee based on the accuracy of the probability estimates
provided. Specifically, they received 25 cents for each probability estimate
within 10 % (+/− 5%) of the objective Bayesian value. Across all studies, it
took participants approximately 7 minutes to complete the experiment and
participants earned $1.50 on average.
5.3.2 Experimental Variations
We conducted two variations of our baseline experiment, referred to as Re-
duced Diagnosticity and Reduced Uncertainty. The two additional experiments
are designed to identify whether the belief updating after a disconfirming
signal depends on (i) the diagnosticity of the signal (i.e. its informational
content), (ii) subjects’ uncertainty about the distribution (i.e. whether the
asset turns out to be good or bad), and (iii) whether subjects do not antici-
pate the disconfirming signal (i.e. are surprised about the disruption of the
sequence of confirming signals).
Experiment Reduced Diagnosticity: In the experiment Reduced Diagnos-
ticity we change the informational content that subjects can infer from a pos-
itive signal. This means, we change the probability of the higher outcome in
the good distribution from 70 % to 60 % and of the lower outcome from 30
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% to 40 %, respectively. In the bad distribution, we change the probability of
the lower outcome from 70 % to 60 % and of the higher outcome from 30 %
to 40 %, respectively. On the one hand, we expected to observe - as Bayes’
Theorem implies - lower (higher) absolute levels of probability estimates in
the good (bad) distribution given the reduced diagnosticity of signals. On
the other hand, we expect to observe no impact of diagnosticity on the fun-
damental counting rule we are testing. Within our empirical framework, the
increase (decrease) in posterior probability after a confirming signal in the
good (bad) distribution should remain exactly as much as the decrease (in-
crease) in posterior probability after a subsequent disconfirming signal, irre-
spective of how informative the signal is.
Experiment Reduced Uncertainty: In the experiment Reduced Uncertainty
we combine aspects (ii) and (iii) from above. To do so, we change the previ-
ously framed forward-looking updating task to a backward-looking updat-
ing task. In detail, subjects in the baseline experiment are asked to make a
forecasting decision without knowing the future outcome history. In the Re-
duced Uncertainty experiment, we show subjects the full outcome history be-
forehand. Then, we ask them to provide probability estimates period by pe-
riod as in the baseline experiment for exactly the same outcome history they
have seen in advance. Importantly, subjects were still incentivized to provide
probability forecasts which only incorporate the information subjects had in
each period. In other words, the objective Bayesian probabilities are identical
to the baseline experiment. By showing subjects the entire outcome history
beforehand, we already eliminate most of the uncertainty regarding the un-
derlying distribution and any of the potential surprise related to the period
in which the disruptive signal occurs. Additionally, before the first period,
we directly ask subjects two questions: (i) we ask them to count the number
of positive and the number of negative payoffs in the outcome history and
(ii) we ask them to state the period in which the disconfirming signal occurs.
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5.3.3 Demographics
Table 5.2 presents summary statistics for all our three experiments. Over-
all 1807 subjects participated in our studies, with an average age of 33.79
years in Experiment 1 (33.59 years in Experiment 2, and 35.01 years in Ex-
periment 3). Thirty-five percent (forty-one percent, thirty-two percent) were
female. Subjects reported average statistical skills of 4.46 out of 7 (4.42, 4.42)
and their level of risk aversion, measured by how much of an endowment of
10,000 they are willing to invest risky in a broad equity index, is as follows.
Subjects invest on average 4,470 (4,420, 5,000) in the risky asset. Across all ex-
periments subjects report medium financial literacy. In particular, they make
1.73 (1.70, 1.70) out of three possible basic errors.
Table 5.2: Summary Statistics on Subjects
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Baseline Reduced Reduced
Diagnosticity Uncertainty
Variable (N=601) (N=602) (N=604)
Age 33.79 33.59 35.01
(9.89) (9.17) (9.83)
Female 0.35 0.41 0.32
(0.48) (0.49) (0.47)
Statistical Skills (1-7) 4.46 4.42 4.42
(1.64) (1.64) (1.68)
Risk Preferences 44.7% 44.2% 50.0%
(2.94) (2.89) (2.98)
Financial Literacy (1-3) 1.73 1.70 1.70
(0.93) (0.91) (0.93)
Note: This table shows summary statistics for our experimental data. Reported are the mean
and the standard deviation (in parentheses) for each experiment individually. Female is an
indicator variable that equals 1 if a participant is female. Statistical skills denotes participants’
self-assessed statistical skills on a 7-point Likert scale. Risk preferences are elicited by asking
subjects to split an endowment between a risky and a risk-free asset (reported is the frac-
tion invested risky). Financial literacy was assessed by asking subjects to identify the correct
formula for calculating the expected value of the portfolio they selected. Through multiple
choice answers, participants could make three basic errors (reported is the number of basic
errors).
164 Chapter 5. Can Agents Add and Subtract When Forming Beliefs?
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Main Results
In this section, we first present results of our baseline experiment of how
individuals update their beliefs after disconfirming signals as well as of how
they revise their probability estimates after a correction. Then, we test the
robustness of our findings with respect to the diagnosticity of the information
signals and finally examine how the reduction of uncertainty with respect to
the underlying distribution affects subjects’ updating behavior.
Baseline Results
Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3 present subjects’ average updating tendency over
all periods for each treatment G-3 to G-6 of our baseline experiment. Figure
5.2 shows the results of those treatments in which the underlying distribu-
tion is good and Figure 5.3 shows the results of those treatments in which the
underlying distribution is bad.
To be consistent with our framework in Section 5.2, we focus our analysis
on the treatments in which subjects observe at least two subsequent same-
directional signals before a disconfirming signal occurs. This is the case for
our treatments G-3, G-4, G-5, and G-6 (B-3, B-4, B-5, and B-6). We will analyze
the results of treatments G-1 and G-2 (B-1 and B-2) in a separate section at the
end of this chapter. From Figure 5.2, we observe that subjects in the good dis-
tribution increase their prior beliefs by 6.44 % on average after a confirming
signal, whereas they decrease their prior beliefs by 18.63 % on average after
observing a disconfirming signal. In the bad distribution, the findings look
similar as seen in Figure 5.3. Subjects decrease their prior beliefs by 5.38 %
on average after a confirming signal, while they increase their prior beliefs by
16.94 % on average after observing a disconfirming signal. In relative terms,
this means that subjects in the good distribution update their prior beliefs af-
ter a disconfirming signal with a magnitude that is approximately three times
as large as if they update after a confirming signal. This ratio is more or less
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Figure 5.2: Subjects’ Average Updating Behavior in the Good Distribution
– Experiment 1
Note: The figure displays subjects’ average probability estimates over six consecutive pe-
riods in the good distribution for each treatment G-3 to G-6 individually. The dashed line
shows the objective Bayesian posterior probabilities and the solid line shows subjects’ aver-
age probability estimates. Displayed are 95% confidence intervals.
independent of the distribution, albeit a little bit stronger in the bad distribu-
tion. Participants update their beliefs after a disconfirming signal as if they
failed to incorporate three previously observed confirming signals. In other
words, subjects strongly overreact after a disconfirming signal. In particular,
it appears that a disconfirming signal destroys up to five prior confirming
signals.
Next, we investigate how individuals update their prior beliefs after a
disconfirming signal gets reverted. In particular, we examine whether and to
what extent subjects correct the observed overreaction after a disconfirming
signal. We find that subjects in the good distribution increase their probabil-
ity estimate on average by 17.11 %. Similarly, in the bad distribution, sub-
jects decrease their probability estimates on average by 14.16 %. In essence,
166 Chapter 5. Can Agents Add and Subtract When Forming Beliefs?
Figure 5.3: Subjects’ Average Updating Behavior in the Bad Distribution –
Experiment 1
Note: The figure displays subjects’ average probability estimates over six consecutive pe-
riods in the bad distribution for each treatment G-3 to G-6 individually. The dashed line
shows the objective Bayesian posterior probabilities and the solid line shows subjects’ aver-
age probability estimates. Displayed are 95% confidence intervals.
the previously observed overreaction after a disconfirming signal is almost
entirely corrected. This finding holds independent of the distribution.
From these descriptive statistics alone, it becomes already evident that
subjects fail to follow a simple counting heuristic when they incorporate in-
consistent signals in their beliefs. In other words, they do not adhere to the
simple updating rule in which they count the difference between positive
and negative signals. Instead, they strongly overreact after a disconfirming
signal. Interestingly however, this is not the case, if an inconsistent (i.e. dis-
confirming) signal is reverted. Then, subjects appear to follow the counting
heuristic implied by Bayes’ Rule and fully correct their prior overreaction.
Besides the descriptive analysis, we also run regressions, in which we can
control for the objective posterior probability. To investigate how individuals
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update their prior beliefs both in response to disconfirming signals and sub-
sequent confirming signals (i.e. the correction of the disconfirming signal),
we estimate the following model2:
∆pi,t = β1∆ObjectivePriori,t + β2Discon f irmi,t + β3Correctioni,t + εi,t, (5.2)
where ∆pi,t is the difference in subjects’ probability estimates between two
subsequent periods and ∆ObjectivePriori,t is the difference in the objective
Bayesian probability between two subsequent periods. Finally, Discon f irmi,t
and Correctioni,t are two indicator variables which equal one if subject i ob-
serves a disconfirming signal or a correction in period t, respectively. In the
above specification we can test both for Bayesian behavior and in which way
individuals depart from it. If subjects were perfect Bayesian, we would ex-
pect that β̂1 = 1, and β̂2 = β̂3 = 0. In other words, subjects always update
their prior beliefs according to Bayes’ Rule, while neither a disconfirming sig-
nal (which disrupts a sequence of confirming signals) nor a subsequent cor-
rection would explain any additional variation. Conversely, β̂1 < (>)1, β̂2 <
(>) 0, and β̂3 < (>) 0 would signal underinference (overinference) to sub-
sequent confirming signals, to disconfirming signals, and to corrections, re-
spectively. The results are reported in Table 5.3.
The findings support our previously drawn conclusions. Even after con-
trolling for the objective posterior, we find an economically strong and sta-
tistically highly significant overreaction after a disconfirming signal. Addi-
tionally, we find that the initial overreaction is almost entirely corrected if the
disconfirming signal is reverted. While in the bad distribution, both effects
are of similar magnitude and thus cancel out, we find a slightly asymmetric
effect in the good distribution. Whereas the correction is of similar strength
as in the bad distribution, the overreaction is stronger. As such the overreac-
tion in the good distribution is not entirely corrected.
2 Since we investigate changes in subjective probability estimates, we estimate the model
without constant to be consistent with the theoretical benchmark. However, results are
qualitatively similar if we estimate the model on levels or with constant. For the ease of
interpretation, we report the specification without constant.
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Table 5.3: Updating Behavior After Disconfirming Signal and Correction –
Experiment 1
Dependent Variable Change in Posterior Probability Estimate
Good Distribution Bad Distribution
Change in Bayes 0.770*** 0.377*** 0.718*** 0.384***





Observations 1782 1782 1824 1824
R2 0.138 0.218 0.097 0.142
Note: This table reports the results of four OLS regressions on how subjects update their
posterior beliefs after a disconfirming signal and a correction in the baseline experiment.
We report the results of OLS regressions for each distribution individually (good and bad
distribution). The dependent variable in the regression model, Change in Posterior Probability
Estimate, is the change in subjective posterior beliefs that the asset is paying from the good
distribution between period t and period t-1. Independent variables include the Disconfirm
dummy, an indicator variable that equals 1 if participants observe a disconfirming signal and
zero otherwise, the Correction dummy, an indicator variable that equals 1 if a disconfirming
signal is subsequently reverted, as well as Change in Bayes, which is the change in the correct
Bayesian probability that the stock is good between period t and period t-1. Reported are
coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) using robust standard errors. *, **, *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Next, we examine how our model in which we explicitly control for a
disconfirming signal and a subsequent correction performs compared to the
standard Bayes model. When comparing the explanatory power of the two
models, we find that the standard Bayesian model explains roughly 14 % (10
%) in the good (bad) distribution, while our model explains roughly 22 % (14
%). Irrespective of the distribution, our model explains roughly 50 % more
of the variation of subjects’ probability estimates than the standard Bayesian
model.
Moreover, Table 5.3 implies that subjects generally underinfer which is
consistent with several studies on Bayesian updating (see Benjamin, 2019).
Interestingly, our results suggest that the observed underinference is mostly
driven by subsequent confirming signals. When differentiating between the
good and the bad distribution, we find that the observed underinference is
stronger when subjects update their beliefs from a sequence of confirming
bad signals than when updating their beliefs from a sequence of confirming
good signals. This finding is consistent with the recently identified good
news-bad news effect reported by Eil and Rao (2011) as well as Möbius et al.
(2014). However, for our main finding, it remains to stress that we do not
find such an asymmetric effect across domains.
Reducing the Diagnosticity of Information Signals
In this section, we report results of our second experiment in which we vary
the informational content of the signals. Like in our baseline experiment,
Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5 present subjects’ general updating behavior in the
good and the bad distribution, respectively, over all periods for each treatment
G-3 to G-6.
Overall, the findings look very similar to our baseline experiment. In
particular, we find that subjects in the good distribution increase their prior
beliefs by 7.15 % on average after a confirming signal, whereas they decrease
their prior beliefs by 14.81 % on average after observing a disconfirming sig-
nal. In the bad distribution, the findings look similar. Subjects decrease their
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Figure 5.4: Subjects’ Average Updating Behavior in the Good Distribution
– Experiment 2
Note: The figure displays subjects’ average probability estimates over six consecutive pe-
riods in the good distribution for each treatment G-3 to G-6 individually. The dashed line
shows the objective Bayesian posterior probabilities and the solid line shows subjects’ aver-
age probability estimates. Displayed are 95% confidence intervals.
prior beliefs by 3.65 % on average after a confirming signal, while they in-
crease their prior beliefs by 7.15 % on average after observing a disconfirm-
ing signal. Like in our baseline experiment, subjects update their beliefs after
a disconfirming signal as if they failed to incorporate up to three previously
observed confirming signals. Despite the lower diagnosticity in the second
experiment, the observed overreaction after a disconfirming signal persists.
This finding even holds after controlling for the objective Bayesian proba-
bility as to be seen in Table 5.4. The observed overreaction after a disconfirm-
ing signal remains economically large and statistically significant. In compar-
ison to the results from our baseline experiment, the magnitude with which
subjects update their prior after a disconfirming signal is smaller. However,
this is to be expected since the updating magnitude strongly correlates with
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Figure 5.5: Subjects’ Average Updating Behavior in the Bad Distribution –
Experiment 2
Note: The figure displays subjects’ average probability estimates over six consecutive pe-
riods in the bad distribution for each treatment G-3 to G-6 individually. The dashed line
shows the objective Bayesian posterior probabilities and the solid line shows subjects’ aver-
age probability estimates. Displayed are 95% confidence intervals.
the diagnosticity. Consistent with our previous findings, we find that sub-
jects correct their priors after a disconfirming signal is reverted. Interestingly,
we find that in contrast to the baseline experiment, subjects seem to not suffi-
ciently correct their previous overreaction which can especially be seen in the
bad distribution. Overall, even in a setting with lower diagnosticity subjects
still do not follow the simple counting heuristic when observing a discon-
firming signal. Instead, they show a strong overreaction which they partly
correct subsequently.
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Table 5.4: Updating Behavior After Disconfirming Signal and Correction –
Experiment 2
Dependent Variable Change in Posterior Probability Estimate
Good Distribution Bad Distribution
Change in Bayes 0.860*** 0.430*** 0.877*** 0.524***





Observations 1872 1872 1740 1740
R2 0.112 0.169 0.087 0.116
Note: This table reports the results of four OLS regressions on how subjects update their
posterior beliefs after a disconfirming signal and a correction in Experiment 2 with lower
diagnosticity than in the baseline experiment. We report the results of OLS regressions for
each distribution individually (good and bad distribution). The dependent variable in the
regression model, Change in Posterior Probability Estimate, is the change in subjective posterior
beliefs that the asset is paying from the good distribution between period t and period t-1.
Independent variables include the Disconfirm dummy, an indicator variable that equals 1 if
participants observe a disconfirming signal and zero otherwise, the Correction dummy, an
indicator variable that equals 1 if a disconfirming signal is subsequently reverted, as well as
Change in Bayes, which is the change in the correct Bayesian probability that the stock is good
between period t and period t-1. Reported are coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses)
using robust standard errors. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
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Reducing the Uncertainty About the Underlying Distribution
In the following, we discuss the results of our third experiment in which we
reduce subjects’ uncertainty about the underlying distribution. This varia-
tion of the design allows us to exclude the possibility that subjects falsely
infer trends or price reversal. Additionally, we control for the possibility that
subjects do not anticipate (i.e. are surprised by) the disconfirming signal as
they observe the full outcome history in advance. The results on individuals’
updating behavior are reported in Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7. Again, Figure
5.6 shows the results of those treatments in which the underlying distribu-
tion is good and Figure 5.7 shows the results of those treatments in which the
underlying distribution is bad.
Figure 5.6: Subjects’ Average Updating Behavior in the Good Distribution
– Experiment 3
Note: The figure displays subjects’ average probability estimates over six consecutive pe-
riods in the good distribution for each treatment G-3 to G-6 individually. The dashed line
shows the objective Bayesian posterior probabilities and the solid line shows subjects’ aver-
age probability estimates. Displayed are 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 5.7: Subjects’ Average Updating Behavior in the Bad Distribution –
Experiment 3
Note: The figure displays subjects’ average probability estimates over six consecutive pe-
riods in the bad distribution for each treatment G-3 to G-6 individually. The dashed line
shows the objective Bayesian posterior probabilities and the solid line shows subjects’ aver-
age probability estimates. Displayed are 95% confidence intervals.
We find that both, overreaction after a disconfirming signal and subse-
quent correction even persist in a setting in which the uncertainty about the
underlying distribution is dramatically reduced. In particular, the Bayesian
probability of the asset being in the good distribution is 96.74 %. As such
after subjects observe the full outcome history there should be barely any
uncertainty left about the distribution. Besides almost no uncertainty about
the underlying distribution, there is also no uncertainty about the period in
which the disconfirming signal will occur. First, the graphical representation
of the full outcome history in the form of a price-line chart is known to sub-
jects and makes the period in which the disconfirming signal occurs easily
identifiable. Second, we also explicitly ask participants to state the period in
which the disconfirming signal occurs prior to the forecasting task. As such
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our design should eliminate any potential surprise subjects may experience
when observing a disconfirming signal. In the light of the still persistent
overreaction, we can confidentially rule out that surprise effects or uncer-
tainty about the underlying distribution drive the results. Moreover, we can
also exclude that subjects overreact after a disconfirming signal because they
potentially anticipate a new trend, given that they know that a disconfirming
signal will subsequently be reverted.
We run the same regression as previously to control for the objective
Bayesian posterior probability, while also investigating potential differences
to the baseline experiment. The results are reported in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5: Updating Behavior After Disconfirming Signal and Correction –
Experiment 3
Dependent Variable Change in Posterior Probability Estimate
Good Distribution Bad Distribution
Change in Bayes 0.603*** 0.294*** 0.666*** 0.362***





Observations 1884 1884 1740 1740
R2 0.088 0.135 0.086 0.122
Note: This table reports the results of four OLS regressions on how subjects update their
posterior beliefs after a disconfirming signal and a correction in Experiment 3. We report the
results of OLS regressions for each distribution individually (good and bad distribution).
The dependent variable in the regression model, Change in Posterior Probability Estimate, is
the change in subjective posterior beliefs that the asset is paying from the good distribu-
tion between period t and period t-1. Independent variables include the Disconfirm dummy,
an indicator variable that equals 1 if participants observe a disconfirming signal and zero
otherwise, the Correction dummy, an indicator variable that equals 1 if a disconfirming sig-
nal is subsequently reverted, as well as Change in Bayes, which is the change in the correct
Bayesian probability that the stock is good between period t and period t-1. Reported are
coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) using robust standard errors. *, **, *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
A direct comparability is given as Bayes’ probabilities are identical across
treatments in the baseline and the reduced uncertainty experiment. First, we
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can confirm all prior findings. Subjects strongly overreact after a disconfirm-
ing signal and subsequently correct the overreaction. Second, when com-
paring the effect sizes between the two experiments, we find that the over-
reaction as well as the subsequent correction are slightly more pronounced
in the baseline treatment. Even though the reduced uncertainty experiment
was designed to significantly decrease the overreaction resulting from dis-
confirming signals, the effect is still economically strong and statistically sig-
nificant.
Additional Treatments G-1 and G-2 (B-1 and B-2)
Finally, we analyze the results of treatments G-1 and G-2 (B-1 and B-2) for
which – per definition – our empirical framework does not apply. In these
treatments, the single opposite-directional signal occurs either directly in the
first period or in the second period. As such these treatments describe price
paths for which the pre-requisite for Phase 1 of our framework (i.e. at least
two confirming signals prior to the disconfirming signal) is not fulfilled. Nev-
ertheless, they allow us to analyze how subjects update their beliefs (i) in
situations without prior outcome history (G-1 and B-1) and (ii) in situations
with exclusively alternating signals (G-2 and B-2).
Figure 5.8 reports the results for the good distribution split by experiment.
Figure 5.9 reports the results for the bad distribution split by experiment.
Across all experiments, we find that subjects do not significantly update their
beliefs downwards if the first signal is bad.3 In contrast to that, subjects sig-
nificantly update their beliefs upwards if the first signal is good. Their first
probability estimate is almost identical to the objective Bayesian probability
and this finding holds for both, the two experiments with high diagnostic-
ity (70 %) and the experiment with low diagnosticity (60 %). In period 2,
3 We follow the terminology used in the empirical framework section and also refer to a bad
signal in the first period drawn from an asset with a good distribution as a disconfirming
signal, even though subjects cannot know at this point in time that the signal disconfirms
the true underlying distribution. The same logic applies to a good signal in the first period
drawn from the good distribution which we refer to as a confirming signal.
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when the bad signal of period 1 is reverted, subjects state probability esti-
mates significantly above the objective probability of 50 %, while when the
good signal of period 1 is reverted, subjects are almost perfect Bayesian. In
other words, subjects in the B-1 treatment almost perfectly adhere to the in-
vestigated counting rule implied by Bayes’ Theorem, while subjects in the
G-1 treatment clearly violate this rule. In particular, they seem to violate this
rule because they ignored or were averse to adjust their beliefs downwards
following the first bad signal.
Figure 5.8: Subjects’ Average Updating Behavior in the Good Distribution
– Treatments G-1 and G-2
Note: The figure displays subjects’ average probability estimates over six consecutive pe-
riods in the good distribution for treatments G-1 and G-2 of experiment 1, 2, and 3. The
dashed line shows the objective Bayesian posterior probabilities and the solid line shows
subjects’ average probability estimates. Displayed are 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 5.9: Subjects’ Average Updating Behavior in the Bad Distribution –
Treatments G-1 and G-2
Note: The figure displays subjects’ average probability estimates over six consecutive peri-
ods in the bad distribution for treatments G-1 and G-2 of experiment 1, 2, and 3. The dashed
line shows the objective Bayesian posterior probabilities and the solid line shows subjects’
average probability estimates. Displayed are 95% confidence intervals.
This pattern is mirrored when looking at the treatments G-2 and B-2. In
these treatments, the signals alternate up until period 3. Subjects, who ob-
serve first a good, second a bad, and then again a good signal, are almost
perfect Bayesian. Across all experiments, they follow the counting rule and
increase their probability estimate after the good signal in period 3 as much
as they decreased it after the bad signal in period 2 which in turn they pre-
viously increased exactly as much as after the good signal in period 1. In
contrast to that, subjects who first observe a bad, second a good, and then
again a bad signal do only partly follow the counting rule. Like subjects in
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the G-1 treatment, they do not significantly adjust the probability estimate
downwards if the first signal is bad, but correctly – as implied by the count-
ing rule – decrease their probability estimate in period 3 by the amount by
which they previously increased it in period 2. This robust pattern can be
found across all experiments.
Taken together, we can complement our findings from treatments G-3 to
G-6 (B-3 to B-6) as follows: We find that subjects adhere to the counting rule
implied by Bayes’ Theorem in situations with no prior sequence of same-
directional signals and in situations with exclusively alternating signals. In-
terestingly however, subjects seem to have problems following this rule right
at the beginning of the updating task, when the first signal is bad. In these
cases, they act as if they ignore the bad signal and consequently update too
much after the subsequent good signal.
5.4.2 Signal Ordering
One aspect of the counting heuristic we have not discussed so far is that
Equation 5.1 of the established framework also implies that a Bayesian is
indifferent regarding the order in which outcomes occur. In other words, ob-
serving a disconfirming signal followed by five subsequent confirming sig-
nals should lead to the same posterior probability as first observing five sub-
sequent confirming signals followed by a disconfirming signal. Since our
experimental design explicitly varies the round in which the single discon-
firming signal occurs, we can directly test this relation. To do so, we estimate
the following model:
Pi,6 = β0 + β1Di | R=2 + β2Di | R=3 + β3Di | R=4 + β4Di | R=5 + β5Di | R=6 + ε i,t, (5.3)
where Pi,6 is the subjective posterior in round 6, and Di | R=t are indicator
variables denoting the round in which participants encountered the discon-
firming signal (with round 1 being the baseline category). Note that the
Bayesian posterior in our setting is the same for each treatment and only de-
pends on the underlying distribution (good or bad) and the underlying diag-
nosticity. To accommodate this feature, we estimate the model separately for
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each distribution and split by diagnosticity of the signal. Results are reported
in Table 5.6.
Table 5.6: Outcome Ordering
Dependent Variable Posterior Probability Estimate in Period 6
Experiment 1 & 3 Experiment 2
Good Bad Good Bad
Distribution Distribution Distribution Distribution
Disconfirm Round 2 0.912 11.45** −1.755 5.194
(0.39) (2.52) (−0.53) (0.77)
Disconfirm Round 3 −0.374 5.306 1.224 11.09*
(−0.16) (1.36) (0.41) (1.74)
Disconfirm Round 4 −1.070 8.198** −4.059 7.177
(−0.46) (2.17) (−1.21) (1.21)
Disconfirm Round 5 −5.043** 10.63*** −5.145 17.34***
(−2.00) (2.68) (−1.61) (2.76)
Disconfirm Round 6 −16.09*** 21.24*** −16.09*** 19.67***
(−5.15) (5.10) (−4.33) (3.05)
Constant 80.45*** 26.16*** 78.25*** 32.10***
(45.94) (9.72) (34.38) (6.69)
Observations 611 594 312 290
R2 0.094 0.046 0.101 0.049
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions on how subjects updating behavior
after a disconfirming signal and correction depends on their prior beliefs. We report the re-
sults of OLS regressions for each experiment (Experiment 1 and 3 pooled) and distribution
(good and bad distribution) individually. The dependent variable in the regression model,
Posterior Probability Estimate in Period 6, is the absolute subjective posterior belief that the
asset is paying from the good distribution in period 6. Independent variables include Con-
dition t dummies which are indicator variables for each period t. Reported are coefficients
and t-statistics (in parentheses) using robust standard errors. *, **, *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
We find that the round in which the disconfirming signal occurs plays an
important role in how individuals form their posterior beliefs. In particu-
lar, the later the disconfirming signal occurs, the stronger the overreaction
which ultimately leads to a lower final posterior after round 6. This result
holds independent of the underlying distribution and is of similar magnitude
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across different diagnosticities. One potential driver of this further incon-
sistency is that individuals generally overreact after disconfirming signals,
which is mostly corrected after subsequently observing another confirming
signal. However, if subjects observe the disconfirming signal in the final pe-
riod (where the objective prior in the good distribution is as high as 96.74
%!) subjects can no longer correct their strong overreaction, causing them to
be substantially more pessimistic (or optimistic if the underlying distribution
is the bad one) about the underlying distribution than they should be. This
relation can be especially seen by the considerably higher coefficients of the
disconfirming dummy for round 6.
Overall, this result highlights once more the fact that individuals consis-
tently violate the counting heuristic after they encounter disconfirming sig-
nals. However, whereas they mostly correct their strong overreaction if they
can, the violation is most severe when subjects have no opportunity to collect
further information.
5.4.3 Robustness Checks
In this section we will replicate our main analyses on different subsamples to
validate its robustness against extreme outliers or individuals who are inat-
tentive and as such more likely to suffer from a bias in probabilistic reason-
ing. Besides validating the robustness of our main finding, such an analysis
might also provide valuable insights into which subgroup is most likely to
violate the counting heuristic.
In particular, we conduct splits regarding (i) extreme outliers; (ii) "speed-
ers"; and (iii) below median forecasters. Extreme outliers are individuals
whose subjective priors largely deviate from the Bayesian benchmark. Fol-
lowing the classification of Enke and Graeber (2019), we define extreme out-
liers as individuals who report a subjective posterior ps < 25% (> 75%)
when the Bayesian posterior is pB > 75% (< 25%). Speeders are defined as
subjects who are in the bottom decile of the response time distribution. Fi-
nally, we also investigate whether the here documented effect is only driven
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Table 5.7: Forecasting Ability and Extreme Outliers
Panel A: Extreme Outliers
Dependent Variable Change in Posterior Probability Estimate
Good Distribution Bad Distribution
No Outlier Outlier No Outlier Outlier
Change in Bayes 0.397*** −0.0964 0.583*** −0.128*
(15.00) (−0.51) (18.76) (−1.72)
Disconfirm −11.41*** −35.85**** 10.45*** 12.19***
(−14.21) (−4.45) (12.32) (5.22)
Correction 8.757*** 36.26*** −9.312*** −10.33***
(11.80) (5.28) (−9.87) (−4.41)
Observations 5238 300 3882 1422
R2 0.181 0.222 0.242 0.031
Panel B: Speeders versus Non-Speeders
Dependent Variable Change in Posterior Probability Estimate
Good Distribution Bad Distribution
Non-Speeders Speeders Non-Speeders Speeders
Change in Bayes 0.370*** 0.149 0.415*** 0.299***
(12.86) (1.63) (12.20) (3.43)
Disconfirm −13.75*** −7.236** 11.25*** 7.325***
(−13.89) (−2.36) (11.46) (3.15)
Correction 10.81*** 5-825 −10.07*** −5.991***
(12.57) (2.08) (−10.37) (−1.90)
Observations 5028 510 4734 570
R2 0.190 0.040 0.143 0.039
Panel C: Forecasting Ability
Dependent Variable Change in Posterior Probability Estimate
Good Distribution Bad Distribution
Above Below Above Below
Median Median Median Median
Change in Bayes 0.625*** 0.0137 0.823*** 0.111**
(23.44) (0.30) (26.97) (2.48)
Disconfirm −6.218*** −21.97*** 5.924*** 13.95***
(−8.90) (−11.48) (7.29) (10.35)
Correction 5.420*** 16.59*** −5.780*** −12.13***
(8.36) (9.71) (−6.62) (−8.42)
Observations 3270 2268 2154 3150
R2 0.267 0.154 0.388 0.079
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions on how subjects update their posterior
beliefs after a disconfirming signal and a correction across all experiments split by extreme
outliers (Panel A), the time it takes subjects to finish the experiment (Panel B), and subjects’
forecasting ability (Panel C). We report the results of OLS regressions for each subsample
of individuals (with above-median versus below-median updating ability, no outlier versus
outlier, and speeders versus non-speeders) and for each distribution (good and bad distri-
bution) individually. Speeders are defined as the fastest 10% of the subjects. Non-speeders
are defined as the remaining 90% of the subjects. Reported are coefficients and t-statistics
(in parentheses) using robust standard errors. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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by individuals who lack the statistical skills to correctly perform the forecast-
ing task, or whether even individuals who are closer to Bayesian behavior
exhibit a pronounced bias. To examine this relation, we define the squared
deviation of subjects’ probability estimate in each period from the objective
posterior probability as a measure of forecasting quality and conduct median
splits. The results are reported in Table 5.7. Panel A reproduces the analysis
split by extreme outliers, Panel B splits the sample by speeders, and Panel C
reports results split by forecasting ability.
Overall, results are very similar, with two sets of results warrant a brief
discussion. First, throughout each subsample, we consistently find an eco-
nomically strong and statistically significant overreaction following a dis-
confirming signal, which is mostly corrected after observing a subsequent
confirming signal. While the overreaction is even more pronounced for out-
liers and individuals with below-median forecasting ability, it is mostly unaf-
fected by individuals’ response time. This suggest that systematic violations
of the counting heuristic appear to be a general phenomenon even though
they correlate with participants’ statistical skills. Yet, given that response
time does not play a major role, attention does not appear to be a major
driver. Second, when splitting the sample by extreme outliers, it becomes
apparent that outliers are mostly clustered in the bad distribution. This con-
firms our previous finding, that a greater fraction of individuals struggles
to forecast the bad distribution, even though both tasks should be – at least
from a Bayesian perspective – equivalent.
5.5 Conclusion
The goal of this study is to test whether subjects follow a simple counting
heuristic in belief updating as implied by Bayes’ Rule: two informationally
equivalent signals of opposite direction should always cancel out. However,
our study suggests that this is not the case. Whenever a sequence of signals
that go in the same direction is interrupted by a signal of opposite direction,
subjects violate the simple counting heuristic and strongly overreact to the
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signal of opposite direction. In contrast to that, subjects correctly follow the
counting heuristic whenever opposite-directional signals alternate.
Our results show a clear and robust pattern of over- and underreaction
following violations of a simple counting heuristic. This pattern does not
depend on the diagnosticity of the signals, on individuals’ limited memory
capacity, on signals not being anticipated, and the uncertainty of the under-
lying state. While, we identify when people violate simple counting rules, it
remains an open question why they do so.
Our findings have relevant implications for various fields of research,
among others investors’ belief formation and trading behavior in financial
markets as well as asset prices. In particular, the observation that agents’ ex-
pectations are overly influenced by a single opposite-directional signal after
a sequence of already just two same-directional signals may have valuable
implications for how investors form expectations in financial markets and
consequently act upon them. By and large, one of the most important and
widely-applied ideas in behavioral financial economics is that people put
too much weight on recent past returns, i.e. they over-extrapolate (Hong
and Stein, 1999; Barberis and Shleifer, 2003; Greenwood and Shleifer, 2014;
Barberis et al., 2015, 2018). This finding has important applications for ex-
cess stock market volatility, bubbles, and cross-sectional phenomena of stock
returns such as for example momentum and long-term reversal. In mod-
els of extrapolative returns a crucial input parameter is the relative weight
investors put on recent versus distant past returns. So far, the exact charac-
teristics of this input parameter are still incomprehensively understood. For
example, Cassella and Gulen (2018) recently show that the weight parameter
varies over time, but cannot explain why this is the case. Our findings may
add to a better understanding of the characteristics of this parameter in ex-
trapolative belief formation, as we find that (i) individuals already strongly
over-extrapolate from a single opposite-directional signal which interrupts a
sequence of previous same-directional signals and (ii) that the observed over-
extrapolation is relatively independent of the number of previously observed
same-directional signals. In other words, individuals even over-extrapolate
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from a single opposite-directional signal if it occurs after a relatively long
history of same-directional signals which in turn means that they even over-
extrapolate in situations in which they are and should be quite sure about the




Closing A Mental Account: The
Realization Effect for Gains and
Losses
A.1 The Realization Effect and Skewness
In what follows, we use a non-myopic framework to explain more precisely
how the realization effect and the skewness of the investment opportunity
are related. To do so, we build on previous work by Barberis (2012) and
Imas (2016) [in an alternative to his main model]. Barberis (2012) shows that
cumulative prospect theory can explain sequential risk-taking behavior and
demonstrates how the skewness of a lottery affects people’s propensity to
take risk. Therefore, his model is relevant for analyzing the relationship be-
tween realization and skewness. To explain differential risk-taking behavior
after paper and realized losses in a non-myopic case, Imas (2016) uses the
findings from Barberis (2012) framework. In the following, we will, there-
fore, also refer to Imas (2016).
A key ingredient of cumulative prospect theory is probability weight-
ing (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). People tend to overweight small prob-
abilities while underweighting large probabilities. As a result of probabil-
ity weighting, Barberis (2012) shows that (1) people are willing to invest in
a symmetric lottery with negative expected payoff, and (2) prospect theory
predicts an inconsistency in subsequent investment behavior. To understand
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these predictions, we briefly review his model. In the model, cumulative
prospect theory generates inconsistency in sequential risk-taking environ-
ments, which is captured by the difference between people’s ex-ante plans
and actual behavior. People initially optimize over a set of potential gam-
bling plans. For a wide range of parameters, people prefer the “loss-exit”
plan, where they plan to continue gambling if they win and stop gambling if
they start accumulating losses. However, after they begin gambling, people
actually deviate from this “loss-exit” plan: They continue gambling when
they lose and stop gambling when they have a significantly large gain.
The reasoning is as follows: The “loss-exit” plan makes accepting risk
initially attractive. A key characteristic of this plan is that its perceived dis-
tribution of outcomes over all rounds is positively skewed. Since small prob-
abilities of winning in this plan are overweighted, gambling becomes highly
attractive. In other words, following this plan limits the downside (they stop
gambling after losing) while it retains the potential upside (they continue
gambling after winning), making the overall lottery distribution much more
positively skewed than the one of a single lottery. However, over the course
of rounds, the probabilities of the prospective outcome distribution change,
becoming less positively skewed. The difference in skewness over final out-
comes before and after the individual starts gambling is what generates in-
consistent behavior. Barberis (2012) shows that for a wide range of preference
parameter values, the described probability weighting effect outweighs the
loss aversion effect, and thus people are willing to begin gambling in the first
place with the “loss-exit” plan in mind. The trade-off between probability
weighting and loss aversion will be important to our line of argument.
When do people deviate from the plan? People only show inconsistent
behavior over the course of lotteries if the plan makes it attractive enough to
accept risk in the first place. This means that the overall lottery distribution
needs to be sufficiently positively skewed such that small probabilities within
this plan are initially overweighted but over the course of rounds become
less overweighted. More precisely, the probability weighting effect needs to
dominate the loss aversion effect. Otherwise, the person would stick to his
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plan and not deviate from it. Now, what does realization do to gambling be-
havior? Imas (2016) has theoretically shown for losses that realization brings
people closer to their initial plan if they suffer from inconsistent behavior.
The argument is the following: Realization closes the respective mental ac-
count and internalizes the paper outcome. For a loss, this means that there is
no option to break-even anymore and, therefore, people stop chasing losses.
In addition to this, investing in the lottery after a realization becomes less at-
tractive as the overall distribution becomes less positively skewed the more
rounds have already been played. How realization influences risk taking af-
ter gains requires a little more explanation: For a gain, realization removes
the possibility to offset future losses by previous gains. Therefore, losses
are more painful after realized gains than after paper gains, which decreases
people’s willingness to take risk after a realized gain compared to a paper
gain. In addition to this, the progress in rounds decreases the attractiveness
of investing in the lottery because probability weighting changes over time.
Once gains which were initially unlikely and, therefore, overweighted oc-
curred, they are not perceived as unlikely anymore and consequently less
overweighted. The lower attractiveness of the lottery combined with the
larger sensitivity to future losses makes investing in the lottery after a re-
alized gain less attractive than after a paper gain. Realization decreases peo-
ple’s propensity to gamble after a gain - they deviate from the ex-ante plan.
Realization of a loss brings people closer to their initial plan (Imas, 2016),
whereas realization of a gain does not. How can this prediction be used to
explain the relationship between the realization effect and the skewness of
lotteries? First, we consider a symmetric lottery and assume that it is played
over four rounds (as in experiment 2). We assume that people form an op-
timal “loss-exit” plan as described above. However, this plan has an overall
lottery distribution, which is not very positively skewed compared to, for ex-
ample, the one that would emerge from a positively skewed lottery. This has
a key implication: People are less likely to deviate from the optimal plan for
losses and more likely to deviate from it for gains. They are predicted to act
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inconsistently after gains while they act consistently after losses. This impli-
cation follows directly from Barberis (2012), who finds that at least 26 rounds
are necessary to observe inconsistency with symmetric lotteries for the usu-
ally assumed preference parameter values of Tversky and Kahneman (1992).
This can easily be seen in our setting of either a symmetric lottery with p=1/2
versus a positively skewed lottery with p=1/6 played over four rounds. The
most favorable outcome (4 successes) occurs with a probability of 1/16 for
the symmetric lottery compared to 1/1296 for the positively skewed lottery.
Therefore, the more positively skewed the lottery is, the fewer rounds are
needed to observe inconsistency.
This implication is essential to understand why the realization effect is
less likely to be found for symmetric lotteries. A necessary condition to find
differential behavior between paper and realized outcomes is that people de-
viate from their optimal plan after a loss and stick to it after a gain. As ex-
plained, this occurs if probability weighting is very pronounced due to the
degree of skewness of the lottery distribution. The skewness can be affected
in two ways: Either it can be increased by providing a positively skewed lot-
tery from the beginning or by extending the number of rounds people can
invest in the lottery. Since the number of rounds is fixed over all our experi-
ments, it is the skewness of the symmetric lottery that makes deviations from
the ex-ante plan after a loss unlikely and after a gain likely. After a paper
loss, people are actually willing to gamble but do not do so with a symmetric
lottery over a few rounds because the probability weighting effect does not
outweigh the loss aversion effect.
There is a second argument adding to this reasoning: when abstracting
from the role of ex-ante plans, a symmetric lottery provides little opportunity
to recover from a paper loss because the potential upside is relatively small
compared to the downside. Consistent with the effect of probability weight-
ing, the decreased chance to break-even makes deviations from the ex-ante
plan after a paper loss less likely. As explained by Imas (2016), realization of
a loss brings people closer to the initial plan and circumvents inconsistent be-
havior. However, if there is no inconsistent behavior, realization should have
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little effect: people will adhere to their ex-ante plan after a loss and behave
similarly after a paper and realized loss.
Similar reasoning works for gains. After a gain, the loss aversion effect
outweighs the probability weighting effect. Although, previous paper gains
cushion future losses, which decreases loss aversion, the progress in rounds
in a symmetric lottery is accompanied by a strong reduction in probability
overweighting. Ultimately, the unattractiveness of the lottery dominates, and
the person is less likely to continue gambling after a paper gain. This means
that the person shows inconsistency in his investment decisions. There is
another point adding to the unattractiveness of a symmetric lottery: The rel-
atively large downside can potentially wipe out people’s previous gains as
well as parts of their own money if they gamble again. Consistent with our
previous line of argument, the risk to be wiped off by large losses makes de-
viations from the ex-ante plan after a paper gain more likely. As explained
above, realization presents another way to prevent people from gambling af-
ter a gain. However, if there is inconsistent behavior after paper gains as well
as after realized gains, realization has little effect in preventing people who
else gamble from gambling: people will not adhere to their ex-ante plan after
a gain and behave similarly after a paper and realized gain.
The same reasoning as above applies to negatively skewed lotteries. As
the probability weighting works in the opposite direction (losses are over-
weighted and gains underweighted) and the potential upside relative to the
downside becomes even less attractive compared to the symmetric lottery,
realization will have little effect because people are already predicted to stick
to their ex-ante plan after paper losses and deviate from it after paper gains.
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A.2 Experiment Instructions
This appendix contains the instructions of experiment 1. Moreover, it
presents exemplary screenshots of experiment 1.
Instructions in the Paper Treatment of Experiment 1
Welcome to our experimental study on decision making. The experiment will
take about 30 minutes. All the money you earn is yours to keep. You receive
8.00 Euro in an envelope. This is your money which you can use to partic-
ipate in the experiment. Please check that the envelope contains 8.00 Euro.
The experiment consists of 4 successive rounds of investment decisions. You
will have 8.00 Euro in total to invest. Each round you must decide how much
of 2.00 Euro you would like to invest in a lottery: With a probability of 1/6
(16%) the lottery will “succeed” and you will make 7 times the amount you
invested. With a probability of 5/6 (84%) the lottery will “fail” and you will
lose the amount you invested. The procedure in each round is the same.
First, you are assigned one success number between 1 and 6. It is displayed
on the computer screen. Second, you enter the amount you would like to
invest in the lottery. The amount can be up to 2.00 Euro. When everyone is
ready, the experimenter will roll a six-sided die in front of the class. If the
rolled number is your success number, you will win the round and you will
earn 7 times the amount invested. If the rolled number is not your success
number, you will lose the invested amount. The outcome of the lottery is
reported each round. Afterwards, you get a new success number and make
the same decision in the next round.
At the end of the four rounds, your game payment will be the 8.00 Euro
you started with plus your net earnings from the investments. Note that net
earnings can be positive or negative.
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Instructions in the Realization Treatment of Experiment 1
Welcome to our experimental study on decision making. The experiment will
take about 30 minutes. All the money you earn is yours to keep. You receive
8.00 Euro in an envelope. This is your money which you can use to partic-
ipate in the experiment. Please check that the envelope contains 8.00 Euro.
The experiment consists of 3 successive rounds of investment decisions. You
will have 6.00 Euro in total to invest. Each round you must decide how much
of 2.00 Euro you would like to invest in a lottery: With a probability of 1/6
(16%) the lottery will “succeed” and you will make 7 times the amount you
invested. With a probability of 5/6 (84%) the lottery will “fail” and you will
lose the amount you invested. The procedure in each round is the same.
First, you are assigned one success number between 1 and 6. It is displayed
on the computer screen. Second, you enter the amount you would like to
invest in the lottery. The amount can be up to 2.00 Euro. When everyone is
ready, the experimenter will roll a six-sided die in front of the class. If the
rolled number is your success number, you will win the round and you will
earn 7 times the amount invested. If the rolled number is not your success
number, you will lose the invested amount. The outcome of the lottery is
reported each round. Afterwards, you get a new success number and make
the same decision in the next round.
At the end of the three rounds, your game payment will be the 8.00 Euro
you started with plus your net earnings from the investments. Note that
net earnings can be positive or negative. After the three rounds, you begin
with the next part of the experiment. In the next part, you make one more
decision.
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Figure A.1: Experiment 1 Screen 1 Round 1
A.2. Experiment Instructions IX
Figure A.2: Experiment 1 Screen 2 Round 1
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Figure A.3: Experiment 1 Screen 3 Round 1
A.2. Experiment Instructions XI
Figure A.4: Experiment 1 Screen 4 Round 1
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Figure A.5: Experiment 1 Earnings Update After Round 3 - Paper Treatment
A.2. Experiment Instructions XIII
Figure A.6: Experiment 1 Earnings Update After Round 3 - Realization
Treatment
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A.3 Measures Used in the Experiments
This appendix details how different concepts were measured in the exper-
iments including risk aversion, loss aversion, time preferences, illusion of
control, financial literacy, and cognitive reflection.
Risk Aversion (Dohmen et al., 2011; Falk et al., 2016)
How do you see yourself: Are you generally a person who is fully prepared
to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks? Please use a scale from 0 to
10 for your assessment. 0 means not at all willing to take risks and 10 means
very willing to take risks.
Loss Aversion (Gächter et al., 2007)
Loss aversion is measured by the number of accepted gambles from Table
A.1.
Table A.1: Choices to Accept or Reject a Coin Toss for Different Outcomes
Accept Reject
If the coin shows heads, you lose 20 Euro. If the coin shows tails, you win 60 Euro.
If the coin shows heads, you lose 30 Euro. If the coin shows tails, you win 60 Euro.
If the coin shows heads, you lose 40 Euro. If the coin shows tails, you win 60 Euro.
If the coin shows heads, you lose 50 Euro. If the coin shows tails, you win 60 Euro.
If the coin shows heads, you lose 60 Euro. If the coin shows tails, you win 60 Euro.
If the coin shows heads, you lose 70 Euro. If the coin shows tails, you win 60 Euro.
Time Preferences (Falk et al., 2016)
In comparison to others, are you a person who is generally willing to give
up something today in order to benefit from that in the future or are you
not willing to do so? Please use a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you
are “completely unwilling to give up something today” and 10 means “you
are very willing to give up something today.” You can also use the values
in-between to indicate where you are on the scale.
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Illusion of Control (Wood and Clapham, 2005)
Read each of the following statements carefully. Rate to what extent you
agree or disagree with each statement. 1 means that you strongly disagree
and 5 means that you strongly agree.
1. There are secrets to successful casino gambling that can be learned.
2. It is a good advice to stay with the same pair of dice on a winning streak.
3. One should pay attention to lottery numbers that often win.
4. If a coin is tossed and comes up heads ten times in a row, the next toss
is more likely to be tails.
5. The longer I have been losing, the more likely I am to win.
Financial Literacy (Van Rooij et al., 2011)
1. Which of the following statements describes the main function of the
stock market?
(a) The stock market helps to predict stock earnings.
(b) The stock market results in an increase in the prices of stocks.
(c) The stock market brings people who want to buy stocks together
with people who want to sell stocks.
(d) None of the above.
(e) Do not know.
2. Which of the following statements is correct? If somebody buys the
stock of firm B in the stock market:
(a) He owns a part of firm B.
(b) He hast lent money to firm B.
(c) He is liable for firm B’s debt.
(d) None of the above.
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(e) Do not know.
3. Which of the following statements is correct?
(a) Once one invests in a mutual fund, one cannot withdraw the
money in the first year.
(b) Mutual funds can invest in several assets, for example invest in
both stocks and bonds.
(c) Mutual funds pay a guaranteed rate of return which depends on
their past performance.
(d) None of the above.
(e) Do not know.
4. Which of the following statements is correct? If somebody buys a bond
of firm B:
(a) He owns a part of firm B.
(b) He has lent money to firm B.
(c) He is liable for firm B’s debt.
(d) None of the above.
(e) Do not know.
5. Considering a long time period (for example 10 or 20 years), which




(d) Do not know.
6. Normally, which assets displays the highest fluctuations over time?
(a) Savings accounts
(b) Bonds
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(c) Stocks
(d) Do not know




(c) Stay the same
(d) Do not know.
8. If the interest rate falls, what should happen to bond prices?
(a) Rise
(b) Fall
(c) Stay the same
(d) Do not know.
Cognitive Reflection Test (Toplak et al., 2014)
1. If John can drink one barrel of water in 6 days and Mary can drink one
barrel of water in 12 days, how long would it take them to drink one
barrel of water together?
2. Jerry receives both the 15th highest and the 15th lowest mark in the
class. How many students are in the class?
3. A man buys a pig for 60 Euro, sells it for 70 Euro, buys it back for 80
Euro and sells it finally for 90 Euro. How much has he made?
4. Simon decided to invest 8,000 Euro in the stock market one day early
in 2017. Six months after he invested, on July 17, the stocks he had pur-
chased were down 50%. Fortunately for Simon, from July 17 to October
17, the stocks he had purchased went up 75%. At this point, Simon
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(a) has broken even in the stock market
(b) is ahead of where he began
(c) has lost money
5. A bat and a ball cost 1.10 Euro in total. The bat costs 1.00 Euro more
than the ball. How much does the ball cost?
6. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it
take 100 machines to make 100 widgets?
7. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in
size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long
would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake?
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A.4 Additional Results from the Experiment
This appendix presents additional results from the experiments. In Tables
A.1, A.2, and A.3, we examine dynamic risk-taking more generally and re-
port the changes in risk taking over all rounds prior to the final round for the
positively skewed, symmetric, and negatively skewed lottery, respectively.
In Table A.4, we provide an overview of the outcomes after round 3 for the
participants in the positively skewed lottery. Table A.5 shows how risk taking
after gains in the positively skewed lottery depends on the round of success.
The regression analysis in Table A.6 presents whether, and to what extent the
realization effect depends on individual characteristics such as, for example,
gender, risk aversion and time preferences.
Table A.1: Dynamic Risk-Taking in the Positively Skewed Lottery (Round
1 to 3)
Panel A: Risk-taking after losses
Invested amount Change
Treatment Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 R2−R1 R3−R2 N
Paper 0.98 0.91 0.78 −0.07 −0.13 57
(1.11) (1.77)
Realization 0.90 0.73 0.80 −0.17 0.07 58
(3.07) (1.15)
Panel B: Risk-taking after gains
Invested amount Change
Treatment Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 R2−R1 R3−R2 N
Paper 0.94 0.73 0.71 −0.21 −0.02 35
(2.86) (0.28)
Realization 0.71 0.77 0.73 0.06 −0.04 36
(0.65) (0.42)
Note: The table shows the average invested amounts in the lottery and the respective
changes in the average invested amounts between rounds for the first three rounds of ex-
periment 1 (in Euro). Panel A is restricted to participants who lost in the first three rounds
of the experiment, Panel B shows averages for all participants with at least one gain in the
first three rounds. Both panels show results by treatment (paper and realization). Change
is the difference between the investment of two subsequent rounds. N provides the number
of participants for each treatment-outcome combination. T-values of a two-sided t-test are
shown in parentheses.
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Table A.2: Dynamic Risk-Taking in the Symmetric Lottery (Round 1 to 3)
Panel A: Risk-taking after losses
Invested amount Change
Treatment Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 R2−R1 R3−R2 N
Paper 1.40 1.37 1.45 −0.03 0.08 22
(0.41) (1.45)
Realization 1.57 1.50 1.53 −0.07 0.03 15
(0.49) (0.29)
Panel B: Risk-taking after gains
Invested amount Change
Treatment Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 R2−R1 R3−R2 N
Paper 1.35 1.15 1.19 −0.20 0.04 27
(1.80) (0.52)
Realization 1.43 1.56 1.38 0.13 −0.18 30
(1.81) (1.57)
Note: The table shows the average invested amounts in the lottery and the respective
changes in the average invested amounts between rounds for the first three rounds of ex-
periment 2 (in Euro). Panel A is restricted to participants who lost in the first three rounds
of the experiment, Panel B shows averages for all participants with at least one gain in the
first three rounds. Both panels show results by treatment (paper and realization). Change
is the difference between the investment of two subsequent rounds. N provides the number
of participants for each treatment-outcome combination. T-values of a two-sided t-test are
shown in parentheses.
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Table A.3: Dynamic Risk-Taking in the Negatively Skewed Lottery
(Round 1 to 3)
Panel A: Risk-taking after losses
Invested amount Change
Treatment Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 R2−R1 R3−R2 N
Paper 1.53 1.66 1.67 0.13 0.01 32
(2.12) (0.04)
Realization 1.70 1.79 1.78 0.09 −0.01 38
(1.64) (0.26)
Panel B: Risk-taking after gains
Invested amount Change
Treatment Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 R2−R1 R3−R2 N
Paper 1.45 1.60 1.60 0.15 0.00 70
(2.52) (0.00)
Realization 1.58 1.71 1.67 0.13 −0.04 64
(1.86) (0.67)
Note: The table shows the average invested amounts in the lottery and the respective
changes in the average invested amounts between rounds for the first three rounds of ex-
periment 3 (in Euro). Panel A is restricted to participants who lost in the first three rounds
of the experiment, Panel B shows averages for all participants with at least one gain in the
first three rounds. Both panels show results by treatment (paper and realization). Change
is the difference between the investment of two subsequent rounds. N provides the number
of participants for each treatment-outcome combination. T-values of a two-sided t-test are
shown in parentheses.
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Table A.4: Overview of Outcomes After Round Three in the Positively
Skewed Lottery
Outcome by end of round 3 N Average Std. Deviation N N
Total Earnings of Earnings Paper Realization
Loss (Earnings < EUR 8.00) 115 5.45 1.62 57 58
Gain (Earnings > EUR 8.00) 71 12.04 1.92 35 36
Success only in round 1 21 11.83 2.24 11 10
Success only in round 2 17 12.50 3.46 12 5
Success only in round 3 27 11.39 2.86 10 17
Success in two rounds 6 14.38 2.95 2 4
No Gain/Loss 17 8.00 0 13 4
(Earnings = EUR 8.00)
Note: The table shows how many participants have negative, positive or zero net earnings
after round three, as well as the average earnings and the standard deviation of the earnings
after round three. For those participants who have a gain after round three, we report in
which round they won the lottery (those with a loss never won the lottery). We provide the
number of observations for each outcome by treatment.
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Table A.5: Risk-Taking After Gains in the Positively Skewed Lottery
Panel A: Success in round 1
Invested amount Change
Treatment Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 R4−R3 N
Paper 0.96 0.72 0.74 1.00 0.26 13
(2.00)
Realization 0.78 0.68 0.53 0.48 −0.05 14
(0.73)
Difference 0.19 0.04 0.21 0.52 0.31
(0.95) (0.20) (0.91) (2.32) (2.17)
Panel B: Success in round 2
Invested amount Change
Treatment Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 R4−R3 N
Paper 1.00 0.87 0.68 0.77 0.08 13
(0.64)
Realization 0.81 1.01 0.67 0.83 0.16 7
(1.04)
Difference 0.18 −0.14 0.01 −0.06 −0.07
(0.84) (0.42) (0.03) (0.21) (0.34)
Panel C: Success in round 3
Invested amount Change
Treatment Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 R4−R3 N
Paper 0.86 0.50 0.64 0.86 0.22 11
(1.30)
Realization 0.61 0.65 0.82 0.62 −0.20 19
(1.91)
Difference 0.25 −0.15 −0.18 0.24 0.42
(1.08) (0.60) (0.78) (0.92) (2.24)
Note: The table shows the average invested amounts in the lottery for all rounds of exper-
iment 1 (in Euro) conditional on the round of success. Panel A is restricted to participants
who win in round one and have a gain by the end of round three, Panel B is displays aver-
ages for participants who win in round two and have a gain by the end of round three, and
Panel C shows averages for all participants who win in round three and have a gain by the
end of round three. All three panels show results by treatment (paper and realization) and
differences between treatments. Change is the difference between the investment in the final
round and round three. N provides the number of participants for each treatment-outcome
combination. T-values of a two-sided t-test are shown in parentheses.
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Table A.6: The Realization Effect for Gains and Losses with Controls
Change in invested amount
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Realization -0.175*** -0.182*** -0.193*** -0.173*** -0.179*** -0.174*** -0.176*** -0.213***















Constant 0.0324 0.232*** 0.0984 0.0623 -0.0208 0.0915 0.116 0.112
(-0.0547) (-0.0859) (-0.0776) (-0.13) (-0.104) (-0.0986) (-0.108) (-0.247)
Observations 200 200 189 200 200 200 200 189
R2 0.048 0.054 0.044 0.034 0.04 0.034 0.034 0.081
Note: The table shows the results of OLS regressions with the change in the invested amount
between rounds three and four in experiment 1 as the dependent variable. Realization is an
indicator variable taking a value of one for the realization treatment. Control variables are a
male indicator, risk aversion (RA; reversed scale of the original question, 0=not risk averse,
10=very risk averse), loss aversion (LA), time preferences (TP; 0=very impatient, 10=very
patient), illusion of control (IOC; 1=low, 5=high), financial literacy (FL; 0=low, 8=high), and
cognitive reflection (CR; 0=low, 7=high). Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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A.5 Online Experiment
This appendix presents the results of an experiment, which was conducted
online. The main difference to experiments 1-3 is that we used another real-
ization mechanism and a different framing of the final investment round in
the online experiment.
In his study, Imas (2016) tests the boundary conditions of the realization
effect with respect to the realization mechanism.While in the original exper-
iment money is physically transferred to participants by the experimenter,
a robustness experiment considers an electronic transfer of money between
different accounts. The process of sending money is initiated by participants.
They have to type “closed” to transfer and realize outcomes from the first
three lottery rounds. Based on the results, this realization mechanism is suf-
ficient to produce a similarly strong realization effect. Imas (2016) concludes
that a physical transfer of money is not necessary to show the realization
effect.
We challenge this conclusion for two reasons. First, it is instrumental for
the realization effect that the investor recognizes the difference between pa-
per and realized outcomes and the point in time of realization. Not only is
this distinction presumably less salient for a virtual transfer of money, but
it remains open whether the two separate electronic accounts also consti-
tute separate mental accounts. Secondly, literature in psychology shows that
people perceive a physical transfer of money differently than an electronic
transfer of money. For example, paying with a credit card is perceived as
less painful than paying with cash explained by the transparency of the pay-
ment outflow (Raghubir and Srivastava, 2008). Likewise, realization utility
might be felt less intensely when relying on this realization mechanism. We,
therefore, replicate the two different mechanisms in our experiment.
Furthermore, we examine how framing affects the realization effect. We
initially did not intend to investigate this question as part of the online ex-
periment. However, after we ran the online experiment, we noticed that we
deviated from the original design in how we labeled the final round in the
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realization treatment. This change in framing turns out to make a difference.
We will, therefore, also report the results of an additional treatment in which
we replicate the framing of the final round exactly as in Imas (2016).
A.5.1 Design and Participants
We discuss that the realization mechanism might be a major determinant
for differential risk taking after realized and unrealized outcomes. The less
strong realization effect identified in the prior experiments casts some doubt
on whether a weaker realization mechanism is sufficient to generate the
effect. We thus replicate study 2 by Imas (2016) in experiment 4, which uses
an online experiment without physical transfer of money.
The structure of the online experiment was similar to the laboratory ex-
periments with the main differences that the stakes were smaller, and the
realization mechanism was modified. Participants were paid a fixed amount
of $0.30, plus their earnings at the end of the experiment. They received
an endowment of $1.00 at the beginning of the experiment to be used in four
subsequent investment decisions. In each round, participants were randomly
assigned a success number and decided how much of $0.25 to invest in the
same lottery as in experiment 1. Afterward, they rolled a virtual six-sided
die, and the rolled number (randomly generated) was presented on the com-
puter screen. If the success number matched the rolled number, the invested
amount was multiplied by seven; if not, the invested amount was lost. Par-
ticipants learned the outcome and continued with the next round with a new
success number.
Participants were randomly assigned to either the paper or the realiza-
tion treatment. In the realization treatment, earnings were reported at the
end of the third round, and participants were asked to type “closed” in a
dedicated window to realize their position. It was explained that any money
they lost up to this round would be withdrawn from their account and trans-
ferred to the experimenter and any money they won would be credited to
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their account. Afterward, the same lottery was offered for an additional in-
vestment decision. Participants in the paper treatment viewed their earnings
after round three. However, they did not initialize any transfer of money be-
fore continuing with the final investment decision. The design matches the
original design by Imas (2016) as close as possible using the same stakes and,
most importantly, the same realization mechanism.
As mentioned in the previous section, we unintentionally deviated from
the original design with respect to the framing of the final round in the real-
ization treatment. Instead of “Round 1” we labeled the final round “Addi-
tional Round”.1 We initially did not expect this change in framing to affect
the outcome of the experiment since we assume a proper realization mech-
anism to be robust against relatively minor framing effects. Nevertheless,
we run a second realization treatment (Realization Round 1) on Amazon me-
chanical Turk in which we revert the framing in the final round from “Addi-
tional Round” to “Round 1”.
Experiment 4, including all three treatments, was programmed in
SoSciSurvey, a platform to create academic survey studies and conducted
online using the labor market of Amazon mechanical Turk, which allowed
us to get access to a more representative sample of the population.2 We
recruited 471 individuals for the experiment, again guided by a power
analysis. Participants were on average 36 years old, 42% of participants
were male, 39% stated that they attended a statistics class, and the level
of cognitive reflection was lower than in the student sample (1.84 correct
answers out of 4).
A.5.2 Results
We first examine the investment decisions of participants who lost in each
round prior to round four. Panel A of Table A.1 shows investments in all
1 We noticed this deviation from the original design after we ran the online experiment.
2 https://www.soscisurvey.de/index.php?id=index&lang=en.
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rounds by treatment for this group. Investments are not statistically differ-
ent in round one to three across treatments. Focusing on the changes in in-
vestment between rounds three and four across treatments, we cannot find
evidence for a realization effect. The difference of the changes in invest-
ment between treatments is insignificant and points in the wrong direction
(DiD = −1.48, t(197) = 1.37, p = 0.17). To understand this result better, we
consider the investment by treatment group. In line with a realization effect,
participants in the paper treatment take more risk after a paper loss, but only
marginally and not statistically significant (0.44, t(103) = 0.64, p = 0.52).
Unlike in experiment 1, participants in the realization treatment take signif-
icantly more risk after losses (1.92, t(94) = 2.29, p = 0.02). This result is
contradictory to the realization effect, which predicts the opposite.
As an explanation for these findings, it appears natural to question the
modified realization mechanism. In this experiment, an electronic transfer of
money between accounts instead of a physical transfer of money is supposed
to induce a mental realization of earnings. We argue that by merely typing
“closed,” participants do not perceive the difference between realized and
unrealized outcomes and do not derive disutility from the realization of a
loss (Barberis and Xiong, 2012). Since the realization is unrecognized, the
mental account remains open, and the opportunity to break even by taking
more risk persists. The investment pattern of participants in the realization
treatment is consistent with this reasoning. The mechanism might rather
emphasize the existence of a loss and stimulate more risk taking.
Further evidence for the assumption that participants did not perceive the
electronic transfer of money between accounts as a realization might come
from the gain domain. Panel B of Table A.1 summarizes the investments for
participants who have a gain by the end of round three. Indeed, we neither
find a realization effect for gains. Participants do not take less risk after a re-
alized gain compared to a paper gain, but rather the opposite (DiD = −1.67,
t(152) = 1.38, p = 0.17). As for losses, participants tend to take more risk
after a realized gain than before a realized gain (1.50, t(64) = 1.81, p = 0.07).
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Again this is inconsistent with a realization effect but consistent with the as-
sumption that participants in the realization treatment did not part with the
money they gained.
In the remaining part, we show the results of the “Realization (Round 1
framing)” treatment. To remind the reader, we only change the label of the
final round in the realization treatment from “Additional Round” to “Round
1”. The change in framing is implemented to exactly align this version with
the original design of the online study by Imas (2016). Consistent with the re-
alization effect, participants now tend to take less risk after a gain and a loss
in the realization treatment when using the proposed change in framing (see
Table A.1). In the slightly altered version, we thus successfully replicate the
online study by Imas (2016). One possible reason is that the altered framing
of the final round strengthens the triggered process of closing the respective
mental account. The “Round 1” frame makes the beginning of a new invest-
ment episode clearer to participants, while the “Additional Round” frame
might rather give participants the impression that they still have the chance
to recover from the previous loss as they are offered an additional lottery.
This would imply a continuation of the investment episode rather than an
end.
We conclude that the realization effect is sensitive to the realization mech-
anism if money is not physically transferred. Presumably, participants in the
realization treatment of the online experiment do not part with the money in
the same way as those participants in the experiments with physical trans-
fer do. Therefore, the realization effect becomes vulnerable to circumstantial
effects such as framing. Future research could follow up on potential other
effects that may be interrelated with the realization effect.
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Table A.1: Risk-Taking in the Online Experiment
Panel A: Risk taking after losses
Invested amount Change
Treatment Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 R4−R3 N
Paper 12.03 9.30 10.07 10.51 0.44 104
(0.64)
Realization 13.06 10.78 11.32 13.24 1.92 95
(2.29)
Realization (Round 1 framing) 12.54 9.89 14.97 12.51 −2.46 37
(2.51)
Difference −1.03 −1.48 −1.25 −2.73 −1.48
(0.84) (1.20) (1.00) (2.00) (1.37)
Difference (Round 1 framing) −0.51 −0.59 −4.91 −2.00 2.90
(0.32) (0.37) (3.04) (1.14) (2.23)
Panel B: Risk taking after gains
Invested amount Change
Treatment Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 R4−R3 N
Paper 17.64 14.79 13.41 13.24 −0.17 70
(0.19)
Realization 15.87 13.38 13.39 14.89 1.50 84
(1.81)
Realization (Round 1 framing) 11.74 10.94 11.61 10.45 −1.16 31
(0.81)
Difference 1.77 1.40 0.02 −1.65 −1.67
(1.28) (0.93) (0.01) (1.05) (1.38)
Difference (Round 1 framing) 5.90 3.85 1.80 2.79 0.99
(3.17) (1.96) (0.91) (1.35) (0.60)
Note: The table shows the average invested amounts in the lottery for all rounds of experi-
ment 4 (in Cent). Panel A is restricted to participants who have a loss by the end of round
three, Panel B shows averages for all participants who have a gain by the end of round three.
Both panels show results by treatment (paper, realization and realization round 1 framing)
and differences between treatments. In this experiment the realization is a non-physical
transfer of money. Participants in the realization treatment had to type the word "closed" in
a respective window after round 3 to realize their earnings. In the realization round 1 fram-
ing treatment, the final round was named "Round 1" instead of "Additional Round". Change
is the difference between the investment in the final round and round three. N provides the
number of participants for each treatment-outcome combination. T-values of a two-sided
t-test are shown in parentheses.
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The Portfolio Composition Effect
B.1 Experiment Instructions
In this section we present the experiment instructions. First, the instructions
of Experiment 1 are shown and then the instructions of Experiment 3. The
instructions of Experiment 2 are similar to the instructions of Experiment 3.
Experiment 1
Dear participant,
You participate in an experiment on decision making which is part of a re-
search study at the University of Mannheim.
In the following you will be presented with the performance of two portfo-
lios of stocks. Each portfolio consists of ten different stocks. Please imagine
that you bought the respective stocks one month ago. You invested equal
amounts of money in each stock. Now you observe the performance of the
stocks in each of your portfolios.
Please take your time and ask yourself how you would feel when observing
the performance. There are two pairs of portfolios. It is possible that the
second pair of portfolios is shown to you before the first pair of portfolios.
Overall, this study will take 3-5 minutes. You will be compensated $0.50 for
the successful completion of this HIT on MTurk.
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Experiment 3
Dear participant,
You participate in an experiment on decision making which is part of a re-
search study at the University of Mannheim. Please read all instructions care-
fully. Your payment depends on your decisions. Overall this study will take
approximately 10 minutes.
In the following you will be presented with the performance of two portfolios
of stocks (Portfolio X and Portfolio Y). Each portfolio consists of ten different
stocks. Please imagine that you have bought the respective stocks in period 0
(t = 0). To be precise, you have invested 10,000 ECU (experimental currency
unit) in Portfolio X and 10,000 ECU in Portfolio Y in period 0. Within each
portfolio, you have invested equal amounts in each stock (i.e. 1,000 ECU in
each stock). More about the exchange rate between ECU and $ is described
at the end of the instructions.
Today, you are in period 30 (see graph below) and you observe the per-
formance of your portfolios. In particular, you will see how each stock in
each of your portfolios has performed over 30 periods (block 1). Before you
make any further decision, both portfolios will be rebalanced (the weight
of each stock will be reset to 1/10). Then, at the beginning of block 2, you
will be asked to make a return forecast for each portfolio and an investment
decision for the next 30 periods. Importantly, while the weights of the stocks
are reset between the blocks, the stocks themselves in your portfolios remain
the same.
How do stock prices change over time?
Each period, the price of a stock can either increase by z or decrease by -z (z is
supposed to be a variable that takes an absolute value). How likely it is that
a stock price increases or decreases depends on its type. There are two types:
A stock can be a good stock or a bad stock. If the stock is a good stock, the
probability that the price increases is 70% and the probability that the price
decreases is 30%. While, if the stock is a bad stock, the probability that the
price increases is 30% and the probability that the price decreases is 70%.
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Figure B.1: Timeline of the Experiment
In the beginning (t = 0), you do not know whether a stock is a good or a bad
stock. As such, it is equally likely that a stock will be good or bad, i.e. the
probability is exactly 50%. The table gives an overview of the types of stocks
with the probability distributions.
Figure B.2: Probability Distribution of Stocks
Today, in period 30, you will observe 30 price changes for each stock. From
this information, you can learn whether a stock is more likely to be a good or
a bad stock. If you observe more increases in price than decreases, the stock
is more likely to be a good stock, while if you observe more decrease in price
than increases, the stock is more likely to be a bad stock.
Although, all stocks follow the same described rules, they differ in the mag-
nitude of price change z. For each stock, z (and consequently−z) is randomly
determined once and remains fixed over 60 periods. For example, the value
of z may be 6 for one stock (e.g. Stock U (+/−6)), such that this stock can
increase in price by 6 or decrease in price by−6. While for another stock (e.g.
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Stock W (+/−10)), the value of z may be 10, such that this stock can increase
in price by 10 or decrease in price by −10. Once again, how likely each out-
come is, depends on the type of stock (see table). Consequently, the expected
price change of a stock depends on its type (good or bad) and the magnitude
of price change. The expected price change is calculated as 0.7z− 0.3z = 0.4z
if you believe the stock is good or 0.3z− 0.7z = −0.4z if you believe the stock
is bad.
Comfortably, the computer will do the calculations for you. Once you are
asked to make a return forecast, the computer will support you by doing the
calculations. However, one thing you need to do by yourself, is to decide
whether the stock is more likely to be a "good" or a "bad" stock.
In addition to the portfolio return forecast, you will make an investment
decision in period 30. You will be asked to allocate "fresh" money between
Portfolio X and Portfolio Y for the investment horizon of 30 periods (between
period 30 and period 60). This investment decision will be payoff-relevant.
Your payment:
You will be paid according to your performance which will be based on your
investment decision. For the investment decision, you will be endowed
with 10,000 ECU which can increase or decrease in value depending on your
decision. This means that you will earn the proportion of the change in
portfolio value between period 30 and period 60 (block 2) given the amount
invested in each portfolio (e.g. assume, you invest x% in Portfolio Y which
has a total increase in value of 30, you will earn x% of 30). Changes in price
of 100 ECU correspond to $ 0.10 (e.g. a portfolio value increase of 150 units
corresponds to a 15 cent gain).
Depending on your investment decision, you can gain money which will be
added to your fixed payment of $ 1.00.
There is one last important information. We briefly want to make you fa-
miliar with the presentation format and then ask you some comprehension
questions.
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You can see an example of how the performance of the portfolios of stocks is
presented to you below. On the left hand side, you can see the performance
of Portfolio X and on the right hand side the performance of Portfolio Y. For
each stock, we show ...
• the size of the positive and negative return (z and −z) in parentheses
(e.g. Stock A (+/−4),
• the number of days with a positive return and the number of days with
a negative return,
• and the total value change of the respective stock over 30 periods.
The total value change of each stock can easily be calculated by summing up
the product of z times the number of positive return days and −z times the
number of negative return days.
On the following page, we will ask you some comprehension questions.
Figure B.3: Display Format of the Portfolios of Stocks
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Comprehension Questions
Below we report the comprehension questions that participants had to an-
swer correctly after reading the instructions to proceed to the Bayesian Up-
dating task. Correct responses are displayed in italic.
1. Imagine you observe the following performance of Stock A (+/−4) in
period 30: Number of positive return days = 18, number of negative
return days = 12. Please evaluate whether Stock A is more likely to be
a good or a bad type.
(a) Good type
(b) Bad type
2. What is the expected return of Stock A (+/−4) for the next period given
the following performance in period 30: Number of positive return
days = 18, number of negative return days = 12? The computer will
do the calculation in the investment task. However, we kindly ask you
to do it on your own in this question such that you understand what












3. Please evaluate the statement: Stock A (+/−4) can only make a return
of +4 or −4 per period.
(a) True
(b) False
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B.2 Screenshots of the Experiments
In this section, we display screenshots of the experiments. Figure B.4 to Fig-
ure B.7 present screenshots of Experiment 1 and Figure B.8 to Figure B.11
show screenshots of Experiment 3.
Figure B.4: Screen with Satisfaction Question
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Figure B.5: Screen with Investment Task
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Figure B.6: Screen with Confidence Question
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Figure B.7: Screen with Return Expectations and Risk Perception Question
B.2. Screenshots of the Experiments XLI
Figure B.8: Screen with Assessment of Stock Type
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Figure B.9: Screen with Return Expectations and Volatility
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Figure B.10: Screen with Risk Perception Question
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Figure B.11: Screen with Investment Task
B.3. Portfolio Expected Return and Standard Deviation XLV
B.3 Portfolio Expected Return and Standard Devi-
ation
Portfolios in Experiment 2 and 3 are designed such that (i) the expected port-
folio return and (ii) the standard deviation of portfolio returns are identical.


















The expected return and the standard deviation of individual stocks are cal-
culated based on these formulas:
µi = piXi + (1− pi)(−Xi) (B.3)
σ2i = pi(Xi − µ)2 + (1− pi)(Xi − µ)2 (B.4)
Table B.1 show the values for the two portfolios in Experiment 3.
Figure B.12: Portfolio Standard Deviation
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The highest Sharpe ratio is achieved by investing 50% in Portfolio GW and
50% in Portfolio GL.
Table B.1: Portfolio Expected Return and Standard Deviation
Portfolio GW
Stock High Low P (High P (Low E(Return) Std. Dev. Weight
Return Return Return) Return)
A 4 -4 0.7 0.3 1.60 5.97 0.1
B 10 -10 0.7 0.3 4.00 14.88 0.1
C 6 -6 0.3 0.7 -2.40 5.90 0.1
D 7 -7 0.3 0.7 -2.80 6.87 0.1
E 2 -2 0.7 0.3 0.80 3.02 0.1
F 5 -5 0.7 0.3 2.00 7.46 0.1
G 2 -2 0.7 0.3 0.80 3.02 0.1
H 9 -9 0.3 0.7 -3.60 8.80 0.1
I 6 -6 0.7 0.3 2.40 8.94 0.1
J 3 -3 0.7 0.3 1.20 4.50 0.1
Portfolio 4.0 24.30
Portfolio GL
Stock High Low P (High P (Low E(Return) Std. Dev. Weight
Return Return Return) Return)
K 2 -2 0.3 0.7 -0.80 2.12 0.1
L 3 -3 0.3 0.7 -1.20 3.04 0.1
M 2 -2 0.3 0.7 -0.80 2.12 0.1
N 8 -8 0.7 0.3 3.20 11.91 0.1
O 5 -5 0.3 0.7 -2.00 4.94 0.1
P 6 -6 0.7 0.3 2.40 8.94 0.1
Q 1 -1 0.3 0.7 -0.40 1.28 0.1
R 2 -2 0.3 0.7 -0.80 2.12 0.1
S 12 -12 0.7 0.3 4.80 17.86 0.1
T 1 -1 0.3 0.7 -0.40 1.28 0.1
Portfolio 4.0 24.30
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B.4 Additional Analyses
This section presents results of further analyses.
Figure B.13: Risk Perception in Experiment 2 (Baseline Treatments)
Note: The figure shows participants’ mean risk perception for each portfolio elicited on a
Likert scale from 1: low to 7: high for the two portfolio pairs GpWS − GpLS and LpWS −
LpLS. The blue bars refer to Portfolio X which corresponds to the first two letters of each
portfolio pair (e.g. GpWS for the first portfolio pair) and the red bars refer to Portfolio Y
which corresponds to the second two letters of each portfolio pair (e.g. GpLS for the first
portfolio pair). Displayed are 95%confidence intervals.
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Figure B.14: Risk Perception in Experiment 3
Note: The figure shows participants’ mean risk perception for each portfolio elicited on a
Likert scale from 1: low to 7: high for the portfolio pair GpWS − GpLS. The blue bar refers
to Portfolio X which corresponds to the first two letters of the portfolio pair (e.g. GpWS
for the first portfolio pair) and the red bar refers to Portfolio Y which corresponds to the
second two letters of the portfolio pair (e.g. GpLS for the first portfolio pair). Displayed are
95%confidence intervals.
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Figure B.15: Risk Perception in Experiment 3 Conditional on Expected
Returns
Note: The figure shows participants’ mean risk perception for each portfolio elicited on a
Likert scale from 1: low to 7: high for the portfolio pair GpWS − GpLS. The blue bar refers
to Portfolio X which corresponds to the first two letters of the portfolio pair (e.g. GpWS for
the first portfolio pair) and the red bar refers to Portfolio Y which corresponds to the second
two letters of the portfolio pair (e.g. GpLS for the first portfolio pair). Displayed are 95%
confidence intervals.
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Figure B.16: Satisfaction in Experiment 1 (Additional Treatments)
Note: The figure shows participants’ mean satisfaction levels for each portfolio elicited on a
Likert scale from 1: low to 7: high for the four portfolio pairs GpWS− LpWS and GpLS− LpLS
(Panel A) and GpWS − LpLS and GpLS − LpWS (Panel B). The blue bars refer to Portfolio X
which corresponds to the first two letters of each portfolio pair (e.g. GL for the first portfolio
pair) and the red bars refer to Portfolio Y which corresponds to the second two letters of each
portfolio pair (e.g. LL for the first portfolio pair). Displayed are 95%-confidence intervals.
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Figure B.17: Return Expectations in Experiment 1 (Additional Treatments)
Note: The figure shows participants’ mean expected returns for each portfolio for the four
portfolio pairs GpWS − LpWS and GpLS − LpLS (Panel A) and GpWS − LpLS and GpLS −
LpWS (Panel B). The blue bars refer to Portfolio X which corresponds to the first two letters
of each portfolio pair (e.g. GL for the first portfolio pair) and the red bars refer to Portfolio
Y which corresponds to the second two letters of each portfolio pair (e.g. LL for the first
portfolio pair). Displayed are 95%-confidence intervals.
LII Appendix B. The Portfolio Composition Effect
Figure B.18: Risk Perception in Experiment 1 (Additional Treatments)
Note: The figure shows participants’ mean risk perception for each portfolio elicited on a
Likert scale from 1: low to 7: high for the four portfolio pairs GpWS− LpWS and GpLS− LpLS
(Panel A) and GpWS − LpLS and GpLS − LpWS (Panel B). The blue bars refer to Portfolio X
which corresponds to the first two letters of each portfolio pair (e.g. GL for the first portfolio
pair) and the red bars refer to Portfolio Y which corresponds to the second two letters of each
portfolio pair (e.g. LL for the first portfolio pair). Displayed are 95%-confidence intervals.
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Figure B.19: Investment in Experiment 2 (Additional Treatments)
Note: The figure shows participants’ mean investments in US dollar in each portfolio for
the four portfolio pairs GpWS − LpWS and GpLS − LpLS (Panel A) and GpWS − LpLS and
GpLS − LpWS (Panel B). The blue bars refer to Portfolio X which corresponds to the first two
letters of each portfolio pair (e.g. GpWS for the first portfolio pair) and the red bars refer to
Portfolio Y which corresponds to the second two letters of each portfolio pair (e.g. LpWS for
the first portfolio pair). Displayed are 95%confidence intervals.
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Figure B.20: Investment in Experiment 2 Conditional on Return
Expectations (Additional Treatments)
Note: The figure shows participants’ mean investments in US dollar in each portfolio of
those participants who state the same expected returns for the two portfolios of a pair. The
portfolio pairs are GpWS − LpWS and GpLS − LpLS (Panel A) and GpWS − LpLS and GpLS −
Lp (Panel B). The blue bars refer to Portfolio X which corresponds to the first two letters of
each portfolio pair (e.g. GW for the first portfolio pair) and the red bars refer to Portfolio
Y which corresponds to the second two letters of each portfolio pair (e.g. LW for the first
portfolio pair). Displayed are 95%-confidence intervals.
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Figure B.21: Risk Perception in Experiment 2 (Additional Treatments)
Note: The figure shows participants’ mean risk perception for each portfolio elicited on a
Likert scale from 1: low to 7: high for the four portfolio pairs GpWS− LpWS and GpLS− LpLS
(Panel A) and GpWS − LpLS and GpLS − LpWS (Panel B). The blue bars refer to Portfolio X
which corresponds to the first two letters of each portfolio pair (e.g. GL for the first portfolio
pair) and the red bars refer to Portfolio Y which corresponds to the second two letters of each
portfolio pair (e.g. LL for the first portfolio pair). Displayed are 95%-confidence intervals.
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Table B.2: Satisfaction with Portfolios in Experiment 1
Dependent Variable Satisfaction
Entire Portfolio Portfolio Entire
sample return return not sample
displayed displayed
Gain 1.860*** 2.455*** 1.264*** 1.264***
(0.103) (0.142) (0.139) (0.139)
Winner 0.645*** 0.446*** 0.843*** 0.843***
(0.0996) (0.141) (0.140) (0.140)
Gain x Winner 0.264** 0.0950 0.434** 0.434**
(0.124) (0.170) (0.172) (0.171)
Display −0.124
(0.156)
Display x Gain 1.190***
(0.199)
Display x Winner −0.397**
(0.199)
Display x Gain x Winner −0.339
(0.241)
Constant 2.751*** 2.653*** 2.777*** 2.777***
(0.0782) 0.112) (0.109) (0.109)
Observations 1,936 968 968 1,936
R2 0.318 0.408 0.263 0.345
Note: The table shows the coefficients of OLS regressions of satisfaction on a gain dummy
variable (1 if portfolio trades at a gain), a winner dummy variable (1 if portfolio has more
winner than loser assets), the interaction term of gain and winner, a display dummy variable
(1 if total portfolio return is displayed) and multiple interaction terms of the display, gain
and winner dummy variable. Regression (1) and (2) are run with data from experiment 1,
regression (3) and (4) are run with data from experiment 2. We cluster standard errors on
the individual investor level and on the portfolio pair level, standard errors are reported in
parentheses, and *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
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Table B.3: Risk Perception in Experiment 1
Dependent Variable Risk Perception
Entire Portfolio Portfolio Entire
sample return return not sample
displayed displayed
Gain −1.184*** −1.397*** −0.971*** −0.971***
(0.0870) (0.130) (0.114) (0.114)
Winner −0.386*** −0.256** −0.517*** −0.517***
(0.0766) (0.102) (0.114) (0.114)
Gain x Winner −0.355*** −0.314* −0.397** −0.397**
(0.117) (0.167) (0.163) (0.163)
Display 0.0537
(0.113)
Display x Gain −0.426**
(0.173)
Display x Winner 0.260*
(0.153)
Display x Gain x Winner 0.0826
(0.233)
Constant 5.676*** 5.702*** 5.649*** 5.649***
(0.0565) (0.0810) (0.0789) (0.0789)
Observations 1,936 968 968 1,936
R2 0.221 0.246 0.206 0.228
Note: The table shows the coefficients of OLS regressions of risk perception on a gain
dummy variable (1 if portfolio trades at a gain), a winner dummy variable (1 if portfolio has
more winner than loser assets), the interaction term of gain and winner, a display dummy
variable (1 if total portfolio return is displayed) and multiple interaction terms of the display,
gain and winner dummy variable. Regression (1) and (2) are run with data from experiment
1, regression (3) and (4) are run with data from experiment 2. We cluster standard errors on
the individual investor level and on the portfolio pair level, standard errors are reported in
parentheses, and *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
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Table B.4: Return Expectations in Experiment 1
Dependent Variable Return Expectations
Entire Portfolio Portfolio Entire
sample return return not sample
displayed displayed
Gain 7.068*** 8.926*** 5.188*** 5.188***
(1.086) (1.371) (1.685) (1.685)
Winner 2.654** 1.210 4.116** 4.116**
(1.098) (1.409) (1.677) (1.677)
Gain x Winner 0.142 −1.024 1.380 1.380
(1.359) (1.630) (2.180) (2.180)
Display −1.338
(1.827)
Display x Gain 3.738*
(2.172)
Display x Winner −2.906
(2.190)
Display x Gain x Winner −2.404
(2.721)
Constant 1.000 0.333 1.671 1.671
(0.913) (1.203) (1.375) (1.375)
Observations 1,533 744 759 1,533
R2 0.055 0.088 0.044 0.063
Note: The table shows the coefficients of OLS regressions of return expectations on a gain
dummy variable (1 if portfolio trades at a gain), a winner dummy variable (1 if portfolio has
more winner than loser assets), the interaction term of gain and winner, a display dummy
variable (1 if total portfolio return is displayed) and multiple interaction terms of the display,
gain and winner dummy variable. Regression (1) and (2) are run with data from experiment
1, regression (3) and (4) are run with data from experiment 2. We cluster standard errors on
the individual investor level and on the portfolio pair level, standard errors are reported in





Belief Formation and Risk-Taking
in Boom and Bust Markets
C.1 Further Analyses
In this section we present results of further analyses.
LX Appendix C. Why So Negative?
Table C.1: Pessimism Bias Split by Forecasting Quality
Dependent Variable Probability Estimate (Subjective Posterior)
Pooled Data Domain-specific Mixed
Above Below Above Below Above Below
Median Median Median Median Median Median
Bust -4.529*** -6.813*** -4.261*** -7.247*** -4.997*** -5.661***
(-6.13) (-4.54) (-3.72) (-3.11) (-5.18) (-2.86)
Objective Posterior 0.671*** 0.133*** 0.641*** 0.165*** 0.693*** 0.107***
(48.14) (7.46) (34.13) (6.33) (35.46) (4.37)
Constant 20.92*** 58.92*** 14.88*** 66.86*** 27.49*** 50.78***
(6.75) (9.62) (3.22) (6.82) (6.38) (6.60)
Observations 6032 6016 2704 2896 3328 3120
R2 0.69 0.10 0.68 0.08 0.70 0.12
Note: This table reports the results of three OLS regressions on how subjective posterior
beliefs about the distribution of the lottery depend on the treatment split by above and below
median forecasting ability as defined in the text. We report the results of OLS regressions
for the whole sample, and for each experiment individually (Experiment 1: Domain-specific;
Experiment 2: Mixed). The dependent variable Probability Estimate is the subjective posterior
belief that the asset is paying from the good distribution. Independent variables include the
Bust dummy, an indicator variable that equals 1 if participants were in the bust treatment
and zero otherwise, as well as Objective Posterior, which is the correct Bayesian probability
that the stock is good, given the information seen by the participant up to trial t in the
learning block. Controls include age, gender, statistical skills, self-reported experience in
stock trading, whether subjects were invested in the stock market during the last financial
crisis, and the order of outcomes they experienced in the forecasting task. Reported are
coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) using robust standard errors. *, **, *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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C.2 Experimental Instructions and Screenshots
Instructions Bayesian Updating (Exemplary for Boom Treat-
ment of Experiment 1)
In this part, we would like to test your forecasting abilities. You will make
forecasting decisions in two consecutive blocks each consisting of 8 rounds.
Suppose you find yourself in an environment, in which the value of a risky
asset can either increase by 2 or by 15. The probability of either outcome (2
or 15) depends on the state in which the asset is (good state or bad state). If
the risky asset is in the good state, then the probability that the risky asset
increases in value by 15 is 70% and the probability that it increases in value
by 2 is 30%. If the risky asset is in the bad state, then the probability that the
risky asset increases in value by 15 is 30% and the probability that it increases
in value by 2 is 70%.
The computer determines the state at the beginning of each block (consisting
of 8 rounds). Within a block, the state does not change and remains fixed. At
the beginning of each block, you do not know which state the risky asset is
in. The risky asset may be in the good state or in the bad state with equal
probability.
At the beginning of each round, you will observe the payoff of the risky asset
(2 or 15). After that, we will ask you to provide a probability estimate that
the risky asset is in the good state and ask you how sure you are about your
probability estimate. While answering these questions, you can observe the
price development in a chart next to the question.
There is always an objective correct probability that the risky asset is in the
good state. This probability depends on the history of payoffs of the risky
asset already. As you observe the payoffs of the risky asset, you will update
your beliefs whether or not the risky asset is in the good state.
Every time you provide us with a probability estimate that is within 5% of
the correct value (e.g., correct probability is 70% and your answer is between
65% and 75%) we will add 10 Cents to your payment.
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Objective Bayesian Posterior Probabilities
This table provides all possible values for the objectively correct probability
that the asset is in the good state for every possible combination of trials and
outcomes. The initial prior for good and bad distribution is set to 50%. The
objective Bayesian posterior probability that the asset is in the good state,





where p is the initial prior before any outcome is observed that the stock is in
the good state (50% here), and q is the probability that the value increase of
the asset is the higher one (70% here).
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C.2. Experimental Instructions and Screenshots LXIII
Screenshots of Experiment 1
Figures C.1 to C.3 present the screens of the forecasting task as seen by sub-
jects in the experiment (example block 1, round 5). One round consists of
three sequential screens. First, subjects saw the payoff of the risky asset in
the respective round. Second, the cumulated payoffs of the risky asset are
shown in a price-line-chart and subjects are asked to provide a probability
estimate that the risky asset pays from the good distribution. Finally, subjects
are asked on a 9-point Likert scale how confident they are in their probability
estimate.
Figure C.1: Payoff Screen
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Figure C.2: Probability Estimate Screen
C.2. Experimental Instructions and Screenshots LXV
Figure C.3: Confidence Level Screen
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C.3 Experimental Measures
Risky Lottery
Imagine in the stock market there is a risky asset, in which you can invest
100 Cent now. The asset pays you either 2.5 times the amount you invest or
it becomes valueless, i.e. your invested amount is lost. The probability of
either outcome is exactly 50%.
You can keep whatever amount you decide not to invest in the risky asset.
How much of your endowment do you want to invest in the risky asset?
[Dropdown Menu of all possible combinations in 5 Cent steps]
C.3. Experimental Measures LXVII
Ambiguous Lottery
Imagine in the stock market there is a risky asset, in which you can invest
100 Cent now. The asset pays you either 2.5 times the amount you invest
or it becomes valueless, i.e. your invested amount is lost. However, the
probability of either outcome is unknown.
You can keep whatever amount you decide not to invest in the risky asset.
How much of your endowment do you want to invest in the risky asset?
[Dropdown Menu of all possible combinations in 5 Cent steps]
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Life Orientation Test
Below we report the questions used in the revised version of the Life Orienta-
tion Test developed by Scheier et al. (1994). All questions were answered on a
5-point Likert scale from "do not agree at all" to "fully agree". Reverse-coded
items are indicated by [R]. Filler-items are indicated by [F]. The non-filler
items were added to a final score.
1. In uncertain times, I usually expect the best.
2. It’s easy for me to relax. [F]
3. If something can go wrong, it will. [R]
4. I’m always optimistic about my future.
5. I enjoy my friends a lot. [F]
6. It’s important for me to keep busy. [F]
7. I hardly ever expect things to go my way. [R]
8. I don’t get upset too easily. [F]
9. I rarely count on good things happening to me. [R]
10. Overall, I expect more good things to happen to me than bad.
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Comprehension Questions for Bayesian Updating Task
Below we report the comprehension questions that participants had to an-
swer correctly after reading the instructions to proceed to the Bayesian Up-
dating task. Correct responses are displayed in italic.
1. If you see a series of +15 [−2 for Bust treatment], what is more likely?
(a) The risky asset is in the good state.
(b) The risky asset is in the bad state.
2. The correct probability estimate is let’s say 0.70. Which probability esti-
mate(s) would be in the range such that you earn 10 cents? [Note: You






3. At the beginning of each block, the probability that the risky asset is in
the good state is 50%.
(a) True
(b) False
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Dow Jones Return Expectations Question in Experiment 1
The Dow Jones Industrial Average (Stock Market Index of the 30 largest US
companies) is currently trading at around 25,343.
In which price range would you expect this index to trade in 6 months from
now? [Dropdown]
• < 23,000
• 23,000 - 23,500
• 23,501 - 24,000
• 24,001 - 24,500
• 24,501 - 25,000
• 25,001 - 25,500
• 25,501 - 26,000
• 26,001 - 26,500
• 26,501 - 27,000
• 27,001 - 27,500
• 27,501 - 28,000
• > 28,000
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Dow Jones Return Expectations Question in Experiment 2
The Dow Jones Industrial Average (Stock Market Index of the 30 largest US
companies) is currently trading at around 26,770.
In which price range would you expect this index to trade in 6 months from
now? [Dropdown]
• < 24,500
• 23,000 - 23,500
• 24,500 - 25,000
• 25,001 - 25,500
• 25,501 - 26,000
• 26,001 - 26,500
• 26,501 - 27,000
• 27,001 - 27,500
• 27,501 - 28,000
• 28,001 - 28,500
• 28,501 - 29,000





Can Agents Add and Subtract
When Forming Beliefs?
D.1 Experimental Instructions and Screenshots
Instructions Bayesian Updating (Exemplary for Experiment 1)
In this part we would like to test your forecasting abilities. You will make
forecasting decisions in one block consisting of 6 rounds.
Suppose you find yourself in an environment, in which a risky asset with an
initial value of 50 can either increase by 5 or decrease by 5. The probability
of either outcome (5 or −5) depends on the state in which the asset is (good
state or bad state). If the risky asset is in the good state, then the probability
that the risky asset increases in value by 5 is 70% and the probability that
it decreases in value by 5 is 30%. If the risky asset is in the bad state, then
the probability that the risky asset increases in value by 5 is 30% and the
probability that it decreases in value by 5 is 70%.
The computer determines the state at the beginning of the block (consisting
of 6 rounds). Within a block, the state does not change and remains fixed.
At the beginning of the block, you do not know which state the risky asset
is in. The risky asset may be in the good state or in the bad state with equal
probability.
At the beginning of each round, you will observe the payoff of the risky asset
(5 or −5). After that, we will ask you to provide a probability estimate that
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the risky asset is in the good state and ask you how sure you are about your
probability estimate. While answering these questions, you can observe the
price development in a chart next to the question.
There is always an objective correct probability that the risky asset is in the
good state. This probability depends on the history of payoffs of the risky
asset already. As you observe the payoffs of the risky asset, you will update
your beliefs whether or not the risky asset is in the good state.
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Objective Bayesian Posterior Probabilities
This table provides all possible values for the objectively correct probability
that the asset is in the good state for every possible combination of trials and
outcomes. The initial prior for good and bad distribution is set to 50%. The
objective Bayesian posterior probability that the asset is in the good state,
after observing t high outcomes in n trials so far is given by:
1




where p is the initial prior before any outcome is observed that the stock is in
the good state (50% here), and q is the probability that the value increase of
the asset is the higher one (70% in Experiment 1 & 3, and 60% in Experiment
2).
Experiment 1 and 3 (q = 70%) Experiment 2 (q = 60 %)
n (number of t (number of Probability [stock is good Probability [stock is good
trials so far) high outcomes so far) t high outcomes in n trials] t high outcomes in n trials]
0 0 50.00% 50.00%
1 0 30.00% 40.00%
1 1 70.00% 60.00%
2 0 15.52% 30.77%
2 1 50.00% 50.00%
2 2 84.48% 69.23%
3 0 7.30% 22.86%
3 1 30.00% 40.00%
3 2 70.00% 60.00%
3 3 92.70% 77.14%
4 0 3.26% 16.49%
4 1 15.52% 30.77%
4 2 50.00% 50.00%
4 3 84.48% 69.23%
4 4 96.74% 83.51%
5 0 1.43% 11.64%
5 1 7.30% 22.86%
5 2 30.00% 40.00%
5 3 70.00% 60.00%
5 4 92.70% 77.14%
5 5 98.57% 88.36%
6 0 0.62% 8.7%
6 1 3.26% 16.49%
6 2 15.52% 30.77%
6 3 50.00% 50.00%
6 4 84.48% 69.23%
6 5 96.74% 83.51%
6 6 99.38% 91.93%
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Screenshots of Experiment 1
Figures D.1 to D.3 present the screens of the forecasting task as seen by sub-
jects in the experiment (example round 4). One round consists of three se-
quential screens. First, subjects saw the payoff of the risky asset in the respec-
tive round. Second, the cumulated payoffs of the risky asset are shown in a
price-line-chart and subjects are asked to provide a probability estimate that
the risky asset pays from the good distribution. Finally, subjects are asked on
a 9-point Likert scale how confident they are in their probability estimate.
Figure D.1: Payoff Screen
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Figure D.2: Probability Estimate Screen
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Figure D.3: Confidence Level Screen
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Comprehension Questions for Bayesian Updating Task
Below we report the comprehension questions that participants had to an-
swer correctly after reading the instructions to proceed to the Bayesian Up-
dating task. Correct responses are displayed in italic.
1. If you see a series of −5, what is more likely?
(a) The risky asset is in the good state.
(b) The risky asset is in the bad state.
2. You observe a−5, how do you have to update your probability estimate
that the asset draws from the good distribution??
(a) I reduce the probability estimate that the asset is in the good distribution.
(b) In increase the probability estimate that the asset is in the good
distribution.
3. The correct probability estimate is let’s say 0.70. Which probability esti-
mate(s) would be in the range such that you earn 10 cents? [Note: You






4. At the beginning of each block, the probability that the risky asset is in
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